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Self-Defense and Subjectivity 
V.F. Nourset 
Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the 
most fundamental, and most ruinous, is the one that is set up be-
tween subjectivism and objectivism.1 
The law of self-defense has rarely produced as much academic or 
popular heat as it has in the past two decades. Widely publicized trials, 
such as the Goetz and Menendez cases,2 have generated deep-seated 
fears of a law unmoored from principle. Those fears have generated a 
standard public critique-that the criminal law has become too soft 
and subjective, too wedded to syndrome science and prone to weak-
kneed affection for defendants.3 The criminal law has lost its "objectiv-
ity," so the argument goes. The poster child, and even the alleged cause 
of this development, is the battered woman: 
In this Article, I present evidence that much of this public debate 
is misdirected: the charge of subjectivity and abuse, if not a deception, 
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. I want to thank the participants at 
faculty workshops at both the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan for engag-
ing with the ideas presented in early drafts of this paper. Special thanks to Juliet Brodie, Tom 
Green, Martha Ertman, Don Herzog, Dan Kahan, Jane Schacter, Stephen Schulhofer, and Cass 
Sunstein for asking the interesting and important questions. My research assistants worked val-
iantly and under pressure; they deserve enormous credit for the final product. My heartfelt ap-
preciation to Vanessa Tanaka, Daniel Fulkerson, and Roseann Kitson, for reading so many cases, 
and to Khanitta Tanawirattananit, for expert statistical assistance. 
1 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 25 {Stanford 1980). 
2 See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U Pitt 
L Rev 553,571-76 {1996) {discussing the controversy surrounding the trial of Lyle and Erik Me-
nendez). For a general discussion of the Goetz case, see George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-
Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial {Free Press 1988). 
3 See, for example, James Q. Wilson, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten 
Our Legal System? 62-66, 101-12 (Basic 1997) (urging that the criminal law has become too 
"subjective" and reflects undue sympathy toward disadvantaged "groups"). See also Donald 
Alexander Downs, More Than Victims: Battered Women, the Syndrome Society, and the Law 6-1 
{Chicago 1996) {decrying the development of a "syndrome" society); Alan M. Dershowitz, The 
Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-Outs, Sob Stories, and Evasions of Responsibility 18-19 (Little, 
Brown 1994) {decrying the increasing number of"abuse" excuses). 
4 See Wilson, Moral Judgment at 63 (cited in note 3) (arguing that battered woman claims 
are examples of the criminal law's unwarranted affection for "subjective" defenses); David L. 
Faigman and Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 Ariz L Rev 
67, 79 {1997) (arguing that "[t]he integrity of legal doctrine has suffered immensely" from the 
spread of syndrome evidence aimed at aiding battered women); Downs, More Than Victims at 3-
50 (cited in note 3) (arguing that battered woman syndrome claims have helped to nurture a 
"syndrome" society); Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 17, 25 (cited in note 3) (arguing that some 
battered woman claims may be classified as an abuse excuse). 
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is a diversion. The problem with the law of self-defense is neither new 
nor limited to the battered woman; it is as old and as persistent as the 
law's search for an objective meaning for necessity. Based on a survey 
of twenty years of self-defense cases,' I sought to "test" claims of ob-
jectivity by focusing on what purports to be one of the most objective 
of self-defense rules: the requirement that the threat must have been 
"imminent" for the defendant's response to have been permissible." 
Time is not something legal scholars generally study.' I chose to study 
imminence, however, because it seems the quintessential definition of 
"objectivity," the hard case. Perhaps more importantly, there is no 
more controversial element in the law of self-defense. As George 
Fletcher has put it: "The central debate in the theory of self-defense 
for the last decade has been whether we should maintain a strict re-
quirement of imminence."" 
My survey shows that the important question is not whether the 
law has become too soft or subjectified but what we mean by its objec-
tivity. The case law shows that imminence has many meanings; indeed, 
imminence often operates as a proxy for any number of other self-
defense factors- for example, strength of threat, retreat, proportional-
ity, and aggression. Perhaps more importantly, my survey shows that 
My survey includes all self-defense cases between 1979 and 1999 that discuss or note the 
issue of imminence as an issue at trial or on appeal. My focus is not on battered women, but self-
defense cases in general. Moreover, my empirical claim is only that the law's image of immi-
nence, to the extent it is tied to a particular factual pattern (defendants who wait to kill), is highly 
unlikely to be representative of self-defense claims. For an article focusing specifically on the 
battered woman cases, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Mis-
conceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U PaL Rev 379 (1991) (offering a different em-
pirically based study of self-defense). 
6 Self-defense law typically requires a showing of an "imminent" threat. Wayne R. LaFave, 
Criminal Law§ 5.7(d) at 495-96 (West 3d ed 2000) (describing the imminence requirement). On 
the "objectivity" of this requirement, see Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 561 (cited in note 2) 
("[l]mminence, necessity and proportionality-speak to the objective characteristics or• self-
defense claims.). 
7 There is one important exception to this in the criminal law: Mark Kelman's brilliant ar-
gument about "time framing," which may be found generally in Mark Kelman, Interpretive Con-
struction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan L Rev 591 (1981). His argument shows, I be-
lieve, that the meaning of time in the criminal law is incomplete. Here, my claim is that time's 
completeness and its coherence depend upon undeclared social norms about the relationships 
between the defendant and the victim and between the defendant and the state. 
8 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 567 (cited in note 2). Many assume that battered woman 
cases routinely fail the imminence requirement. See, for example, Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse 
of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am 
U L Rev 11,43 (1986) (stating that "[m]ost battered woman's defense cases involve situations in 
which the defendant was not, in fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her 
victim's hands"). See also note 30. There is reason to doubt this assumption. See Maguigan, 140 
U PaL Rev at 388-97 (cited in note 5) (presenting empirical evidence challenging this view). 
Much of the legal commentary on self-defense has focused on the imminence requirement. See, 
for example, Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556-58 (cited in note 2) (arguing that imminence is es-
sential to self-defense doctrine). 
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the conventional image of imminence may be incorrect. It is widely 
believed by scholars that the "problem" of imminence is one of too 
much time between the threat and the killing. If my survey is right, 
however, most judicial opinions raising imminence do not involve long 
periods of time between the threat and the killing. They are cases of 
weak threats and extended fights, cases in which the defendant is 
struggling with the victim, is faced with a gun, believes that the victim 
is advancing, or hears a stranger in the woods outside his home! This 
should confound traditional doctrinal understandings of the term 
"imminence" (which presume imminence as relevant only in noncon-
frontational "waiting" cases). Indeed, it presents strong evidence sup-
porting my hypothesis-that imminence carries undeclared meanings. 
This has important implications for both the law of self-defense 
as well as our image of the problem of battered women. The law of 
self-defense, if I am right, is far from as settled or coherent as it is as-
sumed to be; its meaning and theory remain, in my view, largely unre-
solved. What seems so objective-the status quo-turns out to be a 
good deal more complex and contingent than has been assumed. In-
deed, it is even possible that the law, through imminence, contradicts 
itself: for example, if imminence is really asking whether the defen-
dant had a means to escape the violence, it may function as a retreat 
rule in jurisdictions that do not require retreat.10 What is more inter-
esting is that this failure of objectivity- the potential for contradic-
tion- predicts the possibility of injustice in the battered woman cases. 
It turns out that the battered woman cases in my survey, like their 
male counterparts,'' raise imminence most often in confrontational 
situations, where the defendant kills when she sees a gun, where the 
victim is advancing, or during an actual brawl.'2 1f that is right, then the 
See, for example, Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 521 Pa 41,555 A2d 772,780 (1989) (de-
scribing claim in which defendant asserts that when she shot, the defendant was pointing a gun at 
her); State v Negrin, 37 Wash App 516, 681 P2d 1287, 1290 (1984) (describing claim in which 
defendant shoots into woods because he hears rustling in the bushes); Commonwealth v Watson, 
494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949,951 (1981) (describing claim in wl ;ch parties were struggling). 
10 Jurisdictions are divided on whether a legitimate c aim of self-defense requires that the 
defendant have "retreated" once the attack has begun. A majority of jurisdictions do not require 
retreat. See LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(f) at 497-99 (cited in note 6) (discussing the retreat 
rule). For a discussion of the history and importance of this issue, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret 
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413,429-35 (1999). 
11 This Article does not address at length the question of the battered woman who, in fact, 
does "wait" to kill. This is not an evasion, but simply a recognition that concentration on these 
cases may well have occluded more serious problems in the law of self-defense, both for battered 
women and for others. 
12 See, for example, State v Sallie, 81 Ohio St 3d 673,693 NE2d 267,270 (1998) (recounting 
defendant's testimony that the victim" attacked her and, as he was choking her, threatened to kill 
her," and she responded); Smith v State, 268 Ga 196,486 SE2d 819,821 (1997) (describing defen-
dant's claim that, during the fight, victim continued to hit and hold a metal can over her head just 
before she shot him): Commonwealth v Dillon, 528 Pa 417, 598 A2d 963, 965 (1991) 
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problem of the battered woman case may not be one of fact, but of 
law. We do not ask of the man in the barroom brawl that he leave the 
bar before the occurrence of an anticipated fight, but we do ask the 
battered woman threatened with a gun why she did not leave the rela-
tionship.13 If, when courts are saying "imminence," they import mean-
ings that demand retreat before the confrontation, they are applying a 
rule that the law itself disavows (for any defendant).14 And, if that is 
right, we need not subjectify the law for the disfavored; instead, we 
must deal with the potential for objective rules to contradict them-
selves, to perpetuate meanings that they disavow. 
This is not only an argument about the law of self-defense but 
also an argument of objective, yet constitutive, feminism15-an argu-
ment that uses traditional claims of objectivity to predict the ways in 
which the law embraces social meaning and thus constitutes gender 
inequity. We might have known from other disciplines, or even the his-
tory of the criminal law, that time "works," that it has meaning in the 
law of self-defense.lt should be no surprise, really, that if the objective 
rules have meaning, that they may absorb social meanings and that 
those meanings may incorporate assumptions about women's rela-
tionship to men. 
("[A)ppellant testified that the decedent ... grabbed her by the arm, pushed her, punched her 
and told her he was going to kill her just prior to her stabbing him."), affd in part, vacd in part as 
Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Super 297,634 A2d 614 {1993). 
13 See, for example, Stonehouse, 555 A2d at 783 (noting that the prosecutor "stressed to the 
jury in his closing argument that if appellant had truly been an innocent victim she could put an 
end to the relationship"), revg Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 358 Pa Super 270, 517 A2d 540,544 
{1986) (stating that "[t)he continued relationship between appellant and the victim further points 
to how unreasonable appellant's assertion of self-defense is. Appellant had ample time and op-
portunity to have the victim arrested."). The facts of the case are lengthy, but see Stonehouse, 555 
A2d at 780 ("As she leaned over the railing, appellant saw Welsh on the ground below aiming his 
gun at her. Believing that she heard a shot, appellant fired her gun twice."). 
14 Do not confuse this with a statement about the law of retreat-a minority of jurisdic-
tions demand that the defendant leave the scene of confrontation once it has begun. It has never 
been the law of self-defense, however, that a defendant who is being choked should be denied 
the defense because he was "in the wrong place" at the wrong time-whether in a violent town 
or bar or street comer, much less in the wrong home. See text accompanying notes 235-39 {dis-
cussing this principle at greater length). Moreover, courts have consistently disavowed the notion 
that "leaving the relationship" is the proper legal standard in battered woman cases. See text ac-
companying notes 223. 
15 My intellectual method here is, admittedly, not a method of engagement but of distance. 
I am attempting to "step back from our initial view" of the topic of self-defense and subjectivity 
and "form a new conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its object." 
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 4 {Oxford 1986). This is not a recommendation for all 
legal studies or an insult to the many wise and wonderful approaches that emphasize experien-
tial or multiple viewpoints. It is a means, self-consciously chosen, to challenge an orthodoxy by 
the very methods that it chooses and the only methods that it recognizes. At the same time, the 
argument I am making is, like much feminist scholarship, constitutive: it asks how law constitutes 
the relation of woman to others and to the state. 
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And yet we continue to argue about all this in terms that make 
the rules' absorption of social meanings very difficult to see. In self-
defense and elsewhere, the discourse of subjectivity and objectivity 
gives challengers only one way to disagree (special rules)/6 and then 
brands the argument as unfair and partial. Objectivity, alone, tells us 
nothing- it is radically incomplete without a specification of the ways 
the law incorporates and creates social meanings. " Without that con-
tent, the debate about subjectivity and self-defense becomes an empty 
exercise, a set of vague assertions of power and charges of lawlessness. 
Part I of this Article explains the legal issues of imminence and 
the law of self-defense as well as the construction of the legal debate 
as a question of subjectivity. Part II presents the results of my survey 
and its method. Part III argues that the so-called objectivity of con-
temporary doctrine is belied by its content; that doctrine we call "ob-
jective" leaves open many questions and risks the embrace of contra-
dictions. This Part traces these failures to a basic theoretical disagree-
ment about the meaning of necessity in the law of self-defense. Part 
IV argues that "subjectivity" cannot resolve these questions. It argues 
that even the apparently most subjective aspects of self-defense law-
such as battered woman syndrome-may rest on objective legal 
propositions. Finally, Part V questions whether a discourse of objectiv-
ity and subjectivity really helps us understand the criminal law, in self-
defense or the many other places it may be found.'8 I argue that if 
there is a problem with the law of criminal defenses today, it is not 
with syndromes or subjectivity, but with a criminal law that purports 
to be neutral and precise but remains full of contested meanings. 
I. THE MODERN CONSTRUCTION OF SELF-DEFENSE 
It is widely assumed today that the law of self-defense is quite 
settled and that the hornbook elements of a self -defense claim are 
well-established. As a general rule, a defendant makes out a claim of 
self-defense when he shows that he was confronted by a serious threat 
of bodily harm or death, the threat was imminent, and his response 
was both necessary and proportionate." This general principle is then 
16 See, for example, Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 554 (cited in note 2) (posing the question 
as "whether special rules should apply on behalf of women who kill those who have persistently 
battered them in the past"). 
17 See Nagel, View from Nowhere at 6 (cited in note 15) (arguing that objectivity "cannot 
by itself provide a complete picture of the world, or a complete stance toward it"). 
18 In its focus on objectivity and subjectivity, the law of self-defense is hardly unique. One 
can see similar debates on a variety of legal topics within the criminal law, including cases on 
provocation or negligence, or in other disciplines entirely. But, in the law of self-defense, it is 
thought that much hangs upon the distinction. Indeed, it is thought that the most controversial 
cases, although small in number, depend upon it. 
19 See LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(a)-(d) at 491-96 (cited in note 6). 
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qualified by two features that may bar some claims: if the defendant 
provoked the violence or was the "initial aggressor," he may lose his 
right to claim self-defense.w More controversially, in a substantial mi-
nority of jurisdictions, the defendant will lose a self -defense claim if he 
fails to retreat in circumstances where it was safe to do so." 
A. Time, Subjectivity, and Self-Defense 
If there is a debate within the criminal law academy about self-
defense today, it does not focus on the content of the doctrine. Instead, 
it focuses on whether the legal standard should be more "objective"22 
or "subjective."23 Conventional wisdom has it that the principal issue in 
self-defense cases is whether we should apply a rule that focuses on 
the particular defendant or one that imposes the standards of the 
"reasonable person."24 This apparent dichotomy has had an enormous 
influence on modern teaching and case law. In many a self-defense 
case, defendants argue that the jury instructions granted were too "ob-
jective," the State responds that they were "subjective" enough," and 
2o See id § 5.7(e) at 497. 
21 See id § 5.7(f) at 497-99. 
22 I use "objectivity" here in ways that are traditional in legal literature. For a thoughtful 
account, see George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 504-14 (Little, Brown 1978) (attempt-
ing to dispel prevailing "confusion [regarding] the notions of objectivity and subjectivity in the 
theory of liability"). I am not using this term in the relatively more disciplined sense used in phi-
losophical debate. For a general discussion, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 Phil & 
Pub Aff 283 (1991) (exploring the question of when killing in self-defense might be justified 
through a series of illustrative examples). See also Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Objec-
tivity: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson, 1 Buff Crim L Rev 537.538 (1998) (arguing "that a care-
ful analysis of Thomson's approach yields conclusions diametrically opposite to those which she 
claims"). 
23 The "subjectivity" to which I refer in this Article is that associated with its meaning in 
criminal law, not its meaning elsewhere (including feminism or postmodernism). For an example 
of the traditional criminal law distinction between subjectivity as "state of mind" versus objectiv-
ity as an external "judgment" of conduct. see Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and 
Bernhard Goetz, 89 Colum L Rev 1179. 1186-88 (1989) (reviewing Fletcher, A Crime of Self-
Defense (cited in note 2)). The precise nature of subjectivity is an interesting and difficult ques-
tion and one debated and discussed at length among feminists and others. See, for example, 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 Stan L Rev 703 (1982) (reviewing 
Ann Jones, Women Who Kill (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1980)). 
24 This is often reflected in case books and appellate opinions. See, for example, cases cited 
in notes 25 and 26. See also John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, and Guyora Binder, Criminal Law: 
Cases and Materials 630-38 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1996); Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schul-
hofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 801-26 (Aspen 6th ed 1995). 
25 See, for example. State v Bellino, 31 Conn App 385,625 A2d 1381, 1383-84 (1993) (not-
ing the defendant's argument that the trial court's jury instructions "regarding the subjective as-
pect of the self-defense inquiry" were erroneous; rejecting this argument on the ground that the 
jury must determine not only the "subjective" belief of the defendant but must also "determine 
whether that belief was reasonable"). 
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the court most often concludes that the standard requires both objec-
tivity and subjectivity.26 
This dichotomy between subjective and objective approaches has, 
in turn, come to shape our vision of the problems of self-defense law. 
In an attempt to generate discussion about the wisdom of a more or 
less subjective standard, casebooks routinely juxtapose a case involv-
ing a battered woman claiming a subjective rule with a case that 
pushes that rule to encompass a far less sympathetic defendant.27 The 
central image of the debate is often the sad tale of Judy Norman,28 or a 
case like hers, of a woman who killed her partner while asleep or 
hours after the last bout of violence. Often, the foil to this drama is the 
unpalatable racist, such as Bernhard Goetz, the subway vigilante.29 
Students who sympathize with the battered woman are questioned 
about whether they are prepared l:o defend a subjectified legal stan-
dard if they know that this will mean aid for those, such as Goetz, to 
whom they are generally unsympathetic. 
The debate over the "subjective" is often associated with an em-
pirical assumption about the nature of battered woman cases-that 
the facts don't quite measure up. In particular, the facts are thought 
not to "measure up" primarily because they fail to meet the legal doc-
trine's requirement for an imminent threat.'o Given this, it is not sur-
26 See, for example, id at 1384 ("It is settled that a jury's evaluation of a claim of self-
defense has both subjective and objective elements."). See also State v Walker, 136 Wash 2d 767, 
966 P2d 883, 886 (1998) ("With both subjective and objective aspects taken into account, the trial 
judge must determine whether the defendant produced any evidence to support his claimed 
good faith belief that deadly force was necessary and that this belief, viewed objectively, was rea-
sonable."). As Holly Maguigan notes, appellate courts sometimes obscure this dualism by using 
misleading terms for their own standards, using the term "subjective," for example, to describe a 
standard that is both subjective and objective, or using the term "objective" to describe a similar 
standard. Maguigan, 140 U PaL Rev at 410 (cited in note 5) (stating that "[t]he combined nature 
of the standard actually used by a majority of the states is sometimes obscured by the label a 
state's highest court has attached to it"). 
27 See, for example, Ronald N. Boyce and Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law and Procedure 
940-54 (Foundation 8th ed 1999) (contrasting a battered wife case with that of Bernhard Goetz); 
Kaplan, Weisberg, and Binder, Criminal Law at 609-36 (cited in note 24) (same); Phillip E. John-
son, Criminal Law: Cases, Materials, and Text 379-88 (West 5th ed 1995) (contrasting a battered 
wife case with a case in which the defendant killed his Asian neighbor, irrationally fearing a mar-
tial arts attack). 
28 Norman killed her husband while he was asleep, hours after the last bout, after enduring 
years of degrading abuse in which she was prostituted, deprived of food, made to sleep on the 
floor, and driven to attempt suicide. The North Carolina court denied a jury instruction based on 
self-defense. State v Norman, 324 NC 253, 378 SE2d 8, 9-10, 19 (1989). Legal scholarship has 
been at pains to try to grapple with Norman; entire symposia have been conducted on the theory 
that Norman's problem is the central problem of battered women and the law of self-defense. 
See, for example, Symposium, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal Per-
spectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U Pitt L Rev 461 (1996). 
29 For a general discussion of the Goetz case, see Fletcher, Crime of Self-Defense (cited in 
note 2). 
30 See, for example, David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
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prising that the legal concept of imminence has come to occupy a 
"central" place in the debate over the law and theory of self-defense." 
That debate, as currently envisioned, pits "objectivists," who argue that 
a strict imminence requirement is important to the law of self-
defense," against "subjectivists," who appear to argue that the law 
should be "loosened" for battered women." 
B. Time as Meaningful 
Much of this debate appears to proceed on the assumption that 
the meaning of the term "imminence" is self-evident. Treatises and law 
reviews tell us that "[t)he requirement of imminence means that the 
time for defense is now. The defender cannot wait any longer."34 Simi-
larly, force is "imminent" if it will occur "almost immediately,"35 "upon 
the instant," or "at once."36 "Legitimate self-defense must be neither 
too soon nor too late."1' Although the Model Penal Code sought to 
change this rule, and potentially soften it, by shifting the requirement 
from the threat (as "imminent") to the response (as "immediately 
necessary"),"" this approach has done little to change the basic assump-
tion that we are still talking about temporal matters. 
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VaL Rev 619,621 (1986) ("Frequently, however, a 
battered woman kills her mate after an attack has ended or at some time when, seemingly, no 
immediate threat is present."); Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 13 (cited in note 8) (noting that, often, 
"[d]espite the defendant's long-term victimization, she most likely would not have been killed or 
subjected to serious bodily injury on the occasion when she killed her abuser"). In fact, appellate 
judges have repeated these claims. See, for example. State v Koss, 49 Ohio St 3d 213, 551 NE2d 
970, 977 (1990) (Holmes concurring), quoting Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 43 (cited in note 8) 
("Most battered woman's defense cases involve situations in which the defendant was not, in 
fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her victim's hands."). 
31 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 567 (cited in note 2). 
32 See id at 561 (describing imminence as an objective characteristic of self-defense law). 
See also id at 554 (framing the question raised by feminists as whether "special rules" are neces-
sary to protect battered women). 
33 See LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(d) at 496 (cited in note 6) (discussing the conventional 
debate about imminence and battered woman syndrome, citing relevant authorities). 
34 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added). 
35 LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(d) at 495 (cited in note 6). Indeed, some of the most well-
known appellate decisions in this area have appeared to tum upon the difference between the 
terms "immediate" and "imminent." See, for example, People v Aris, 215 Cal App 3d 1178, 1187, 
264 Cal Rptr 167, 173 (1989) ("Defense counsel's objection was that the terms 'imminent' and 
'immediate' must be differentiated, defining immediate as 'something next in order, about to oc-
cur' and 'more happening right away' and defining imminent as 'more of a threatening and im-
pending ... and impending is something that might or is about to occur."'), overruled in part by 
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1 (1996). See also State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461, 
693 P2d 475, 478 (1985) ("Thus, the question is whether the instruction allows the jury to con-
sider 'all the evidence' or whether the use of the word 'immediate' rather than 'imminent' pre-
cludes the jury's consideration of the prior abuse."). 
36 Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 206 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1995). 
37 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2). 
38 MPC § 3.04 (ALI 1962). See Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses§ 131(c) at 78 
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There is reason to doubt the confidence with which the conven-
tional notion of imminence as "the now" is asserted, either as a gen-
eral matter or as a matter of criminal law. To students of other disci-
plines-philosophy, history, and even physicS39 - the notion that time 
has meaning is far from odd. Social scientists, for example, have shown 
us that different cultures have very different ideas of time,'" indeed, 
that different institutions and occupations create different "norms" of 
time." Scientists have explained that the meaning of time may depend 
upon our reference point and that space and time may be inevitably 
conjoined.42 Behavioral economists have shown that the sense of time 
and rewards may be crucial in assessing and predicting behavior:3 So-
cial theorists have explained that temporal frameworks give social 
practices "form," that time gives social practices their "direction and 
meaning."44 Philosophers have argued that the idea of the "now" is es-
sentially incomplete from an objective point of view.45 
Moreover, there is a very ancient tradition in which time carries 
meaning in the criminal law, in particular the law of murder and self-
defense. Although categories like imminence in self-defense and 
"cooling time" in provocation are principally nineteenth-century crea-
tions, time was essential to the early common law of murder, drawing 
the line between murder and manslaughter.46 The malice necessary for 
(West 1984) (explaining the MPC's preference for the "immediately necessary" language over 
"imminent" alternative, taken by "[m]any states"). 
39 For modern efforts in this regard, see generally Michael G. Flaherty, A Watched Pot: 
How We Experience Time (NYU 1999) (social and cultural perceptions of time); Philip Turetzky, 
Time (Routledge 1998) (history of the philosophy of time); Robert Levine, A Geography of Time 
(Basic 1997) (social psychologist's view of time); Barbara Adam, Time watch· The Social Analysis 
of Time (Polity 1995) (how individuals and culture address time). Einstein's relativity theory has, 
of course, put time into contention even in the sciences. 
40 For a general discussion, see Adam, Timewatch (cited in note 39); Levine, Geography of 
Time (cited in note 39); Flaherty, A Watched Pot (cited in note 39). 
41 See, for example, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein eta!, The Part-Time Paradox: Time Norms, Pro-
fessional Life, Family, and Gender (Routledge 1999) (analyzing a study of the experiences law-
yers in different types of practices have had with part-time work). 
42 For a general discussion, see Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity (Princeton 5th 
ed 1956). 
43 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1538-39 (1998) (arguing that criminals tend to calculate 
costs and benefits over time in deciding whether to commit criminal acts, though suggesting that 
the calculating rationality is bounded by "problems of self-control"). 
44 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice at 98 (cited in note 1). See id at 106 ("[T]ime derives its effi-
cacy from the state of the structure of relations within which it comes into play."). 
45 Nagel argues: 
There is no room in a fully objective description of the world for the identification of a par-
ticular time as the present .... Yet the fact that it is now the particular time that it is seems 
to be a fundamental truth which we cannot do without. The tenseless description of the 
temporal order is essentially incomplete, for it leaves out the passage of time. 
Nagel, View from Nowhere at 57 n 1 (cited in note 15). 
46 See, for example, Sir Matthew Hale: 
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unexcused homicide was taken to be a "settled anger (which requires 
some length of time )."47 By contrast, manslaughter was a killing upon a 
sudden affray or upon a sudden passion.48 Even today, this is still the 
line-a line conceived in time-that marks the difference between 
provoked homicide and first-degree murder in many jurisdictions. 
Time has particular historical importance not only for the law of 
murder but also for the law of self-defense. Indeed, temporality is cen-
tral to the common law distinction between excused and justified self-
defense. Blackstone•• imagined two classic self-defense situations-in 
one, the defendant prevented a felony and was justified; in the other, 
the defendant was in the midst of a fight and was merely excused.'" 
The upstanding citizen who sought to prevent a felony" was not only 
blameless but deserved commendation; 52 as an agent of the law, he was 
If A. and B. fall suddenly out, and they presently agree to fight in the field, and run and 
fetch their weapons, and go into the field and fight, and A. kills B. this is not murder but 
homicide [Hale defines homicide as something less than murder], for it is but a continuance 
of the sudden falling out, and the blood was never cooled, but if there were deliberation, as 
that they meet the next day,nay, tho it were the same day, if there were such a competent dis· 
tance of time, that in common presumption they had time of deliberation, then it is murder. 
Sir Matthew Hale, 1 The History of the Pleas of the Crown *453 (Professional1971) (emphasis 
added) (originally published 1680). 
47 R. v Oneby, 92 Eng Rep 465 (KB 1727) (Holt). 
48 See Hale, 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown at 449 (cited in note 46) ("Murder and 
manslaughter differ not in the kind or nature of the offense, but only in the degree, the former 
being the killing of a man of malice prepense, the latter upon a sudden provocation and falling 
out.") (emphasis added). 
49 William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *182-86 (Chicago 1979) 
(originally published 1769). My account here focuses on Blackstone, a principal influence in 
America, but its history is consistent with earlier English common law writers on the split theory 
of self-defense. See, for example, Hale, 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown at *491-95 (cited in 
note 46) (distinguishing between se defendendo and killings of felons). 
50 The justificatory form of self-defense law was called "prevention of a felony"; the excuse 
form was deemed a plea of "se defendendo." Scholars have known of this two-headed version of 
self-defense for some time but have differed on their interpretations of Blackstone, mostly con-
cerning the necessity of retreat. Beale, at the turn of the century, claimed that retreat should be 
applied to both excused and justified self-defense. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous 
Assault, 16 Harv L Rev 567,580-82 (1903). Perkins disputed this understanding (rightly in my 
view), arguing that retreat, in Blackstone's view, was limited only to those situations in which 
there was "fault" for entering the affray. Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-examined, 1 UCLA L 
Rev 133, 139-45 (1954). 
51 This was not the only version of "justified" self-defense; also justified were homicides 
that Blackstone dubbed as ones for the "advancement of public justice." See Blackstone, 4 Com-
mentaries at *178-82 (cited in note 49) (listing as "justified" homicides those committed by an 
executioner, those committed by an officer of the government, and those that involve "pre-
vention of any forcible and atrocious crime" by a private party); id at *183-84: 
Homicide in self-defence, or se defendendo, upon a sudden affray, is also excusable rather 
than justifiable, by the English law. This species of self-defence must be distinguished from 
that just now mentioned, as calculated to hinder the perpetration of a capital crime; which 
is not only a matter of excuse, but of justification. 
52 For this reason, Blackstone would go so far as to say that one who killed to prevent a 
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unbound by special rules about "sudden" affrays, or retreating to the 
walC Not so the brawler whose claim was one of culpable necessity.54 
The brawler needed to show that he killed for the right motives and 
without offense to legal authority, to negate his partial responsibility 
for entering into mutual combat.55 Suddenness featured prominently in 
that calculus. 56 The sudden affray excused the brawler's failure to seek 
"recourse to the proper tribunals,"57 suggested that he had not killed 
out of a "previous malice and concerted design,"58 and confirmed that 
felony, to thwart a robbery or a burglary or even an unjustified attack, was "in no kind of fault 
whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is therefore to be totally acquitted and dis-
charged, with commendation rather than blame." ld at *182. 
53 Retreat was specifically aimed, in the case of the brawler, to temper the defendant's cul-
pability for entering the affray. See, for example, People v Fowler, 178 Cal657, 174 P 892,897 
(1918) (stating that "[t]wo men being in the wrong, neither can right himself except by retreating 
to the wall") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Perkins, 1 UCLA L Rev at 139-45 
(cited in note 50) (discussing the relationship between fault and retreat at early English common 
law). 
54 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *186-87 (cited in note 49). Comparing se defendendo 
with misadventure, Blackstone states: 
And as to the necessity which excuses a man who kills another se defendendo, Lord Bacon 
entitles it necessitas culpabilis, and thereby distinguishes it from the former necessity of kill-
ing a thief or a malefactor. For the law intends that the quarrel or assault arose from some 
unknown wrong, or some provocation, either in word or deed: and since in quarrels both 
parties may be, and usually are, in some fault; and it scarce can be tried who was originally 
in the wrong; the law will not hold the survivor intirely [sic] guiltless. 
ld (citation omitted). 
55 Because the defendant was partially at fault, his plea did not lead to automatic exonera-
tion, but conviction with a likely pardon (as a matter of grace). See Thomas A. Green, The Jury 
and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600,74 MichL Rev 413,425 (1976); Perkins, 1 UCLA L 
Rev at 141-42 (cited in note 50). Both se defendendo and provoked manslaughter rely upon the 
notion of chance-medley. See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *184 (cited in note 49) (noting the 
difficulty of distinguishing homicide upon chance-medley and manslaughter). 
56 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *184 ("But the self-defence, which we are now speaking 
of, is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the like, in the course of a sud-
den brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.") (emphasis added). 
57 Id (emphasis added): 
[F]or, instead of attacking one another for injuries past or impending, men need only have 
recourse to the proper tribunals of justice. They cannot, therefore, legally exercise this right 
of preventive defence, but in sudden and violent cases; when certain and immediate suffer-
ing would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law. 
58 Id at *185 ("And, as the manner of the defence, so is also the time to be considered: for if 
the person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor till the affray is over, or when he is running 
away, this is revenge, and not defence.") (emphasis added). Jeremy Horder notes that se de-
fendendo attempted to square a homicide with the presumed "impurity of will" of one who 
killed: 
For a defendant who only struck when his back was to the wall could be presumed to have 
acted without a corrupt intention. It could be presumed that he acted either 'with sorrow of 
heart' or 'from fear and instinctively' ... [thereby] purifying the defendant's will, tainted as 
it was by the deliberate character of the violence employed. 
Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility 20 (Clarendon 1992). 
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the threat was serious." If the affray was sudden, there was no time for 
the king and his courts, no time for the defendant to contemplate re-
venge, no time for the victim to put down his weapon. In other words, 
time had common law meaning. 60 
II. SURVEYING THE MEANING OF IMMINENCE 
Given that sources both outside and inside the law suggest that 
time is neither transparent nor without content, I sought to study the 
meaning of "imminence" in self-defense doctrine. My survey of twenty 
years of case law challenges the basic image we have of the problem 
of imminence in the law of self-defense. 
A. Assumptions Reconsidered 
When I first began this study, I assumed that a search for cases 
raising the issue of imminence would yield a fairly small complement 
of opinions, similar to the Judy Norman decision, where the defendant 
waited to kill her sleeping husband. My research assistants, however, 
soon disabused me of the notion of small numbers of cases as well as 
their similarity to the "waiting" fact pattern. (Ultimately, we reviewed 
hundreds of cases, although only a small portion turned out to be rele-
vant to the imminence question.) I soon came to realize that the prob-
lem was with my view of "the problem." Because of the very powerful 
force that sleeping-man cases have on the legal imagination about 
self-defense-and because my findings tend to challenge this as our 
view of the standard "imminence" case-it is important, at the start, to 
ground this discussion in a different image of the problem. Admittedly, 
the example that follows (like Norman) may present an unusual fact 
pattern, but the insight it provides-that imminence has meaning-is 
not unusual. 
Barbara Watson killed her common law husband while she was 
struggling with him."' And yet the trial court rejected her claim of self-
defense on the grounds of imminence:' Why? Not because of time. 
59 See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *184 (cited in note 49) ("Wherefore, to excuse homi· 
cide by the plea of self-defence, it must appear that the slayer had no other possible [or at least, 
probable] means of escaping from his assailant."). 
60 Much of this meaning has been obscured by the tendency to push temporal matters into 
the minds of defendants. See MPC § 3.04 (stating that "the use of force ... is justifiable when the 
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary"). See also Part V.B (discussing the his-
tory of Holmes's use of imminence to resolve the retreat question). 
6! Commonwealth v Watson, 494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949,951 (1981) (relating eyewitness tes-
timony that the victim had the defendant "around" the neck or was on top of her when she shot; 
trial court finds no imminent threat, a finding reversed on appeal). 
62 The appellate court emphasized the centrality of imminence to the trial court's reason-
ing and to the case: "The central issue in this case stems from the trial court's finding that appel-
lant's belief-that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the time of the 
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This was not the killing of a sleeping man hours after the last bout. 
There was a clear confrontation63 -eyewitnesses testified that the vic-
tim had jumped on top of Mrs. Watson and that he had her "around 
the neck."64 The trial court based its imminence finding in part on the 
following: the threat was not imminent because of "the parties' rela-
tionship involving 'a long course of physical abuse."'65 Put another way, 
the threat was not imminent because the victim had been battered,66 
that is, because Mrs. Watson should have left the relationship before 
the final attack.67 Imminence represented a judgment not of fact68 but 
shooting-was unreasonable." Watson, 431 A2d at 951 (emphasis added). 
63 Watson, 431 A2d at 951. Later cases have made quite clear that Watson was a confronta-
tional case. See Commonwealth v Grove, 363 Pa Super 328,526 A2d 369,373 (1987) (citing Wat-
son and recounting the violent confrontation that took place there). 
64 Watson, 431 A2d at 951. The appellate court reported the testimony of the defendant 
and a friend who was walking thirty to forty feet behind the defendant and the victim. Id. The 
friend, testifying for the state, reported that the victim, Mr. Black, "hit [Watson], knocked her 
down and jumped on top of her before the shooting." Id. The friend stated: "I know one time he 
got her around the neck some kind of way or another. And that's when I heard the shots, when 
he got her around the neck." Id. Watson testified at trial: 
I d. 
So we was walking, you know, up the street. And he just hauled off and grabbed me around 
the neck and shoulders and started choking me. And he had me down on the ground. And I 
was scared. And he said, "You black bitch, I should have killed you a while ago when we 
was at the house." And I was scared. It was me or him. I didn't know what to do, I was so 
scared. I was scared he was going to kill me, because he told me he was going to kill me. So 
that's why I shot him. I don't know how I managed to get to the gun. I was just scuffling 
down on the ground. It was me and him. 
65 Id. The trial court also seemed to believe that the deadly response was disproportionate 
or overly aggressive, noting that the victim had no weapon. Id. It is well-established self-defense 
law, however, without regard to battered women, that a physical struggle, particularly where the 
parties are of unequal size, may be mt!t with deadly force. See, for example, In the Interest of D.S., 
694 S2d 565,567 (La App 1997) ("[A] killing may be justified to prevent the infliction of great 
bodily harm. While weapons may be used to inflict such harm, it is often the case that an oppo-
nent who is physically large, powerful or skilled at fighting will inflict great bodily harm upon a 
weaker adversary.") (emphasis added). As the appellate court in Watson noted: "The fact that 
Mr. Black [the victim] possessed no weapon at the time of the shooting did not render appel-
lant's belief that she was in danger any less reasonable, since it is beyond question that manual 
strangulation can result in serious bodily injury, if not death." 431 A2d at 952. It is possible, of 
course, that the trial court conflated threat and imminence, concluding that the prior abuse un-
dermined Mrs. Watson's claim to a reasonable expectation of serious violence. But that, again, 
would mean that a woman struggling on the ground had no reasonable expectation of a serious 
threat, precisely because she had been battered. 
66 The appellate court rejected the trial court's assumptions on the question of imminence. 
Id at 951-52: 
A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, by 
choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their children, consent 
to or assume the risk of further abuse. That woman faces a difficult choice: she must decide 
whether to endure continued abuse, or ... leave her home. 
67 Lest there be any confusion, this finding cannot be rationalized as an appropriate "re-
treat" rule in the guise of imminence; retreat is not required, as a general rule, before the con-
frontation. For the difference between a pre-retreat rule (not generally required) and a retreat 
rule (required in some jurisdictions), see note 14. 
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of norm.69 Mrs. Watson was found guilty of manslaughter by the trial 
court, a sentence the appellate court reversed on the factS. 70 
Watson shows in a particularly dramatic way that imminence may 
have meaning and that its meaning may be normative and contestable. 
Of course, Watson is not a common type of self-defense case in many 
ways: battered woman cases are rare self-defense cases and rarer 
when reversed on appeal. Indeed, the clarity of the fight makes it 
unlike many self-defense cases in my survey (whether they involve 
male or female defendants). But Watson is not unusual in one impor-
tant respect: in its challenge to our assumption that imminence should 
arise only in cases where the defendant "waits" for substantial periods. 
Imminence can, and does, find a home in cases where there appears 
no substantial time gap between the threat and the killing-in con-
frontational claims.71 In fact, my survey shows that imminence arises 
most often in confrontational rather than nonconfrontational cases. 
That should confound traditional expectations; indeed, it provides 
strong evidence that imminence may mean something more than the 
treatises and the law reviews tell us, more than simply "now," "upon 
the instant," or "at once." 72 
6B Oddly, this version of imminence actually inverts the timing requirements, extending the 
time frame into the past. 
69 Although it is impossible to tell, Watson may well be an example of the upward mobility 
of racial as well as gender norms. The trial court found that Mrs. Watson was too aggressive in 
circumstances that run contrary to the law of proportionality. See note 65. The question this 
raises is whether stereotyped norms about the aggressiveness of African-Americans informed 
this fmding. On this stereotype and its potential influence in self-defense cases, see Jody D. Ar-
mour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negro-
phobes, 46 Stan L Rev 781, 781-85 (1994). For evidence that Mrs. Watson was African-American, 
see Watson, 431 A2d at 952 (recounting her testimony in which she reports that the victim [her 
common law husband] called her a "black bitch"). 
70 The court reversed for insufficient evidence. Watson, 431 A2d at 951 ("Appellant cor-
rectly asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
shooting of her husband was not done in self-defense."). 
71 Lest Watson seem too far outside the norm, it is far from the only case in this survey in 
which a battered woman's claims are clearly confrontational, along the lines of the standard "fist-
fight" or "gun battle." See, for example, State v Sallie, 81 Ohio St 3d 673, 693 NE2d 267, 270 
(1998) (relating defendant's testimony that the victim "attacked her and, as he was choking her, 
threatened to kill her," and she responded); Smith v State, 268 Ga 196,486 SE2d 819,821 (1997) 
(relating defendant's claim that during the fight the victim hit her and held a metal can over her 
head, just before she shot him); Commonwealth v Dillon, 528 Pa 417,598 A2d 963,965 (1991) 
("[A]ppellant testified that the decedent ... grabbed her by the arm, pushed her, punched her 
and told her he was going to kill her just prior to her stabbing him."), affd in part, vacd in part as 
Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Super 297, 634 A2d 614 (1993); Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 
521 Pa 41,555 A2d 772,780 (1989) (relating defendant's claim that, when she shot, the defendant 
was pointing a gun at her). 
72 See notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Method 
My study proceeded in two steps.73 I first sought a sample of 
twenty years of homicide cases involving self-defense claimS74 in which 
the term "imminence" appeared repeatedly in an trial or appellate 
opinion.75 This search was limited to those opinions most likely to be 
generated by a standard computer search. The second iteration of the 
study expanded this sample to achieve, as nearly as possible, a uni-
verse of cases in which imminence was stated to be an issue at trial or 
on appeal.'6 The first iteration was limited to those cases using the 
term "imminence" repeatedly; the second iteration was not-a single 
reference to imminence in an opinion was sufficient if one could de-
termine that imminence was considered an issue in the case. Com-
bined, the first and second iterations yielded a dataset approximating 
the universe of homicide self-defense cases raising imminence as an 
issue and reported between 1979 and 1999. 
Cases were included in the dataset only if they were "imminence-
relevant." To qualify as an "imminence-relevant" case, more was re-
quired than mere discovery of the word "imminence" in the case, or a 
repetition of jury instructions, or standard boilerplate references to 
the law of self-defense. Opinions referring to imminence in a general 
discussion of the "three requirements of the law" of self-defense or 
repeated in a set of jury instructions were marked as irrelevant. In an 
imminence-relevant case, the concept of imminence had to appear 
relevant to the court's decision, the parties' arguments on appeal, or 
an issue at trial or on appeal. At the same time, it is important to re-
member that these cases typically do not discuss the meaning of im-
minence at any length. Very few judicial opinions deal straightfor-
wardly with imminence as a legal question; to qualify as an issue for 
the purposes of my study, it was only necessary that the opinion raise, 
in some form, a legal question about imminence, even if it were rele-
gated to a footnote. By "an issue," then, I do not mean the issue on ap-
peal. An imminence-relevant case may, for example, be a case that 
presents itself primarily as one about evidentiary matters, or the stan-
73 A far more complete methodology and statistical analysis appears in the Appendix. 
74 Included within the coverage of a "self-defense" claim were claims involving imperfect 
as well as perfect self-defense. Defensive force claims based on the "defense of another" were 
excluded because of various doctrinal differences. Also, these claims had to arise in a homicide 
prosecution; claims involving assaults, attempted homicide or conspiracy to commit homicide 
were excluded. See Appendix. 
75 For a discussion of how this search was conducted, see Appendix. 
76 Note that this search focused on the term "imminent," not "immediately necessary," 
which is the relevant statutory term in a minority of jurisdictions. On this issue, see Appendix. 
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dard of review on appeal, or questions to eyewitnesses. Relevance was 
determined not by the holding of the case but by the legal discussion." 
Opinions were first coded for their factual allegations. The ques-
tion asked was whether the facts of the case, as alleged by the defen-
dant, involved a substantial delay between attack and killing. I defined 
as a confrontational case any claim made by the defendant that the 
killing was prompted by violence that was either present or within 
minutes of the killing. All other claims were classified as nonconfron-
tational.78 Doubts about the facts were called in favor of classifying a 
case as nonconfrontational.'• If there was no judicial recitation of the 
facts, determinations about whether a claim was confrontational were 
based on the defendant's allegations."" It is these allegations that 
would be relevant at trial and on appeal to determine the propriety of 
a jury instruction on self-defense."' These judgments were made based 
on the facts as reported and, of course, ambiguity is a source of poten-
tial classification error.81 Moreover, let me emphasize at the start that 
77 For example, a case that discussed imminence in the context of the admission of battered 
woman syndrome evidence would be an "imminence-relevant" case, as would a case that dis-
cussed imminence in the context of a jury instruction claim or an appeal on the sufficiency of 
evidence. Indeed, there is even a case in my dataset in which the appeal arises from the denial of 
witness fees. Thus, the grounds for appeal or the legal holding is not the measure of the relevancy 
of imminence used in this survey. 
78 There are, of course, many ways in which one might draw the line between "confronta-
tional" and "nonconfrontational" claims. It should be noted, for example, that my definition dif-
fers from that used by Professor Maguigan. See Maguigan, 140 U PaL Rev at 391-94 (cited in 
note 5). Unlike Maguigan, for example, I made no attempt to determine, from the sparse facts 
reported in appellate opinions, whether the defendant was the "initial aggressor" who provoked 
the violence, or whether the victim was in a "harmless" position. 
79 I resolved doubts in favor of a nonconfrontational designation because this tended to 
support the conventional view of the imminence problem and thus to operate against my 
hypothesis. 
80 For example, in People v Trevino, 200 Cal App 3d 874,246 Cal Rptr 357 (1988), the ap-
pellate opinion reported that the defendant and the victim had been in a fight several hours be-
fore the victim's death. The state claimed that the victim "was asleep when [the defendant] in-
flicted the first stab wound," while the defendant admitted stabbing the victim but claimed the 
victim was awake and had again assaulted the defendant at the time of the stabbing. ld at 358. 
This is an unusual case. Consistent with my method to base the claim on the defendant's allega-
tions, however, it was classified as a "confrontational" case. It is the defendant's allegations, not 
the state's theory, that is the basis for a judgment of a defendant's success-his ability to get to a 
jury. 
81 A reviewing court must view the defendant's allegations in their most favorable light in 
determining the availability of the jury instruction she claims was omitted at trial. See, for exam-
ple, Cannon v State, 615 S2d 1285, 1287 (Ala App 1993) ("In determining whether to charge the 
jury on self-defense, 'evidence most favorable to the defendant should be considered."'), quoting 
Byrd v State, 257 Ala 100, 57 S2d 388, 391 (1952). Of course, not all cases involving only instruc-
tional claims were cases in which the imminence discussion related to an instructional claim. 
Consistency, however, demanded that I take one approach to all cases; relying upon the defen-
dant's allegations provided a standard reference point that did not require the reader to evaluate 
the evidence from the standpoint of a juror. 
82 Appellate cases only provide limited facts; moreover, the facts are likely to be slanted in 
favor of the defendant. See note 81. One might argue that this will lead to a result biased in favor 
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this definition of confrontation is not the same as used elsewhere. Be-
cause my study focused on the question of imminence, the idea that 
the victim was in an innocent position at the time of the killing does 
not necessarily render the case one of nonconfrontation in this sur-
83 
vey. 
Opinions were then coded for the meanings adopted by the au-
thor: both nonconfrontational and confrontational cases were re-
viewed to determine the meaning of imminence used. Cases were 
coded for the meaning of imminence based on statements made in the 
opinions themselves-how the judges explained imminence as an is-
sue. After a pilot survey, the coding categories were based loosely on 
the elements of self-defense: threat, proportionality or aggression, re-
treat or alternatives, motive or emotion, and other.84 As one might ex-
pect, some courts' discussions of imminence reflect multiple or con-
flicting meanings. If the meaning could not be determined, the case 
was coded as "unknown." If there was more than one meaning, the 
case was so coded. 
Coding did not proceed on the assumption that time has no ob-
jective meaning. I have no doubt that many of the judges who wrote 
these opinions, like the trial judge in Watson, believed that they were 
referring to the clock. Even if every case had been more successful in 
this association than Watson, the problem would still remain. We may 
readily assume, as the survey does, that imminence carries the mean-
ing of time-as-clock in all of the opinions, and still ask whether immi-
nence carries other, more problematic, meanings for the law of self-
defense. 
The point of this exercise was not to provide a statistically valid 
claim about the relative incidence of particular arguments (immi-
of defendants, one in which the claims look more "confrontational" than they are in fact. That 
may be true and would be an appropriate critique if I were attempting to mirror reality. I am not, 
however, attempting to provide a statistical claim about whether self-defense cases are confron-
tational (in fact). Instead, I am arguing about the meaning of imminence. Given that most aca-
demic commentary on that issue is based on the facts rendered in appellate opinions, I justified 
this approach as maintaining consistency with the claims my study sought to challenge. 
83 A claim, for example, that the defendant killed an attacker during a brawl when the vic-
tim was in fact restrained does not amount, for these purposes, to a nonconfrontational claim 
since my definition of "confrontation" depends on the question of time, as measured by the 
clock, not on whether the defendant was the aggressor. See, for example, State v Buggs, 167 Ariz 
333,806 P2d 1381,1382-83 (Ariz App 1990) (relating that defendant was brawling, got a weapon, 
and fired it; not classified as "nonconfrontational" even though the court reported that the vic-
tims of the attack were not advancing toward the defendant). 
84 Although many standard formulations of self-defense omit it, jurisdictions often explic-
itly or implicitly emphasize the need to show the defendant's fear of, rather than malice toward, 
the victim. See, for example, Trevino, 246 Cal Rptr at 360 (upholding a jury instruction requiring 
that the defendant acted on "fear alone," and stating that the defendant may feel "anger or other 
emotions" toward the victim, but they "cannot be causal factors" in the killing to be justifiable 
self-defense). 
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nence )"' or particular kinds of claims (confrontational or not). A 
sample of trial and appellate opinions cannot tell us what happens at 
plea negotiations or at a trial that never result in a written opinion. As 
such, the survey carries with it enormous dangers in terms of generali-
zations about trial practice or real world plea negotiations.86 At the 
same time, this approach has one major advantage: it can provide an 
assessment of theoretical claims that purport to rest on a sample of 
judicial opinions. My claim is directed at the academic vision of immi-
nence, as presented by casebooks, treatises, law review articles, and 
other sources that rely upon trial and appellate opinions. Put another 
way, a survey of twenty years of trial and appellate opinions is, rela-
tively speaking, far better than the sample of one or two afforded in 
the standard legal treatment. That does not mean that ten cases are 
always better evidence than one, but simply that this argument tests 
present assumptions about case law. It should not be interpreted as an 
empirical study of self-defense practice as a whole. 
A final caveat is in order. This is a survey of self-defense cases 
raising the question of imminence, not claims based on gender or 
claims by women only. For that reason, this survey should be distin-
guished from differently focused work, such as Holly Maguigan's im-
portant study of battered woman claims. Some time ago, Maguigan of-
fered significant evidence that battered woman claims tend to be con-
frontational rather than nonconfrontational.87 My survey does not at-
tempt to redetermine that issue (although my findings, for a limited 
subset of imminence-relevant cases, are consistent with her conclu-
sions). It is, instead, a survey of the legal meaning of imminence in 
self-defense law, and was so constructed. Therefore, it cannot and 
should not be taken as a measure of the factual nature of all self-
defense cases or cases involving battered women. 
C. The Findings 
The conventional wisdom has it that imminence should arise as a 
legal issue only in cases where the defendant waits to kill. This study 
suggests that this assumption cannot be supported by judicial opin-
85 I do not know how often, for example, imminence arises in self-defense cases as a 
relevant issue. To assess that, I would have had to determine the number of imminence-relevant 
cases in proportion to the total number of self-defense cases for this period. A rough approxima-
tion to that may be obtained by comparing the number of imminence-relevant cases (233) to the 
total number of self-defense cases for the same period, but that would only yield a number rele-
vant to appellate practice. 
86 I have enumerated these dangers elsewhere at much greater length. See Victoria Nourse, 
Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L J 1331, 1349-
50 & n 108 (1997) (discussing such dangers in research concerning appellate cases on provoca-
tion). 
87 Maguigan.140 U PaL Rev at 379 (cited in note 5). 
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ions. The vast majority of imminence-relevant cases in my survey look 
like the "standard" self-defense case-a case, for example, in which 
the defendant alleged that he saw a weapon,88 the victim was advanc-
ing,'' or there was a fight. 90 Cases where there was a substantial tempo-
ral lapse were quite rare. Eighty-four percent (196/233) of the immi-
nence-relevant cases were coded as confrontational cases. Sixteen per-
cent (37/233) were cases that had allegations of significant time delay. 
Based on standard statistical methods, we can say with significant con-
fidence that the conventional assumption about imminence-that it 
arises (or should arise) only in connection with cases of long time 
lags-is unlikely to describe case law.'1 
The same can be said of cases involving claims by a battered 
woman. Battered woman cases were relatively uncommon -less than 
a third of the total (70/233, or 30 percent). Nonconfrontational bat-
tered woman cases were even rarer, making up less than 10 percent of 
the total set of imminence-relevant cases (211233, or 9 percent). The 
conventional wisdom has it that most battered woman cases fail be-
cause they fail an "objective" imminence standard:92 for example, the 
defendant kills the victim in his sleep, or there is a significant time lag 
between threat and killing. One would expect, then, that if one gath-
ered all the cases involving a battered woman in which imminence was 
raised, that those cases would involve claims of a threat involving a 
significant time lag. Instead, just the opposite was found. As was true 
of all self-defense cases, the vast majority-almost three quarters-of 
battered woman cases in which imminence appears raised confronta-
tional claims ( 49/70, or 70 percent).'3 Most battered women did not 
claim that they killed when the man was asleep or long after the last 
bout; they claimed they killed when they saw a gun, when he was lung-
ing forward, or when they were in the middle of a fight-and yet im-
88 Cannon v State, 615 S2d 1285, 1286 (Ala App 1993) (reporting that "appellant testified 
that [the victim] was aiming his pistol at him and preparing to shoot as the vehicle approached"). 
The opinion reverses for failure to grant a self-defense instruction. In characterizing the issue, 
the opinion states: "Whether an accused was in imminent danger when he used deadly force 
against a victim ... is a question of fact for the jury." Id at 1288 (emphasis added). 
89 See State v Spaulding, 298 NC 149,257 SE2d 391,396 (1979) ("There was testimony that 
when the two of them went out into the yard, Simmons advanced on defendant with his hand in 
his pocket."). 
90 See, for example, Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002, 1003, 1006 (DC App 1986) 
(reporting a quarrel between two brothers in which the victim "hit [the defendant] in the head 
with a small radio" just prior to defendant's shooting the victim; defendant objects to jury 
instructions on retreat; court invokes imminence to resolve the retreat issue). 
91 We can say with 95 percent confidence that the conventional hypothesis is unlikely to be 
true. Calculations on file with author. 
92 See note 8. 
93 Although the studies are not comparable for a variety of reasons, it is interesting to note 
that Holly Maguigan found that 75 percent of battered woman cases in her survey involved con-
frontations. See Maguigan, 140 U PaL Rev at 397 (cited in note 5). 
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minence still figured in some way in the legal understanding of the 
case (just as it does in cases involving male defendants ).94 Again, we 
can say with significant confidence that the general assumption that 
imminence should arise only in battered woman cases that involve al-
legations of long delays is unlikely to describe case laW.95 
Only if one looks solely at the very small subset of nonconfronta-
tional cases do battered woman cases tend to appear in larger propor-
tions. Still, even in nonconfrontational imminence cases, claims by bat-
tered women were slightly more than half of all nonconfrontational 
cases (21137, or 57 percent).It turns out that nearly 40 percent of non-
confrontational claims were brought not by battered women, but in-
stead by men and male children (14/37, or 38 percent).96 If we elimi-
nate claims made by male children, however, the nonconfrontational 
battered woman cases (twenty-one) substantially exceed the male 
cases (six), but both represent extraordinarily small percentages of the 
total universe of cases in this survey.97 As might be expected, battering 
claims-whether made by men or women-heavily dominated the 
small nonconfrontational universe (31137, or 84 percent). 
In interpreting these findings, three caveats should be taken into 
account. First, it is important not to misconstrue my definition of con-
frontation. It is standard practice to conflate issues of time and threat. 
Perhaps there is a dispute at trial: the defendant is claiming that the 
victim reached for a gun but the state argues, to the contrary, that 
there was no gun. The factual dispute in this case is a standard one, but 
it is not a factual dispute about temporal matters; it is a factual dispute 
about the quality or seriousness of the threat faced by the defendant. 
If the state is right, the time does not expand- there simply is no 
threat. 
Second, another common conflation is between the likelihood of 
the threat and temporal distance. It is common to use imminence as a 
measure of the probability of a victim's actions. For example, a defen-
dant may claim that the victim's prior actions (shooting a gun) or prior 
threats ("I'll kill you") made it more probable that the victim posed a 
94 See, for example, Smith v State, 268 Ga 1%,486 SE2d 819,821 (1997) (reporting that the 
victim "continued to hit her and held a metal can over her head in a threatening manner," 
whereupon the defendant grabbed a pistol and shot the victim). Imminence arises in the context 
of the court's discussion of the defendant's claims about battered woman syndrome. Id at 821-26. 
95 We can say with 95 percent confidence that the conventional hypothesis is unlikely to be 
true. Calculations on file with author. 
96 Of the thirty-seven nonconfrontational cases, twenty-one were brought by a battered 
woman, one by a battered female child, eight by battered male children, and one by a battered 
man. Of the six remaining claims that did not involve battering, five defendants were male, and 
one was female. 
97 The nonconfrontational battered woman cases amounted to 211233, or 9 percent of the 
total; the nonconfrontational male and male children cases represented 14/233, or 6 percent of 
the total. 
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deadly threat at some later time:" Again, this is a standard dispute, but 
one which is less about the clock than about the likelihood of the vic-
tim's threat. If time is an issue in such cases, it is an issue of the past. 
Presumably, a court worried that the jury might rely only on prior 
conduct could so instruct the jury (without focusing on imminence at 
all). 
Finally, I am not arguing that time, as measured by the clock, is ir-
relevant to all of these cases. Few of the cases in the survey are as 
clear as Watson in showing a contemporaneous fight based on undis-
puted evidence. There may well be cases here in which the state be-
lieves, quite rightly, that time as measured by the clock is an issue. But 
if that were to occur in all of these cases, it would fail to explain the 
findings of this survey. For if time has meaning in these cases because 
the prosecutor is making an argument based on the clock, that does 
not explain why time is found to have other meanings-meanings 
other than the clock- in the vast majority of cases in my survey. 
D. Finding the Meaning of Imminence 
My survey shows that imminence is used as a proxy for other self-
defense factors-in some cases openly fault-based factors-in both 
confrontational and nonconfrontational cases. When the court hears 
an argument about jury instructions on the question of imminent 
threat, courts often are considering the severity of the threat: was the 
threat imminent in the sense of whether it was serious or probable to 
arise?99 In other cases, they are considering the necessity of the re-
sponse or the possibility of retreat: was the threat imminent in the 
sense that there were no alternatives to a deadly response?")() In still 
others, the court is concerned with the defendant's motive or emo-
tions: was the threat imminent in the sense that the defendant was act-
98 See, for example, State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461,693 P2d 475 (1985). 
99 See, for example, McCracken v State, 914 P2d 893, 895, 898 (Alaska App 1996) ( describ-
ing situation in which man in wheelchair killed caretaker after caretaker threatened to knock 
him out of the wheelchair and caretaker "leaned forward as if to stand up"; at trial the "disputed 
issues" involved whether defendant believed he was responding to an "imminent" threat); People 
v Martinez, 206 Ill App 3d 813, 564 NE2d 1271, 1279-80 (1990) (suggesting that the defendant 
used disproportionate force to repel an attack of the victim, and then concluding that prior 
threats were "insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief that [defendant] was in dan-
ger of imminent deadly or great bodily harm"). 
100 See, for example, State v Williford, 49 Ohio St 3d 247, 551 NE2d 1279, 1282-83 (1990) 
(noting state's claim that the defendant did not prove imminence and emphasizes the fact that 
the jury appears to have found the defendant had alternate means to escape besides the use of 
force); Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002, 1004 (DC App 1986) (concluding that the jury 
could consider whether the defendant could retreat in determining whether he was '"actually or 
apparently in imminent danger'"), quoting Gillis v United States, 400 A2d 311, 313 (DC App 
1979). 
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ing out of fear rather than malice?101 Finally, imminence also appears 
as a question of aggression or provocation: was the threat imminent in 
the sense that the victim (rather than the defendant) was the principal 
?102 aggressor. 
1. The confrontational cases. 
By far the most common way in which time carries meaning in 
this survey is through the severity of the victim's threat. Indeed, the 
vast majority of confrontational cases were ones in which imminence 
appeared as a measure of the severity of threat or proportionality of 
violence (140/196, or 71 percent). Typical of such cases are ones in 
which the court concludes that there was no imminent threat because 
the victim was unarmed,103 was not in a physical position to pose a 
threat,104 or was turning away or had gone.105 In one sense, this is not 
101 See, for example, In re ChristianS., 13 Cal Rptr 2d 232,235 (Cal App 1992) (reporting 
that the trial court "focused on the substantial interval during which Christian aimed at Elliott 
[the victim] before firing [in an ongoing confrontation], concluding he [the defendant] had suffi-
cient time to carefully consider what he was doing"), superseded on other grounds, 7 Cal 4th 768, 
872 P2d 574 (1994); State v Jackson, 22 Ohio St 3d 281,490 NE2d 893, 897 (1986) (concluding 
that the jury believed testimony that showed the defendant "did not believe he was in imminent 
danger" but instead that "appellant acted out of jealous anger toward the victim rather than out 
of fear for his life"). 
102 See, for example, Ellis v State, 708 S2d 884,888 (Miss 1998): 
Even assuming that Ellis did in fact see Banks [the victim] flash a gun a few minutes earlier, 
Ellis had clearly made himself the aggressor by continuing to chase down a victim running 
for his life .... Under the facts of the present case, there is no reasonable probability that a 
jury would have concluded that Ellis was in imminent danger. 
103 See, for example, State v Spinks, 1998 Wis App LEXIS 306, *13-14 (holding defendant 
"could not have reasonably believed ... that he was in danger of imminent death or great bodily 
harm .... There was no evidence that [the victim] had a weapon or in any way posed a serious 
threat to [the defendant].") (emphasis added); State v Gayden, 259 Kan 69, 910 P2d 826, 836 
(1996) (finding no evidence of imminent threat in a barroom brawl case because "[t]here was no 
evidence that [the victim] was armed or displayed a weapon," only that he struck "one blow 
against defendant with his hand") (emphasis added); People v Hoover, 250 Ill App 3d 338, 620 
NE2d 1152, 1161 (1993) ("Although defendant claimed that she saw a shiny object on the floor 
of the passenger side of the car, she admitted that she did not see Barker [the victim ]with a 
weapon. Therefore, defendant cannot claim that she was in imminent fear.") (emphasis added). 
104 See, for example, State v LeFaber, 77 Wash App 766, 893 P2d 1140, 1146 (1995) (Schul-
theis concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "the jury could have found that Mr. Le-
Faber reasonably believed Mr. Stephens [the victim] intended great personal injury, but that in 
fact there was no imminent danger because Mr. Stephens was unarmed, still outside the house and 
the police were presumably en route") (emphasis added), revd, 128 Wash 2d 896, 913 P2d 369 
(1996); State v Blackman, 875 SW2d 122, 133 (Mo App 1994) (stating that the defendant "pos-
sessed both his own firearm and the victim's firearm and the victim had been shot in the chest 
and in the hand. He [the defendant] was no longer in imminent danger."); State v Correa, 437 Pa 
Super 1, 648 A2d 1199, 1202 (1994) (noting that "Correa could not have believed that he was in 
imminent danger from behind a locked door"). 
105 See, for example, People v Horton, 233 Ill App 3d 22, 598 NE2d 452,455 (1992) ("The 
defendant, however. was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm ... because Sulli-
van [who provoked the fight. although he was not the victim] had already left the premises."); 
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surprising. The connection between imminence and threat is quite 
common in everyday discourse. Indeed, it seems difficult to speak of 
imminence without the notion of danger or threat or harm. On an-
other level, however, this should be surprising since imminence seems 
to serve little doctrinal purpose here. If these cases do not involve 
allegations of long waits between threat and killing, but of 
spontaneous fights and confrontations, then the question raised is 
whether imminence is simply superfluous. 
If imminence operated only as a proxy for the threat's severity, 
we might conclude that the terms "imminence" and "threat" were 
inevitably conjoined, reinforcing each other, and that there was an 
easy remedy in more economical prose. But many confrontational 
cases show that other meanings are at work alone or in addition to the 
severity of threat (120/196, or 61 percent).106 Imminence may be con-
structed in the image of the defendant's motives, emotions (29/196, or 
15 percent), or perceptions (63/196, or 32 percent), the defendant's 
ability to exercise alternatives (28/196, or 14 percent), or the defen-
dant's responsibility for the confrontation (aggression or provocation) 
(29/196, or 15 percent).107 
To see how imminence might operate as a proxy for these kinds 
of issues, consider In re Christian S.,108 a case involving a juvenile who 
was being taunted by a skinhead named Elliott.109 There was no dis-
pute that the defendant, Christian, had killed Elliott after an extended 
set of confrontations on a beach, each time pointing the gun but then 
running away. The question was whether the presence of malice afore-
thought had been sufficiently established in the trial court.110 To the 
trial judge, time implied malice. It was the "substantial interval during 
which Christian aimed at Elliott before firing" that convinced the 
court of Christian's malice: the defendant "had sufficient time to care-
fully consider what he was doing."111 Reversing, the appellate court in-
State v McCarter, 820 SW2d 587,590 (Mo App 1991) ("[The eyewitness's] testimony would not 
support a finding of imminent danger .... Rather, the testimony shows no visible signs [the vic-
tim] possessed a weapon; [the victim's] direction of movement was away from defendant; and 
that defendant started to leave and shot as [the victim] headed for the house."). 
106 Cases involving threats alone constituted 76/196, or 39 percent, of the total, leaving most 
cases to have some meaning other than threat (120/196, or 61 percent). 
107 If there is a good deal of evidence that time-talk is really a surrogate for questions of 
fault, it is unsurprising to see not only cases in which imminence stands in for other self-defense 
factors but also cases in which time disappears as a factor when fault is clear. See, for example, 
Hart v State, 637 S2d 1329, 1336-38 (Miss 1994) (stating that in a case in which the defendant 
clearly pursued the victim and provoked the confrontation, the defendant cannot claim self-
defense no matter how imminent the ultimate threat). 
108 20 Cal App 4th 1210, 13 Cal Rptr 2d 232 (1992), superseded on other grounds, 7 Cal 4th 
768,30 Cal Rptr 2d 33,872 P2d 574 (1994). 
109 13 Cal Rptr 2d at 233. 
no Id at 235-36. 
111 Id at 235. 
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terpreted the meaning of time rather differently, finding lack of mal-
ice.112 "Elliott's repeated threats and his continued pursuit of Christian 
in the face of his request to be left alone confirmed the immediacy of 
that risk." 113 
Notice what has happened here: the clock did not change, but its 
meaning did. There was no dispute between the trial and appellate 
courts about the actual temporal lapse between the threat and the 
shooting. To the trial court, time signified Christian's malice, his mo-
tive or emotion. To the appellate court, it signified a different set of 
emotions and a lack of motive-Christian's fear of Elliott's taunts.114 
For both courts, imminence served as a proxy for emotion and motive, 
fear or malice. 115 
If the motive/emotion cases make clear that imminence can ab-
sorb meanings that seem far more "interior" .and "personal" -even 
subjective-than the clock, cases linking imminence and alternatives 
show how time may cast more than one meaningful shadow. In these 
cases, a finding of no imminence was a way of saying that the defen-
dant did not really "need" to kill, in that there were easily available 
choices other than deadly violence."• The defendant might have left 
through the kitchen door, he might have simply "locked" his home, 
112 Id at 238. 
113 Id. 
114 In re Christian S. is not alone in its equation of imminence with motive and emotion. See, 
for example, Commonwealth v Pike, 428 Mass 393,701 NE2d 951,956 (1998) ("This testimony 
indicates that the defendant threw the radio at Holmes [the victim] out of a feeling of anger or 
revenge resulting from the first stage of the altercation. It does not support at all the contention 
that he acted out of fear of 'imminent danger of death."'), quoting Commonwealth v Barros, 425 
Mass 572,682 NE2d 849,853 (1997);State vlackson,22 Ohio St 3d 281,490 NE2d 893,897 (1986) 
(concluding that the jury believed the state's witnesses when they said that the defendant did not 
believe in an imminent threat because "testimony showed that appellant acted out of jealous an-
ger toward the victim rather than out of fear for his life"); People v Trevino, 200 Cal App 3d 874, 
246 Cal Rptr 357,360 (1988): 
The party killing is not precluded from feeling anger or other emotions save and except 
fear; however, those other emotions cannot be causal factors in his decision to use deadly 
force .... But if the only causation of the killing was the reasonable fear that there was im-
minent danger ... then the use of deadly force in self-defense is proper regardless of what 
other emotions the party who kills may have been feeling but not acting upon. 
115 The trial court emphasized the interval of time before the shooting to support a finding 
of malice by equating time with deliberation. 13 Cal Rptr 2d at 235. The appellate court con-
cluded that the threat did not have to be imminent to negate malice; all that was necessary was a 
finding that the defendant had a sincere (even if unreasonable) fear of an imminent threat. Like 
the trial court, then, the appellate court transformed time into a question of mind (a belief in an 
imminent threat) and emotion (fear). Id at 238. 
116 Although I believe the equation of retreat and imminence should be more controversial 
given that the retreat issue has caused great division in the law of self-defense, it is hardly the in-
vention of my imagination. It can be found in Black's Law Dictionary 676 (West 5th ed 1979) 
(defining "imminent danger" as being "such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assis-
tance of others or the protection of the law") (emphasis added). 
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waited for the police, or avoided the confrontation after it began.117 As 
one judge explained, "[t]he existence of alternatives to homicide ... 
goes to the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that he was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.""" 
Indeed, in some states, the link between imminence and alterna-
tives has been acknowledged openly. Some courts, for example, have 
rejected jury instructions that specifically equate time and alternatives 
on the ground that this re-creates a rule of retreat. In Craig v State,119 
where the killing resulted from a physical fight, the court rejected, as 
inappropriate, a jury instruction defining an imminent threat as one 
"so urgent that there is no reasonable mode of escape except to take 
life" on the theory that there was no rule requiring retreat in that ju-
risdiction.120 Other jurisdictions appear to have taken the opposite 
view. In New Jersey and Ohio, for example, courts define imminence 
as requiring a judgment of appropriate alternatives, as a danger "that 
b h w could only be forestalled or escaped y a resort tot e use of force." 
In State v Kelly,m for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court made 
clear that the imminence rule requires that an actor "who reasonably 
fears that her life will soon be endangered . . . leave the danger 
zone."123 Whether imminence is seen as reinforcing an existing retreat 
requirement or as creating a new one, this survey makes clear that 
such doctrinal links are not isolated caseS.124 
117 For examples of cases in which courts explicitly equate imminence and alternatives, see 
State v Renner, 1994 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 581, *18-21 (affirming prosecution's right toques-
tion defendant on whether "he could have left through the kitchen door and avoided confronta-
tion" even though there was no duty to retreat because "leaving through the kitchen door" was 
relevant to the credibility of defendant's fear and thus, to the "imminen[ce of] danger of death or 
serious bodily injury") (emphasis added); State v Williford, 1988 Ohio App LEXIS 1906, *24-25 
(rejecting the state's argument-that defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction be-
cause the danger was not imminent and "appellant had alternative means of escape, presumably 
to lock his front door behind him" -even though acknowledging defendant was not required to 
retreat); State v Williams, 470 S2d 617,620 (La Ct App 1985) ("The evidence shows that the de-
fendant did not believe himself in imminent danger of receiving great bodily harm. He could eas-
ily have returned to his own house, which was next door, and avoided any confrontation with the 
victim."), revd, 483 S2d 999 (La 1986) (concluding that the defendant did act in self-defense). 
118 Patterson v State, 682 P2d 1049, 1053-54 (Wyo 1984) (Rose concurring) (affirming lower 
court's refusal to provide a jury instruction on self-defense). 
119 660 S2d 1298 (Miss 1995). 
12o Id at 1299-1300. 
121 State v Eng, 1994 Ohio App LEXIS 4655, *6. 
122 97NJ 178,478A2d364 (1984). 
123 Id at 385 n 23. 
124 See Bechtel v State, 1992 Okla Crim 55, 840 P2d 1, 12 (1992) (stating that there is a "pre-
sumption in imminence that the defender may find an alternative to the use of deadly force," and 
therefore the court found it "necessary to address the duty to retreat, which duty is implicit in 
said presumption") (emphasis added). Similarly, in the District of Columbia, imminence is part 
of the "retreat" calculation. In Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002 (DC App 1986), the defen-
dant alleged that he killed his brother after an altercation in which the brother had hit him over 
the head with a radio; the defendant objected to the failure to give a favorable no-retreat instruc-
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2. Battered woman confrontational cases. 
If time carries multiple meanings in self-defense cases in general, 
the question becomes whether this also occurs in the smaller subset of 
cases involving a battered woman defendant. My survey shows that 
imminence can be found operating as a surrogate for motive, alterna-
tive, and aggression in battered woman confrontational cases, as it 
does in cases not involving battering. Many of the battered woman 
cases in this survey involved what I will term "weak" prompting 
threats in a violent context-a claim that the defendant believed the 
victim was moving toward a gun, that the victim had his "hands 
raised" as if in attack, or that the victim was moving suspiciously or 
threateningly. 125 In this sense, these cases look similar to many standard 
self-defense claims, where the male defendant hears a "noise like 
branches shaking,""6 believes "the guy was reaching like he was reach-
ing for a weapon," 127 or believes that "there was a shiny object." 128 Like 
their male defendant counterparts, the battered woman cases often in-
clude arguments in which imminence serves as a proxy for the seri-
ousness of the threat, the proportionality of the defendant's response, 
or the available alternatives. 
tion. Id at 1002. The court refused to decide the retreat question, preferring a "middle ground" in 
which alternatives were to be considered under the rubric of "imminence." Id at 1006. There are 
individual cases, and judges, in other jurisdictions that appear to make the same connection. For 
example: 
The jury must evaluate such perceptions in context .... Therefore, if they would "induce a 
well founded belief ... " that immediate defense against the impending danger was the only 
means of escape from great bodily injury or death, the law of self-defense justifies use of 
whatever force is necessary to "avert the threatened peril." 
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1,14 (1996) (Brown concurring) (emphasis added), 
quoting People v Scoggins, 37 Cal676, 684 (1869). 
125 See, for example, State v Hodges, 239 Kan 63,716 P2d 563,564-65 (1986) (reporting that, 
after beating, defendant killed upon being threatened), disapproved in part, State v Stewart, 243 
Kan 639,763 P2d 572 (1988); State v Osbey, 238 Kan 280,710 P2d 676,678 (1985) (reporting that 
defendant killed when victim reached behind record albums; defendant claimed she believed he 
was reaching for a weapon). Of course, there were cases involving stronger threats. See note 71 
(describing such cases). 
126 State v Negrin, 37 Wash App 516,681 P2d 1287, 1290 (1984) (describing claim in which 
defendant shoots into woods because he finds evidence of a burglary and hears rustling in the 
bushes and a loud stomping; a self-defense instruction was given at trial). 
127 State v Bellino, 31 Conn App 385,625 A2d 1381,1385 (1993) (describing instructions and 
indicating that a self-defense instruction was given at trial). 
128 State v Fuller, 297 SC 440,377 SE2d 328,331 (1989) (reversing for failure to instruct that 
the defendant could have acted in self-defense based in part on the fact that he saw the victims 
"open the trunk of their car and also thought he saw a shiny object in [the victim's] hand"). See 
also People v Spencer, 51 Cal App 4th 1208,59 Cal Rptr 2d 627,632 (1996) (describing claim that 
the defendant shot when the victim "reach[ ed] down to the floorboard of the car," believing the 
victim "was pulling out a gun"). 
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Consider State v Hundley. 129 There, the victim had fled to a hotel 
because of battering by her husband.130 Earlier in the day, he had 
threatened to kill her. That night, he broke into her hotel room and 
proceeded to brutalize and rape her.131 After it was over, he pounded a 
beer bottle (a source of injury in the past) on the table and ordered 
her to get him cigarettes.132 She felt threatened and reached for a gun 
she had brought for protection. "Carl laughed tauntingly and said, 
'You are dead, bitch, now!' ... [and] reached for the beer bottle."133 She 
shut her eyes and fired. 134 The issue on appeal was whether the trial 
court had properly instructed the jury in requiring an "immediate" 
rather than an "imminent" harm.135 
Interestingly enough, of course, there really was no issue of im-
minence in this case if by imminence we mean a significant time gap 
between the threat and the killing. No sleeping husband was present 
in Hundley. At least temporally, Hundley's allegations are very far 
from Judy Norman's. If Hundley's allegations are believed,136 she was 
presented with a confrontational situation much like those of the 
standard barroom brawl in which there is a fight or a threat and the 
victim is "reaching for a beer bottle"137 or pool cue, gives a hostile look 
129 236 Kan 461,693 P2d 475 (1985). 
130 The past history of violence was not disputed by the appellate court, which recounted 
that the defendant's husband 
had knocked out several of her teeth, broken her nose at least five times, and threatened to 
cut her eyeballs out and her head off. Carl [the victim] had kicked Betty [the defendant] 
down the stairs on numerous occasions and had repeatedly broken her ribs. Mrs. Hundley 
[the defendant] suffered from diabetes and, as part of his abuse, Carl prevented Betty from 
taking her required dosage of insulin ... [n]eedless to say, Betty Hundley went into diabetic 
comas on those occasions. 
Id at 475-76. 
!31 Id at 476. State v Stewart, 243 Kan 639, 763 P2d 572, 578 (1988) (summarizing the 
Hundley facts): 
Several weeks prior to the shooting, Betty [the defendant] had moved to a motel. Carl [the 
victim] continued to harass her and threaten her life. On the day of the shooting, Carl 
threatened to kill her. That night he forcibly broke into Betty's motel room, beat and 
choked her, painfully shaved her pubic hair, and forced her to have intercourse with him. 
132 Hundley, 693 P2d at 476. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See id at 477-78. 
136 See id at 477 ("None of appellant's evidence was controverted. The State's case was de-
pendent upon the jury believing from appellant's evidence there was no immediate threat to 
appellant."). 
137 See State v Hill, 242 Kan 68, 744 P2d 1228, 1232, 1236 (1987) (reversing for failure to in-
struct on self-defense in a case where an eyewitness claimed that the victim "raised her hand like 
she had [an unknown object] in it with which she was trying to hit [the defendant]"); State v 
Kelly, 131 Kan 357, 291 P 945, 946-47 (1930) (affirming the self-defense instruction given in a 
case where the defendant said the victim gave him a "mean look" and withdrew his hand from 
his pocket). These are cases in which a weak threat becomes a good deal stronger in the context 
of an ongoing fight or threats of violence. 
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and reaches into his pocket, or seems to have a "shiny object."'" In-
deed, it is not surprising that ultimately the appellate court in Hundley 
resolved the threat issue in the defendant's favor, concluding that, in 
the context of their relationship, Carl's threat ("you are dead") "was 
no less life-threatening with him sitting in the motel room tauntingly 
playing with his beer bottle than if he were advancing toward her."119 
As the Kansas Supreme Court later described the case, the defendant 
was "clearly threatened m the moments prior to the 
shooting[]."'"' 
The important point to see here, for our purposes, is that despite 
the appellate court's extended discussion of the difference between 
the terms "immediate" and "imminent,"'" the questions in Hundley 
were not really about time. Instead, imminence served as a proxy for 
the severity of the threat and the opportunity for withdrawal-
questions, in short, about proportionality, threat, and retreat. For ex-
ample, the state's answer to the defendant's claim was not about tim-
ing as much as it was about the banging of a beer bottle and whether 
that was a severe threat."' Similarly, the dissenting judge equated time 
with alternatives, concluding that the majority was incorrect because 
Hundley had an opportunity to retreat. If only she had complied with 
her attacker's demands and left to get the cigarettes, the dissenter ar-
gued, Hundley would have had a five-minute head start."' 
If the battered woman confrontational cases were similar to the 
rest of the population in the sense that imminence had meaning, these 
cases also diverged in some respects. Often, the argument on appeal 
was evidentiary: whether the trial court properly refused to permit 
battered woman syndrome testimony.'" On appeal, the court would 
138 See, for example, Spencer, 59 Cal Rptr 2d at 632 (describing claim that the defendant 
shot when the victim "reach[ed] down to the floorboard of the car" and the defendant believed 
the victim "was pulling out a gun"); Fuller, 377 SE2d at 331. See also note 128. 
139 Hundley, 693 P2d at 479. 
140 Stewart. 763 P2d at 577. 
141 Hundley, 693 P2d at 478-81. 
142 Id at 477. At trial. the state argued that there was "no immediate threat." I d. Since there 
was no time lag between the death threat/banging of the beer bottle and the shot, the argument 
had to be one about the severity of the threat. On appeal, the state claimed that Hundley was 
seeking to apply a subjective standard, implying that the death threat/beer bottle was not an ob-
jectively sufficient threat under the circumstances. Id at 478. 
143 Hundley, 693 P2d at 481 (McFarland dissenting) (concluding that the harm to the defen-
dant could not have been imminent because of available alternatives and therefore the differ-
ence between imminent and immediate was harmless in this case). See id at 480, quoting Black's 
Law Dictionary 675-76 (5th ed 1979) for the proposition that "imminent danger" means "such as 
must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assistance of others or 
the protection of the law." 
144 See, for example, State v Koss, 49 Ohio St 3d 213, 551 NE2d 970, 974-75 (1990) ( overrul-
ing prior Supreme Court of Ohio precedent that prohibited the use of battered woman syn-
drome evidence to support self-defense as an affirmative defense). 
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discuss imminence but would do so in the context of the meaning of 
syndrome evidence. Almost half of the battered woman confronta-
tional cases raised imminence in the context of a discussion of bat-
tered woman syndrome (24/49, or 49 percent). Indeed, it was a stan-
dard appellate account in which battered woman syndrome was con-
sidered relevant because of imminence-on the theory that a battered 
woman has a different "perception" of the imminence of serious vio-
lence.'•s 
More significantly, the battered woman cases diverged from the 
general population in the degree to which they showed courts equat-
ing imminence with alternative courses of action: the defendant could 
have called the police,'46 had the victim arrested,147 or taken advantage 
of a five-minute head start.'48 There was a significantly greater per-
centage of battered woman confrontational cases in which imminence 
appears as a surrogate for alternatives (47 percent) than other con-
frontational cases (20 percent).14' At least some of these cases seemed 
to equate imminence directly with retreat. When they asked the ques-
tion of imminence, courts asked not about time but whether killing 
"was the only means of escape from great bodily injury or death."'50 
145 See id at 973 ("Expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admit-
ted to help the jury not only to understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine 
whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent 
danger when considering the issue of self-defense."); Smith v State, 268 Ga 196, 486 SE2d 819, 
821-26 (1997) (battered woman syndrome as relevant to imminence); Bechtel v Oklahoma, 1992 
Okla Crim 55,840 P2d 1, 12 (same); Commonwealth v Dillon, 528 Pa 417,598 A2d 963,966--67 
(1991) (Nix concurring) (same), affd in part, vacd in part as Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Su-
per 297,634 A2d 614 (1993). Occasionally, a court would note the disconnect between a claim of 
"imminence" and a confrontational situation and, on that basis, rule against the battered woman 
defendant. See, for example, State v Sallie, 81 Ohio St 3d 673,693 NE2d 267,269-71 (1998) (de-
nial of ineffective assistance claim for failing to introduce battered woman syndrome testimony 
on the theory that defendant's claim was "confrontatienal" and therefore the evidence would 
have been inadmissible as "unnecessary"). 
146 See, for example, State v Moore, 568 S2d 612,617 (La App 1990) ("[The defendant] may 
have been in some danger, but it was not imminent danger. Although the telephone was not in 
perfect working order, it was still functional and could have been used to call for assistance."). 
147 Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 358 Pa Super 270, 517 A2d 540, 544 (1986) ("At the time 
he was gunned down the victim did not present a threat of imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm." Given the parties' relationship, physical separation at the time of the shooting, and 
status as police officers, "[a]ppellant had ample time and opportunity to have the victim ar-
rested."), revd on other grounds, 521 Pa 41,555 A2d 772 (1989). 
148 Hundley, 236 Kan 461, 693 P2d at 480-81 (1985) (McFarland dissenting) (arguing that 
defendant could have had a "five-minute head start" if she had "failed to return with the ciga-
rettes" as the victim had demanded). 
149 We can say with 95 percent confidence that the contrary hypothesis is unlikely to be 
true. Calculations on file with author. There may be a number of reasons for this finding: it may 
be, for example, that alternatives are arising more in these cases because battered woman syn-
drome evidence is more likely to be considered, and one of the "purposes" of such evidence is to 
rebut the notion that "she could have left." For an explanation, see note 223 and accompanying 
text. 
150 People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1,14 (1996) (Brown concurring) (emphasis 
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Other courts equated imminence and alternatives via battered woman 
syndrome testimony-the syndrome attempts to rebut the notion that 
"she should have left" and the syndrome was viewed as relevant to the 
legal question of "imminence."151 
3. The nonconfrontational cases. 
This leaves us with a small minority of nonconfrontational cases 
(37/233, or 16 percent)."' Interestingly enough, even though clock time 
is an issue in these cases, courts did quite a bit more than simply refer 
to the temporal. Indeed, in almost all of these cases (28/37, or 76 per-
cent),"' courts made arguments similar to the ones we have seen 
above in the confrontational cases, arguments based on other self-
defense factors. They claimed not only that the time was too long, or 
that the attack was preemptive, but also that the defendant had time 
to premeditate or to choose lawful alternatives, and that there was no 
real threat or a disproportionate response. The nonconfrontational 
cases, then, only serve to confirm what the confrontational cases tell 
us: that imminence has a tendency to serve as a proxy, a convenient 
added), quoting People v Scoggins, 37 Cal 676, 684 (1869). See also cases cited in notes 146-48. 
Occasionally, a defendant's attempt to take reasonable alternatives to avoid the violence will be 
used to support a finding of imminent threat. See, for example, State v Lynch, 436 S2d 567,569 
(La 1983) (noting with favor, in concluding that the defendant was faced by an imminent threat, 
that the defendant "was trying to retreat and asked [the victim] to leave her alone") (emphasis 
added). 
151 See, for example, Bonner v State, 740 S2d 439.440 (Ala Crim App 1998) (noting that bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence may be admitted to "dispel the ordinary lay person's percep-
tion that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time"), quoting State v Koss, 
49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,973 (1990); State v Williams, 787 SW2d 308,313 (Mo App 1990) 
(stating that "[t]he [battered woman syndrome] evidence rejected was necessary for a jury to 
understand the defendant's perceptions of her situation, particularly her feelings that no escape 
was possible, and her resultant conclusion that killing [the victim] was an act of self-defense"): 
lbn-Tamas v United States, 407 A2d 626.633-34 (DC App 1979) (emphasis added): 
[T]he government implied to the jury that the logical reaction of a woman who was truly 
frightened by her husband (let alone regularly brutalized by him) would have been to call 
the police from time to time or to leave him. In an effort to rebut this line of attack by the 
government, the defense proffered Dr. Walker's [expert] testimony to ... [among other 
things] provide a basis from which the jury could understand why [the defendant] perceived 
herself in imminent danger at the time of the shooting. 
152 For examples of such cases, see generally Ha v State, 892 P2d 184 (Alaska App 1995) 
(holding that reasonable fear that the victim would someday kill the defendant did not constitute 
fear of "imminent" harm for purpose of the defendant's self-defense claim); People v Aris, 215 
Cal App 3d 1178, 264 Cal Rptr 167 (1989) (holding no self-defense where wife killed husband in 
his sleep), overruled in part by People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1 (1996); State v 
Stewart, 243 Kan 639,763 P2d 572 (1988) (holding homicide not justified as self-defense by bat-
tered wife where no evidence of deadly threat or imminent danger); Jahnke v State, 682 P2d 991 
(Wyo 1984) (upholding voluntary manslaughter conviction of son who killed father because son 
premeditatedly attacked father without immediate provocation). 
153 Even if we eliminate those cases in which threat alone is at issue, a majority of noncon-
frontational cases still use imminence as a proxy for other factors (21/37. or 57 percent). 
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one-word symbol for a variety of legal arguments, arguments that seek 
to adjudicate the relative responsibility of the parties for the conflict 
(and, as we will see later, their relationship to the state). This occurred 
in cases of male defendants'54 and female ones as well as in cases in-
volving battering'ss and those that did not.156 
The nonconfrontational cases, like their confrontational counter-
parts, suggest important caveats for the traditional objectivist position 
on imminence. Courts often say that imminence means that the vio-
lence must be "now," "at the instant," or "presently," but when pushed 
to explain their results these courts often seem to refer to factors 
bearing on the relative responsibility of the parties for the violence. 
The defendant in Ha v State'57 had twelve hours between the fight and 
killing, time measured not only in hours and minutes, but in the time 
to change his course and to summon the constable. When he did not, 
his act was deemed one of revenge.158 Similarly, the defendant in Peo-
ple v Aris,159 who killed her husband in his sleep, had time to leave her 
husband and move in with her aunt;'60 and for all we know, he might 
have changed his mind about beating her again.'•' Of course, once ex-
pressed this way, we can begin to see that time has proceeded very far 
from the clock. We only get to these questions, however, if we consider 
the possibility that, even in cases where time has an objective referent, 
it may also carry other meanings. 
154 See, for example, Ha, 892 P2d at 195 (equating time with the time to seek legal redress: 
"The evidence at Ha's trial shows that Ha [the defendant] had ample opportunity to inform oth-
ers of his conflict with Buu [the victim] and to seek their assistance.") (emphasis added). See also 
id, equating a twelve-hour time gap between fight and killing with emotion (lack of fear). 
155 Aris, 264 Cal Rptr at 173 (equating time with seriousness of threat: an immediate, rather 
than a prior threat, is required "because it may be that the party making the threat has relented 
or abandoned his purpose, or his courage may have failed, or the threat may have been only idle 
gasconde [sic], made without any purpose to execute it"); id (equating time with alternatives: an 
imminent threat is one "so urgent as to afford no reasonable mode of escape other than by kill-
ing"), quoting People v Fowler, 178 Cal657, 174 P 892,898 (1918). The Aris court further argued: 
The law of self-defense, whether perfect or imperfect, does not provide an alternative means 
of resolving the battered woman's problem. For resolution of that problem, a battered 
woman must look to other means provided by her family, friends, and society in general 
such as restraining orders, shelters, and criminal prosecution of the batterer. 
264 Cal Rptr at 174 (emphasis added). 
156 See generally Ha, 892 P2d 184. 
157 892 P2d 184 (Alaska App 1995). 
158 See id at 195 (stating that the defendant had ample opportunity to seek legal redress); id 
at 196 (explaining that the defendant had no reasonable fear of imminent danger when he 
"hunted Buu [the victim] through the streets of Dillingham and then shot him from behind"). 
159 215 Cal App 3d 1178, 264 Cal Rptr 167 (1989), overruled in part by People v Humphrey, 
13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1 (1996). 
160 264 Cal Rptr at 174 ("The law cannot allow her to shoot her husband instead of, as was 
the case here, inconveniencing her out-of-state aunt by moving in with her."). 
161 See note 155. 
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Ill. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
OF SELF-DEFENSE 
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If my survey is right, then it should no longer be sufficient to 
wave one's hand at the clock and insist that the justificatory principles 
of self-defense depend upon an "objective" imminence requirement 
without, at the same time, explaining precisely what the imminence 
requirement means. Nor should it be sufficient to conclude that the 
problem of imminence is relegated to the relatively rare battered 
woman case. Instead, it should be seen for what it is-a problem that 
affects all self-defense cases. My argument is not that time has no ob-
jective meaning in the law or in life; it is that the assertion of its objec-
tivity is too often incomplete. By studying the meaning of imminence, 
we may shed light not only on the problems of this particular doctrinal 
rule, but more generally on the debate about subjectivity and objectiv-
ity within the criminal law. 
In this Part, I consider some of the implications of my findings for 
the doctrine and theory of self-defense. In Part III.A, I argue that im-
minence may take back with one hand what the law provides with the 
other hand in other self-defense rules (particularly, the retreat doc-
trine). In Part III.B, I urge that these contradictions reflect conflicting 
models of necessity. Finally, in Part III.C, I argue that this is not ex-
plained or resolved by the ever-present debate about excuse and justi-
fication in the law of self-defense. 
A. Doctrinal Disarray 
If my survey is right, the law is routinely (if not invariably) impos-
ing a rule it considers to be about "time" in cases where "time" may 
not matter. When a man is involved in a brawl or suspects an attacker 
is in the bushes, or sees a flash of a gun, and kills, time (at least as 
measured by the clock) is not really the issue."'' Even if courts are sim-
ply using the term "imminence" loosely, there should be more concern 
about this odd usage. There are obvious costs of misdirection- risks 
that the law's apparent meaning is not its real one. Moreover, there 
are risks of "double-counting," or "intensifying," accomplished by a 
rule of imminence that simply repeats other factors (if imminent 
threat simply means a grave threat, what do we gain by saying "grave 
threat" twice?).163 But these costs are not simply ones of indeterminacy 
and redundancy but also of potential inconsistency. If imminence 
162 Instead, the question is one of threat: was the flash in the woods a serious threat, serious 
enough to provoke deadly violence, either as a matter of a reasonable perception in the situation 
or without regard to the defendant's position? 
163 Of course, if this were a measure of doctrinal tests, which are notoriously repetitive, then 
that would not be much of a critique. 
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serves as a proxy for other self-defense factors-questions of motive 
and emotion and retreat-then scholars of self-defense should be 
worried not only that imminence is sloppy but also that, as applied, 
imminence invites doctrinal confusion. Indeed, they should be worried 
that, despite the conventional wisdom that the elements of self-
defense are well-established and coherent, in fact the law of immi-
nence reflects deep conflicts in the law of self-defense. 
This becomes particularly clear when one compares rules on 
imminence with those on retreat (although potential inconsistencies 
are not limited to retreat rules). For approximately 150 years, the law 
of the United States has been in some conflict about retreae64 The ma-
jority view is that retreat is not required,'6' that in the words of an an-
cient Ohio decision, the "true man" may stand his ground in response 
to an unlawful attack.'66 In a substantial minority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, the defendant must retreat if it is safe to do so. Both sets of juris-
dictions tend to restrict this rule to public places; retreat in the home 
is not required in the vast majority of states, although some jurisdic-
tions make an exception for persons who reside together.167 Now con-
sider how imminence may affect retreat rules. If, as my survey shows, 
imminence serves as a proxy for "alternatives" (at least in some non-
trivial set of cases) then imminence may operate as a retreat rule-
even in those jurisdictions or situations that do not require retreat. A 
court that asks whether the threat was imminent and means by this 
question whether the defendant had any better, lawful choice is de-
manding the kind of second-guessing of alternatives that no-retreat 
jurisdictions do not demand. The jury, told that it need not ask why the 
164 For a survey of this debate, see Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev at 429-35 (cited in note 10). 
165 LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 498 (cited in note 6) (stating that "[t]he majority of 
American jurisdictions holds that the defender ... need not retreat"). Perhaps in a bit of wishful 
thinking, academics have tended to downplay this rule, occasionally writing as if retreat were the 
majority rule. See, for example, Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and 
Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law 54 (Westview 1995) (noting that "codes typically 
oblige a person to retreat before using deadly force"). Indeed, most scholars, following Beale 
(great enemy of realists), seem to believe that any rule other than a retreat rule is positively un-
civilized. See, for example, LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(f) at 498 (cited in note 6) (stating that re-
treat "might be regarded as a more civilized view"); Joseph H. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous 
Assault, 16 Harv L Rev 567,582 (1903) (concluding that law exists to control individuals' uncon-
trolled impulses, "both forcibly and by putting an end to the necessity for their exercise"). Re-
treat goes to the core of the theory of necessity on which self-defense must rest; one cannot sim-
ply assume the proper theory by picking retreat over nonretreat. On competing ideas of neces-
sity, see text accompanying notes 179-200. 
166 Erwin v State, 29 Ohio St 186, 199-200 (1876) (stating that the "true man" cannot be ex-
pected "to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or 
do him enormous bodily harm"). 
167 LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(f) at 498 (cited in note 6) (noting that "even in those juris-
dictions which require retreat, the defendant need not retreat ... from his home"); id § 5.7(f) at 
499 n 72 (noting that the "majority view" does not require retreat of co-occupants). 
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defendant did not go through the kitchen door, is still invited to ask 
the same question, albeit in temporal form168 -did the defendant have 
the time to go through the kitchen doori69 Thus, in the same case, a 
jury may be told to ignore the fact that the defendant could have run 
through the door (no retreat rule) and, at the same time, that they 
must deny the defense if he could have run through the door (immi-
nence rule). 
This risk of silent contradiction (imminence taking back what the 
law gives in other guises) is not limited to a bare majority of jurisdic-
tions that never apply retreat rules. The risk of contradiction operates 
even in those jurisdictions that typically require retreat. Imagine a 
case in a retreat jurisdiction in which the court concludes that it will 
not instruct on retreat because retreat could not be conducted in 
complete safety or because, as in almost all retreat jurisdictions, re-
treat is not required in the home.170 The court instructs on imminence. 
We are back again at the same potential inconsistency and, indeed, it 
has become worse. For, here, the court has specifically concluded that 
the jury should not be second-guessing alternatives and yet, having in-
structed on imminence, it may invite the jury to ask that very question. 
Indeed, the jury may find that the defendant in the confrontational 
situation should have "run through the door" and reject self-defense 
even though the court has specifically found that running through the 
door was dangerous. 
Lest this seem academic, consider Ohio's tortured experience 
with retreat and imminence.171 Ohio is a retreat jurisdiction172 but, like 
many such jurisdictions, makes an exception for "the home" (the 
home is a man's "castle" from which he should not be required tore-
treat).173 At the same time, Ohio defines "imminence" in terms that 
168 Since, by definition, time is not an issue in a confrontational case, the jury may well dis-
count the reference to time and simply ask whether there were alternatives. 
169 These questions are not, of course, identical. But that is all the more reason to worry 
whether "time" is serving a covert function as a retreat or other rule. 
170 See LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(f) at 498-99 (cited in note 6). 
171 Ohio is not the only jurisdiction where imminence and retreat have been explicitly con-
joined. See, for example, Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002,1004 (DC 1986) (concluding that 
the jury could consider whether the defendant could retreat in determining whether he was "ac-
tually or apparently in imminent danger"). See also notes 117-24 (citing cases and jurisdictions) 
accompanying text. 
172 State v Thomas, 77 Ohio St 3d 323,673 NE2d 1339, 1342 (1997): 
In Ohio, the affirmative defense of self-defense has three elements: (1) the defendant was 
not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that 
she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that her only means of es-
cape was the use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or 
avoid the danger. 
173 Id at 1342-43 (citations omitted): 
[T]here is no duty to retreat when one is assaulted in one's own home .... This exception to 
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lower courts have acknowledged sound like a retreat rule: the "immi-
nence" requirement in Ohio is explicitly defined to mean a threat the 
response to which was the "only means of escape,"174 a threat that 
"could only be forestalled or escaped by a resort to the use of ... 
force."175 In most cases, this "imminence-as-retreat" rule may simply 
seem a redundancy or perhaps an intensifier, requiring retreat "twice" 
(once in the form of imminence and again in the form of retreat). But, 
when retreat is not required (for example, when the killing is in the 
home) conflict can easily arise, with imminence requiring retreat 
where retreat rules do not. Lower courts have noted this issue but it 
appears not to have been resolved.176 Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has actually exacerbated the potential field of conflict by expanding 
exemptions from retreat while, at the same time, endorsing an immi-
nence rule that seems to define imminence as retreat.177 
the duty to retreat derives from the doctrine that one's home is one's castle and one has a 
right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack. The rationale is that a person 
in her own home has already retreated "to the wall," as there is no place to which she can 
further flee in safety. 
174 State v Williford, 1988 Ohio App LEXIS 1906, *22 (noting that "the slayer has a bona 
fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means 
of escape from such danger was in the use of such force") (emphasis added). 
175 State v Eng, 1994 Ohio App LEXIS 4655, *5-6 (stating that "the Defendant had an hon-
est belief that she or a member of her family was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm that could only be forestalled or escaped by a resort to the use of such force") (emphasis 
added). And yet Ohio courts perceive retreat and imminence as separate requirements. See, for 
example, State v Alvis, 1997 Ohio App LEXIS 3859, *9 (stating that "[b]efore the jury can reach 
the duty to retreat issue, they must determine if the defendant is in imminent danger of death or 
great bodily harm"). 
176 As one court put it: "The [imminence] instruction ... in saying that it must find that de-
fendant's 'only means of escape from such danger was the use of such force' ... places the bur-
den of retreating upon the defendant." State v Wolfe, 1985 Ohio App LEXIS 5696, *5. See also 
State v Garrette, 1983 Ohio App LEXIS 13965, *6--7 (noting defendant's argument that the im-
minence instruction was inconsistent with the idea that she had no duty to retreat in her home; 
appearing to agree that the imminence instruction implies a duty to retreat). It is worthwhile to 
note that these cases were unpublished because they involved the controversial question 
whether the courts should require retreat for cohabitants, a rule that was disputed primarily (but 
not exclusively) by battered women. That controversy was esolved only much later by the Ohio 
Supreme Court. See Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343 (holding that a person attacked within the home 
has no duty to retreat). 
177 See Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343. Early attempts to avoid this potential conflict found that 
there was a duty to retreat even in the home. See State v Scott, 1995 Ohio App LEXIS 3880, *12-
15 (unpublished opinion) (rejecting a battered woman defendant's challenge to inconsistent in-
structions that she had no duty to retreat in the home, but that she had a duty to "avoid the dan-
ger"); Garrette, 1983 Ohio App LEXIS 13965 at *6--7 (rejecting a battered woman defendant's 
claim that an imminence instruction impermissibly imposed a duty of retreat on the theory that 
the defendant had a duty of retreat in the home). Ohio courts later reverser! the position that 
there was a duty to retreat in the home, first in a case of male-on-male combat, State v Williford, 
49 Ohio St 3d 247,551 NE2d 1279, 1282 (1990) ("there is no duty to retreat from one's home"), 
and only seven years later (after innumerable cases) in a battered woman's case involving co-
habitants. Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343. 
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The skeptic might insist that the conflict between retreat and im-
minence means little because retreat is only one possible source of 
contradiction. However, the risk applies as well to other self-defense 
factors. Consider a case, for example, where imminence operates as a 
surrogate for motive or emotion. A jury finds, in ruling on a premedi-
tated murder charge, that the defendant did not deliberate, but then, 
in the course of ruling on self-defense, finds itself concluding that 
there was no imminent threat because the defendant acted out of re-
venge rather than fear. A jury has thus found both that the homicide 
was not deliberate (when it considers mens rea) and deliberate (when 
it considers imminence). Similar difficulties apply in the case of ag-
gression and provocation. Aggressors are generally denied a self-
defense claim.178 Juries are typically instructed that they must deter-
mine whether the defendant is in fact the "aggressor." Now imagine a 
jury that concludes that the defendant is not the "aggressor," but that 
there was no "imminent threat" because the threat was the defen-
dant's own responsibility (he acted first). The jury will have found 
both that the defendant was not an aggressor and that he was. And 
these theoretical possibilities are all heightened by the fact that the 
clock may be unavailable as an objective referent for "imminence." 
Remember, in this survey, the vast majority of self-defense cases on 
appeal raising the imminence issue involved confrontational allega-
tions. In such cases, the law that focuses on imminence simply invites 
judges and juries to read imminence as a proxy for other factors. 
B. Questions of Theory 
Some have suggested that the way out of the imminence dilemma 
is to focus on "necessity.""• Professors Schulhofer and Robinson, for 
example, have argued that we eliminate the imminence requirement 
altogether.""' Others have urged that necessity takes priority over im-
178 See LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(e) at 497 (cited in note 6) (stating that an aggressor 
generally "may not avail himself of the defense of self-defense"). 
179 The skeptic might also argue that all I have found is a small subset of the total set of ap-
pellate self-defense cases and imminence cases are likely to be a relatively small problem. This is 
possible, but unlikely. If imminence were limited to cases involving time gaps, it would present a 
small problem, but this is not how courts appear to be using the requirement. And, even if the 
relative portion of a full appellate sample were smaller than my survey shows, the critic would 
still have to show that this kind of confusion does not affect the case at other stages-during 
charging, jury deliberation, etc. 
180 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc Phil & Pol105, 127 
(Spring 1990) (arguing that "the traditional insistence on a literally 'imminent' infliction of great 
bodily harm must be abandoned outright" because the correct inquiry is the necessity of the bat-
tered woman's action rather than "imminence per se"). See also Robinson, Criminal Law De-
fenses § 13l(b)(3) at 76--77 (cited in note 38) (stating that "proper application of the necessity 
requirement would seem adequate to prevent potential abuse of a justification defense in cases 
where the force is not imminent"). 
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minence.'"1 Unfortunately, these moves do not resolve the potential for 
conflict in the law of imminence; they simply transform the question 
of the meaning of imminence into the meaning of necessity, bringing 
us to the most fundamental, yet unresolved, questions in the theory of 
self -defense. 
If, as some have asserted, imminence is a "translator" of a neces-
sity principle,182 it translates two opposing views of necessity-
necessity as aversion to violence (one needs to avoid violence at all 
costs) and necessity as liberty and right (one needs to respond to 
wrongful threats). Those theorists, like George Fletcher, who urge that 
an imminence requirement is essential to a justified self-defense claim, 
do so based on a theory of self-defense that is heavily invested with 
pacifism and social responsibility toward the victim's interest in life.'83 
The idea is that a defendant's act is justified when necessary, where 
necessity means that the defendant had "no" alternative but to kill.' .. 
But this is not the only available view of necessity. Theories of self-
defense that focus on autonomy do so on the basis that "[r]ight need 
never yield to wrong."185 The argument is that the killing is "necessary" 
when it serves to right the wrong of a deadly attack. 
These ideas of necessity, in turn, present two conflicting theories 
of self-defense: one theory I will dub "pacifist," the other "libertar-
ian."186 The pacifist stresses a view of necessity that depends upon the 
181 Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 
NC L Rev 371, 406 (1993) (arguing for a "procedure" that "would retain the imminence re-
quirement in those cases in which it is a translator of the necessity principle, but would remove it 
when it acts as a potential inhibitor"). 
182 See id at 380 (stating that "imminence has no significance independent of the notion of 
necessity"; it is, "in other words, a 'translator' of the underlying principle of necessity, not the 
principle itself'); Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 131(b)(3) at 76 (cited in note 38) (noting 
that imminence should be viewed as a "modification of the necessity requirement"). 
183 See Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 560 (cited in note 2) (discussing the "social point of 
view" that requires a proportionality rule sensitive to the "competing interest" in life of the ag-
gressor); Fletcher,A Crime of Self-Defense at 33 (cited in note 2) (discussing the "social variation 
of justifiable self-defense"). 
184 See Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 559 (cited in note 2) ("Necessity speaks to the question 
whether some less costly means of defense ... might be sufficient to ward off an attack."). 
185 See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 10.5 at 865 (cited in note 22) (describing the 
German theory of autonomy). 
186 I have excluded, for textual economy's sake, a comprehensive list of theories of self-
defense, including one of the most popular, the lesser evil approach. See Robinson, Criminal 
Law Defenses§ 131(a) at 69 (cited in note 38) (stating that "[d)efensive force justifications rely 
on [a] balancing of evils"). The "lesser evil" approach assumes what I am trying to put into ques-
tion. It gives us a method-consequentialism-without giving us much to go on in terms of the 
substance of the "costs" and "benefits" at stake. See Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense at 34 
(cited in note 2) (attributing to reformers of the 1950s and 1960s the impetus to look for the 
"costs" and "benefits" of self-defense). Once we begin to consider the "costs" (for example, self-
. help overkill and self-preference) versus the "benefits" (for example, protection of freedom of 
action), we are back to considering the two elements of the theory considered here-avoidance 
of violence and autonomy. However, we also have an added "commensurability" problem-how 
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need for the defendant to avoid violence.'"' The libertarian suggests, to 
the contrary, that self-defense protects the rights of citizens to respond 
to unlawful aggression. Unfortunately, neither the libertarian nor the 
pacifist can claim to have won the debate about self-defense. Neither 
theoretical position actually describes the law of self-defense.188 
Although the pacifist position has become almost orthodoxy, in-
fluencing the work of Professors Fletcher,189 Schulhofer,190 Robinson,"1 
and Ashworth/'2 the law of self-defense remains to the contrary. Doc-
trine, as well as public opinion, is far more willing to insist on the pre-
rogatives of one wrongfully attacked than the pacifist theory suggests 
or its adherents would hope.193 The law positively permits self-help 
remedies in the majority of jurisdictions, which allow the defendant to 
"stand his ground" against an attack. Indeed, all jurisdictions permit 
what might be considered excessive violence in some cases: no juris-
diction, as far as I am aware, limits the right of self-defense to deadly 
threats. They all include threats of "serious" or "grave" bodily harm. 194 
are we to measure these features against each other? On these and other theories, see generally 
Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 
Wayne L Rev 1155 (1987) (distinguishing forfeiture, rights, lesser harm, and public benefit theo-
ries). Perhaps more importantly, I have purposely sought to rephrase available theory to empha-
size the relation between defendant and state, which is important to my claim. 
187 See A.J. Ashworth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life. 34 Camb L J 282, 289 (1975) 
("This might be termed the 'human rights' approach ... [and it] would result in a general duty to 
avoid the use of force where non-violent means of self-protection are reasonably open to the 
person attacked."). It also has affinities with Fletcher's "social variation of justifiable self-
defense" to the extent that it recognizes the rights of the aggressor. See Fletcher, A Crime of 
Self-Defense at 34 (cited in note 2) ("Recognizing the humanity of the aggressor implies that in 
some situations the defender must absorb an encroachment on his autonomy rather than inflict 
an excessive cost on the aggressor."). In theory, I would argue that the pacifist position actually 
goes much further than the legal academy has thought. It asks whether it is ever possible to be 
morally justified in killing someone who also has a right to live. See generally Cheyney C. Ryan, 
Self-Defense, Pacifism, and the Possibility of Killing, 93 Ethics 508 (1983). 
188 In a sense this should not be surprising since both positions, one by emphasizing the de-
fendant's relationship to society and the other the defendant's relationship to the victim, focus 
on different aspects of a defense. It also makes sense because these theories, taken to their logi-
cal extreme, would mean either a sharp curtailment of the defense (in the case of the pacifist 
theory) or an extraordinary expansion (in the case of the libertarian theory). 
189 See generally Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense (cited in note 2). 
190 See generally Schulhofer, 7 Soc Phil & Pol105 (cited in note 180). 
191 See generally Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (cited in note 38). 
192 See generally Ashworth, 34 Camb L J 282 (cited in note 187). 
193 Professors Robinson and Darley express consternation that "Americans [ ] stereotypi-
cally 'stand their ground,' and our subjects seem to want them to even when the legal codes say 
they should not." Robinson and Darley,Justice, Liability, and Blame at 60 (cited in note 165). 
194 See note 65. Although acknowledging this, treatises routinely attempt to reconcile the 
"bodily harm" rule with a pacifist view of necessity by arguing that there is an additional "neces-
sity" element that modifies the bodily harm rule. See LaFave. Criminal Law § 5. 7(b) at 492 (cited 
in note 6) (stating that "deadly force" may be used when the attacker "is about to inflict unlawful 
death or serious bodily harm" but qualifying the statement by requiring "that it is necessary to 
use deadly force to prevent it"). Again. from my view, this simply assumes that which is to be 
proven-the idea of necessity upon which self-defense should be built. Necessity is not a sepa-
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If the law were to take seriously the notion that the defendant should 
"avoid" violence, why does it not require that defendants warn, an-
nounce, or shoot in the air if they could do so safely? And yet there 
has never been a general "shoot-in-the-foot-first" rule-a defendant 
need not shoot to disable to sustain a self-defense claim.'9' If necessity 
were to mean what the pacifist theory suggests, it would effectively 
require retreat in every jurisdiction, a state of affairs that does not ac-
cord with present doctrine. In short, the law's necessity is not always 
as "necessary" as it may seem, if by necessary we mean that the de-
fendant must choose the "least violent" or "most pacifist" alternative. 
The libertarian claims a far different idea of necessity. This argu-
ment emphasizes the wrong inflicted on the defendant and his right to 
respond. The implicit claim is that the law of self-defense must recog-
nize society's interest in preventing "private warfare," but that if we go 
too far in discouraging self-help, the citizenry will become the defense-
less prey of the violent- that, as A.V. Dicey put it, "loyal subjects [will] 
become the slaves of ruffians."'96 Under the libertarian theory, the vic-
tim's provocative violence constitutes an assertion of superiority over 
the defendant which must be answered if for no other reason than to 
support the notion of the "right"-to acknowledge the defendant's 
acts as those of the law-abiding.'97 
Like its pacifist opponent, however, the libertarian theory fails to 
describe current doctrine. The law in most jurisdictions refuses to look 
solely to the "wrong" of the victim/aggressor as the sole measure of 
rate element of self-defense; it is a theory which must consistently modify the entire defense. 
195 Indeed, courts of the nineteenth century explicitly declined to adopt such a rule. See 
Rowe v United States, 164 US 546, 558 (1896) ("[I]t was error to make the case depend in whole 
or in part upon the inquiry whether the accused could, by stepping aside, have avoided the at-
tack, or could have so carefully aimed his pistol as to paralyze the arm of his assailant without 
more seriously wounding him."); Baltrip v Texas, 30 Tex App 545, 17 SW 1106, 1107-08 (1891) 
("Upon the subject of self-defense the [trial] court charged 'that the killing would not be justifi-
able by self-defense if the apprehended danger of serious bodily harm or death could have been 
prevented by the use of less violence than taking the life of the deceased.' Under repeated deci-
sions of this court, this charge is erroneous."). This principle is part of Justice Holmes's most fa-
mous opinion on self-defense, Brown v United States, 256 US 335,343 (1921) ("[I]t is not a condi-
tion of immunity that one ... should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not 
think it possible ... to disable his assailant rather than to kill him."). 
196 A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution 489 (8th ed 1915): 
The rule which fixes the limit of self-help must, from the nature of things, be a compromise 
between the necessity, on the one hand, of allowing every citizen to maintain his rights 
against wrongdoers, and the necessity, on the other hand, of suppressing private warfare. 
Discourage self-help, and loyal subjects become the slaves of ruffians. Over-stimulate self-
assertion, and for the arbitrament of the courts, you substitute the decision of the sword or 
the revolver. 
197 See generally Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hamp-
ton, eds, Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (Cambridge 1988) (describing punishment (and by analogy 
violence) as defeat). 
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self-defense. Instead, doctrine has consistently conceived of the rules 
of self-defense in terms that demand that citizens defer to public 
authorities. Almost all the rules of self-defense can be reconceived not 
simply as rules that identify "real wrongs" (real threats, real lack of 
options) but, as well, as rules that create a system that protects society 
from vigilantism. Rules of proportionality and threat and retreat and 
imminence insist that, in many situations, defendants walk away, call 
the constable, and refuse to "substitute the decision of the sword or 
the revolver" for that of the law.198 
If the law has never really embraced either the pacifist or liber-
tarian vision of necessity, perhaps it should not be surprising to find 
both these ideas unresolved in doctrine, submerged in places, like im-
minence, where they are difficult to see or judge.199 But, if this is right, 
then we cannot confidently solve the imminence "problem" by replac-
ing imminence with necessity, or by claiming priority for necessity, or 
by demanding that imminence means the pacifist rather than the lib-
ertarian version of necessity. Each of these positions simply poses the 
question; it does not answer it."" 
C. Necessity, Excuse, and Justification 
If we cannot answer the imminence question by assuming one 
side of the necessity debate, neither can we answer it by referring to 
the distinction between excuse and justification. Some argue, for ex-
ample, that if we can only decide whether self-defense is an excuse, 
then we might be able to resolve the problems of subjectivity and the 
198 Dicey, Law of the Constitution at 489 (cited in note 196). 
199 Jurors often find the law of self-defense quite confusing and, in their questions, reveal 
conflicts. In Bechtel v State, 1992 Okla Crim 55,840 P2d 1, 5-6 (1992), a case involving questions 
about whether a battered wife killed during an extended physical fight, where she claimed that 
the defendant had raised his arms as if to attack again after a lull in the battle, the jury was un-
clear about whether this was enough or whether there had to be an "active" confrontation. They 
not only asked about "fighting and bickering at the time" (the imminence question), but also 
about necessity: "Self-defense is permitted a person solely because of necessity. (1) Does this 
mean or imply when no other options are available; or from (2) Defendant's viewpoint & circum-
stances." Id at 1, 13-15 (emphasis added). These two options represent the distinction between a 
pacifist theory (no other options) and a libertarian theory (defendant's needs). 
zoo Implicit in my claim here and below is that we need a relational theory of self-defense. 
Unfortunately, current contenders for legal theories of self-defense do not do a very good job of 
considering the influence of relational norms, preferring to posit "end-states" of affairs (for ex-
ample, the pacifist's world of no violence) from which to reason. Meanwhile, doctrine shuttles 
back and forth between an idea of necessity as described by a relationship of fault between at-
tacked and attacker and an idea of necessity as a relationship of citizenship that demands that 
even the attacked withdraw. Both views are as dichotomously sketched as the early common law 
distinction between the prevention of a felony and se defendendo. Neither helps in the difficult, 
in-between cases (most appellate self-defense claims).lf we are to resolve this dilemma we must 
reconsider self-defense in a different key, not as a set of values or functions or end-states but as a 
question of the key relationships involved between citizens and between citizens and state. 
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battered woman, giving her an "excuse," and leaving "real" self-
defense for other claims. Objectivity is then left to the justified side of 
the debate, subjectivity to the excuse side. 
In my view, this confuses two different claims. Every criminal law 
defense implicates two different relations: the relationship between 
the defendant and the victim and the relationship between the defen-
dant and the state.'01 The libertarian theorist focuses almost exclusively 
on the relationship of "wrong" between the defendant and the victim, 
making the relationship of the defendant to the state irrelevant. By 
contrast, the pacifist focuses primarily on the relationship of the de-
fendant to the state, emphasizing that the defendant should defer to 
state law enforcement processes (and that this is essential to maintain 
respect for others' right to life). In my own view, both relationships 
must be considered, not balanced or pitted against each other. Any-
time a defendant makes a claim of defense, whether it is a claim of 
self-defense or duress or provocation, he claims in part that he did no 
wrong or should be excused from any wrongful harm he did to that 
victim. But, in considering such defensive claims, there is always the 
fear that, by recognizing the defense, we grant the defendant the 
power to legislate, to set the rules. This is, after all, what we mean, pre-
sumably, when we claim that Goetz and Menendez and Norman took 
the "law" into their own hands-that their actions not only risked 
harm to other human beings but also risked a world in which the de-
fendants' norms were law. 
This distinction is important for a number of reasons. But here it 
is important in defusing the claim that we can solve the problems of 
self-defense by categorizing the defense as excuse or justification. One 
of the rarely considered premises of the excuse/justification debate is 
that defenses are naturally unified. If defenses point toward different 
audiences, and instantiate different relations, however, then this unity 
may be illusory. If Bernhard Goetz must not only claim that the boys 
"wronged" him but also that his use of violence did not offend the 
state, then it is possible that he is making a claim both of justification 
vis-a-vis the boys (they were in the wrong relative to him) and a claim 
of excuse vis-a-vis the state (I should have called the police but the 
state had failed me in the past). We need not resolve such claims to 
201 This is a fairly large theoretical claim. I have also discussed this in the context of provo-
cation. A fuller explication must await publication of a work in progress, V.F. Nourse, The Politi-
cal Structure of Criminal Law (on file with author). George Fletcher is absolutely right when he 
maintains that the law of self-defense is related to political theory. See Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev 
at 570 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the imminence rule "falls into the domain of political rather 
than moral theory"). Indeed, I believe that until we understand the proper relationship of the 
defendant to the state implied by the criminal law, we cannot possibly have a working theory of 
the criminal law consistent with a democratic order and its commitments to equality. 
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see that two different issues are at stake, to see that self-defense may 
be simultaneously a claim of justification with respect to the victim (a 
question and relation of wrong) and a claim of excuse with respect to 
the state (I was wrong not to the call the police, but please excuse 
me ).202 Put another way, self-defense may (in any individual case) be a 
claim both of excuse and of justification. And, if that is right, then we 
cannot confidently claim that the excuse/justification debate solves 
the problem of either the proper theory of necessity or the meaning of 
imminence. 
D. Self-Defense and Objectivity 
In the end, what does this tell us of the objectivist position on 
imminence? It tells us that it is not enough for the objectivist to claim 
that imminence or even necessity is objective without completing the 
thought: objective about what? Of the many meanings that imminence 
might reflect, what meaning is it objective about? Similarly, of the 
many meanings that necessity might have (I "need" to do this because 
I want to, my choices are restricted, or I have no choices at all) what 
meaning are we claiming as objectively determinate? To answer these 
questions, in the end, requires less of the insistence one tends to hear 
in the voices of those who cry "but imminence is objective," and more 
of a tempered and nuanced understanding of the content of the law. 
Until and unless we can define necessity with some greater degree of 
coherence, we are relegating ourselves to a law that risks both doc-
trinal and theoretical incoherence. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, this very project requires an 
acknowledgment that, to be truly objective, one must consider one's 
relation to the knowledge at issue. Put another way, one must have the 
humility to consider the possibility that, in another age or social posi-
tion, in another world, necessity might look quite different. Once, to a 
charge of murder, the duelist had a valid claim of necessary, justified 
202 Debates about Goetz and Norman tend to confuse these two relationships. For example, 
feminists have charged that to lump Norman in with Goetz is to suggest that a life of virtual 
slavery is morally equivalent to a request, even a threatening one, for a few dollars. I agree, but I 
would also add that the feminist claim is focusing on the defendant's relationship to the victim 
and that there is a separate relationship to consider-between the defendant and the state. Both 
Goetz and Norman made similar claims about their relationship to the state: both claimed, in es-
sence, that the state had failed them. Goetz claimed that he had been beaten up before, that the 
state had done nothing, and so he "had" to take the law into his own hands. Far more compel-
lingly, given the history of the state's failure to protect women, Norman argued that the state had 
failed her. Both were making claims that I would characterize as claims of excuse vis-a-vis the 
state-claims that they should have called the police in theory but their choices were so severely 
constrained as to merit compassion for their failures. Whether and how to resolve these latter 
claims of state failure is a difficult question, but it seems to me it is a better question, and a more 
interesting one, than those currently asked about these cases. 
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self-defense.203 Ask the nineteenth-century aristocrat whether, when 
the glove was thrown, he "had" to act and he will say that he had "no 
other choice," that it was "necessary"; ask him whether his reasons 
were "objective" and the answer will be "yes." Today, we are more 
skeptical about our aristocrats: we think the duelist could easily have 
walked away; we think (from our distance) that his opinion was, for 
that reason, subjective (contingent); we see quite easily (from our so-
cial and temporal distance) that the duelist "needed" to fight to sus-
tain his social position, one contingent upon a political theory we now 
disavow. Put more abstractly, we see the "logic" of objectivity in the 
social and political relations that completed his claims of necessity. 
With this humility in mind, we might even pause to consider the 
possibility that time-so apparently objective-may, from another po-
sition, seem more capable of meaning, more contingent, more reflec-
tive of social relations than we thought. This is not a claim of crude 
relativism or even that we give up on the notion of objectivity (at 
least, as aspiration or even intellectual method). It is a claim that ob-
jectivity requires an acknowledgment of its own limitations. Put more 
pointedly, a more humble aspiration to objectivity might see that there 
is always the risk that objectivity is simply a "projection racket," one 
that projects onto the world that which we take for granted-indeed, 
that objectivity assumes that which it seeks to prove.204 
IV. SUBJECTIVITY AND FEMINISM 
If the objectivist claim may now appear more contingent and 
complex than we imagined, I would like to take the argument further 
and also suggest that what we have seen as subjective may be more 
objective than we thought. The hope of many, liberals and feminists 
alike, has been that if only we soften the focus a bit, if we situate the 
doctrine, if it becomes more sympathetic to the individual, then the 
law will become more just. In this part, I argue that the subjectivist 
view tends, much like its objective antagonist, to avoid the problems of 
self-defense law in its present form. Perhaps more importantly, I urge 
that, to the extent that subjectivism is associated with the feminist po-
203 Russell Hardin reports that in 1822 a duelist was acquitted based on necessity: The 
court's justification for the acquittal was "the necessity, according to the existing law of society, of 
acting as he did." Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict 94 (Princeton 1995), 
quoting V.G. Kiernan, The Duel in European History 208 (Oxford 1989) (emphasis added by 
Hardin). 
204 Those who urge the "objectivity" of the existing law of imminence believe that they are 
proving its objectivity when, in fact, my argument suggests that they are assuming it. Of course, I 
must perform the same experiment, and consider whether I have chosen a method, reading the 
language of cases, that distorts my conclusion in favor of "meaning." Because of this self-
referential risk, I have tried to triangulate my method, looking at history, contemporary law, and 
work in other disciplines to support the claim that imminence may have meaning. 
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sition, it has tended to occlude, rather than expose, certain gender ine-
qualities. I say this because I think that the feminist position is a good 
deal stronger, and more disturbing, than critics have assumed. 
A. The Promise of Subjectivity 
When battered woman self-defense cases first emerged in the late 
1970s, litigators eagerly reached out to the notion of subjectivity to 
help juries and judges understand the causes and incidents of batter-
ing.205 This approach, pioneered by the important work of Elizabeth 
Schneider, revolutionized self-defense law'06 and led to the wide accep-
tance of battered woman syndrome evidence.'07 The theory was that if 
only juries and judges could understand the individual woman's ex-
perience, then self -defense law could be reformed to accord more jus-
tice to women. Doctrinally, the reformers suggested that "imminence" 
is really a question of the battered woman's "perspective" on immi-
nence, i.e. that a battered woman-because of her experience-is 
more sensitized2(" to the "cues" signaling violence.2()9 
205 See, for example, Elizabeth M. Schneider and Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women 
Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 Women's Rts L Rep 149, 
156-57 (1978) (discussing courts' emphasizing subjectivity in self-defense cases with female de-
fendants). 
206 See, for example, Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship 
between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 Tenn L Rev 1019, 
1019 (1997) (asserting that feminist activists such as Schneider have "transformed society's un-
derstanding of abuse against women by their intimate partners"); Peter Margulies, The Violence 
of Law and Violence against Women, 8 Cardozo Stud L & Lit 179, 181 (1996) (arguing that bat-
tered woman self-defense law is an "origin story" in the struggle for women's equality under the 
law). 
2m It is worthwhile noting that, early on, Professor Schneider raised important questions 
about the syndrome, arguing that the testimony was important because it described the experi-
ence of battered women but that it could also prove problematic if it focused exclusively on 
women's victimization. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women s Self-Defense 
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts L Rep 195, 197, 220 
(1986). 
208 Battered woman syndrome evidence often relies upon this sensitivity. See, for example, 
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1,15-16 (1996) (Brown concurring); Developments 
in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 Harv L Rev 1498,1582 (1993) (explain-
ing that battered woman syndrome testimony may involve experts testifying that "because a bat-
tered woman is attuned to her abuser's pattern of attacks, she learns to recognize subtle gestures 
or threats that distinguish the severity of attacks"). 
209 One can be quite sympathetic to these perceptual claims as a psychological matter 
(which I am) and still wonder whether they really help resolve the problem. Mark Kelman has 
asked some very tough questions about the notion of heightened perception, suggesting that it 
may not really differentiate the battered woman from claimants like Bernhard Goetz who simi-
larly rely upon a history of violence to support their claims of imminent and serious threat. Mark 
Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness,17 Critical Inquiry 798,813-14 (1991). My own 
view is that our intuitions differ in these cases not because of the prior history (the law has al-
ways conceded that history may have some effect upon the propriety of a self-defense claim), or 
necessarily perception, but because the normative baseline of the relationships involved colors 
our view of the relevance of the history. In Goetz, we suspect that the defendant sought to domi-
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This approach appealed to many because it unified criminal law 
theory's focus on individuation of the criminal law (emphasizing the 
individual characteristics of defendants) with the needs of women.210 
And, for that reason, it met with a great deal of initial success. Jurisdic-
tions flirted with or adopted "reasonable woman" standards;211 indeed, 
a majority have, by legislative fiat if not judicial decision, permitted 
the admission of expert syndrome testimony based on the defendant's 
"subjective state," known as battered woman syndrome.212 And, if 
there has been some moderation in this effort, yielding for the most 
part standards that are both objective and subjective, it has been in-
creasingly successful in sensitizing courts to the dilemmas of battering 
as well as constructing the academic debate along the lines of "subjec-
tive" versus "objective" standards.213 
More recently, however, the subjectivized approach has come un-
der substantial, and in some cases, intemperate, attacks from the 
criminal law academy. Some have insisted that a subjective approach 
towards self-defense encourages lawlessness by allowing battered 
women to kill with impunity long after the threat has subsided.214 Crit-
nate his attackers because of a view of his inherent racial and other superiority toward his vic· 
tims; in the battered woman case, we see the woman as seeking to assert her dignity in the face of 
an assertion of superiority by her attacker/mate. Because the history of violence purports to be 
neutral with respect to these relationships (both have a history of violence and have a height-
ened awareness of its cues), neither history nor perception appears to provide a distinction be-
tween the cases, unless one views the nature of the relationship at issue. 
210 See David A.J. Richards, Introduction to Symposium on Self-Defense and Relations of 
Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U Pitt L Rev 461, 
463 (1996) (noting that Schneider pioneered self-defense arguments for battered women in 
terms of principles of individualization). 
211 See, for example, State v Wanrow, 88 Wash 2d 221, 559 P2d 548, 559 (1977) (noting that 
self-defense instructions must "afford women the right to have their conduct judged in light of 
the individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination"). See generally 
Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory 
and Practice, 77 Cornell L Rev 1398 (1992) (surveying and critiquing this development). 
212 As of 1994, one study found that "[e]xpert testimony on battering and its effects" had 
been held admissible, at least in part, in "each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia" and 
that "[t]welve states have enacted statutes providing for the admissibility of expert testimony." 
The report noted, however, that "18 states have also excluded expert testimony in some cases." 
Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 
Wise Women's L J 75, 83 (1996). A subsequent government study had somewhat different find-
ings, noting potentially greater diversity among the states, but concluded that nearly 70 percent 
of the states have found expert testimony "relevant to supporting a self-defense claim" and to 
the defendant's "state of mind." See The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and 
Its Effects in Criminal Trials: Report Responding to Section 40507 of the Violence against Women 
Act, NCJ 160972 (May 1996), cited in Clare Dalton and Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women 
and the Law 746 (Foundation 2001). 
213 See, for example, Richards, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 464 (cited in note 210) (explaining that 
facts concerning battered women, when properly introduced under an individualized standard, 
help juries understand how and why a battered spouse might reasonably kill in self-defense). 
214 See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 5 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that battered woman 
nonconfrontational claims "threaten the very fabric of democracy"). 
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ics from the left and right have no hesitation in likening battered 
women to executionerS.215 Nor do they-and a good many others-
have any hesitation in linking this development with unhappy trends 
in the law.216 In the late 1990s, for example, there was a growing aca-
demic chorus charging that the problem with the criminal law was that 
it had become too soft and subjective, and that battered woman cases 
were, at least in part, responsible for that development.'!' 
B. Imminence as Retreat Rule 
The feminist emphasis on subjectivity has appeared to be a claim 
that there is nothing really wrong with the "objective" rules that "sub-
jectivity" cannot cure. If my survey is right, though, there may well be 
things that are "wrong" with the rules, at least where the rules are con-
sidered as reflective of relational norms. Consider what we know from 
my discussion of imminence and retreat. The feminist position has 
generally been hostile to retreat rules on the theory that they too eas-
ily dissolve into questions about why the woman did not leave the re-
lationship rather than whether the knife was poised above her head."" 
By the 1990s, feminists had largely given up the battle, however, think-
ing that it had largely been won.219 
There were good reasons for thinking retreat was not such an im-
portant doctrinal issue. For one thing, most jurisdictions do not re-
215 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2) (discussing the case of Judy Norman, 
who killed her sleeping husband, as one in which she put herself "in the position of judge and 
executioner"); Wilson, Moral Judgment at 62--66 (cited in note 3) (discussing battered women's 
nonconfrontational killings and suggesting that transformation of the concept of necessity would 
authorize "private, paid executions" in such cases). Appellate judges have often engaged in this 
rhetoric as well. See, for example, State v Stewart, 243 Kan 639,763 P2d 572,579 (1988) (stating 
that allowing a self-defense claim for the killing of a sleeping husband would "in effect allow the 
execution of the abuser for past or future acts and conduct"). 
216 See, for example, Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 79 (1997) (cited in note 4) (ar-
guing that "[t]he integrity of legal doctrine has suffered immensely" from the spread of syn-
drome evidence aimed at aiding battered women). 
217 For general discussions, see Wilson, Moral Judgment (cited in note 3); Downs, More 
Than Victims (cited in note 3); Dershowitz,Abuse Excuse (cited in note 3). 
218 See, for example, Cynthia K. Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-
Defense and the Law 187-88 (Ohio State 1989) (arguing that rules requiring retreat in the home 
are especially unfair to women defendants); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the 
Problem of Transitions: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U Chi Legal F 23,36 (ar-
guing that retreat rules fail to comprehend the danger of attempting to leave the abusive situa-
tion and thus make "a mockery of the standard self-defense analysis regarding 'duty to re-
treat"'). 
219 In her survey, for example, Holly Maguigan found the doctrine of retreat led to few 
"bad" trial outcomes. See, for example, Maguigan, 140 U PaL Rev at 419 (cited in note 5) (find-
ing that "[a] survey of the cases analyzed shows that the duty to retreat was generally not the 
cause of bad trial outcomes and that, in most of those cases where it was outcome-determinative, 
it was the result of the rule's application rather than its definition"). 
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quire retreat "in the home,"220 where most battered women kill.221 For 
another, to the extent jurisdictions had exceptions to the castle rule 
for "cohabitants" (which would require a battered woman to retreat 
against her husband), courts have increasingly rejected such rules as 
unfair to battered women, leaving the "retreat" problem to a few non-
conforming jurisdictionS.222 Finally, almost all jurisdictions adopting 
syndrome evidence have accepted the position that leaving is not the 
proper question in these cases.223 
If, however, my survey is right, eliminating "retreat" rules is not 
necessarily going to solve the "retreat" problem. If, as we have seen 
above, imminence (or necessity or any other factor) may operate as a 
proxy for a retreat rule, then we are back at square one. It is still pos-
sible that in battered woman cases a jury or judge will ask, via immi-
nence, whether the defendant should have run through the kitchen 
door, or had a "five-minute head start," even if there is no retreat rule. 
More importantly, once it becomes possible that imminence (or neces-
sity or other factors) can act as a silent retreat rule, the retreat prob-
lem is no longer limited to a few jurisdictions but applies to a vast ar-
220 Retreat is generally not required in one's home. See State v Thomas, 77 Ohio St 3d 323, 
673 NE2d 1339, 1343 (1997) ("The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have held that 
there is no duty to retreat when one is attacked in one's own home, regardless of whether or not 
the assailant has a right to be in the home equal to that of the one being assailed."). See also 
Maguigan, 140 U PaL Rev at 419-20 (cited in note 5) (finding that most jurisdictions imposing a 
duty to retreat "exempt from the duty to retreat those defendants who are attacked in their own 
homes"); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MichL Rev 1, 83 n 373 (1991) (same). 
221 See Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 420 n 141 (cited in note 5) (finding that over two 
thirds of confrontational and nonconfrontational cases studied occurred in the home). 
222 See, for example, Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343 (holding there is no duty to retreat from 
one's own home before resorting to lethal force against a cohabitant with an equal right to be in 
the home); Commonwealth v Derby, 451 Pa Super 100,678 A2d 784,785 (1996) (same); State v 
Brown, 117 NC App 239,450 SE2d 538,540-41 (1994) (same); Bechtel v State, 1992 Okla Crim 
55,840 P2d 1,13 (noting that a person has no duty to retreat where he is not an aggressor and is 
"in a place he has a right to be"). But see State v Gartland, 149 NJ 456, 694 A2d 564, 569 (1997) 
(stating that "New Jersey is among the minority of jurisdictions that impose a duty of retreat on 
a woman attacked by her cohabitant spouse"). 
223 See, for example, Smith v State, 268 Ga 196, 486 SE2d 819, 822 (1997) (reporting that 
"[e]xpert testimony was admitted to explain 'why a person suffering from battered woman syn-
drome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends and would fear increased 
aggression"'), quoting Smith v State, 247 Ga 612,277 SE2d 678, 683 (1981); State v Koss, 49 Ohio 
St 3d 213, 551 NE2d 970, 973 (1990) (stating that '"[e]xpert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering re-
lationship is free to leave at any time"'), quoting State v Hodges, 239 Kan 63, 716 P2d 563, 567 
(1986);State v Kelly, 97 NJ 178,478 A2d 364,377 (1984) (noting that "[t]he crucial issue of fact on 
which this expert's testimony would bear is why, given such allegedly severe and constant beat-
ings, combined with threats to kill, defendant had not long ago left decedent"). See also Com-
monwealth v Watson, 4~4 Pa 467, 431 A2d 949, 951-52 (1981) (stating that "[a] woman whose 
husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, by choosing to maintain her 
family relationship with that husband and their children, consent to or assume the risk of further 
abuse"). 
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ray of jurisdictions. The syndrome may provide some counterweight to 
this by instructing the jury about the difficulty of leaving, but since this 
is offered as scientific fact and character trait rather than as legal 
proposition, it may be inapplicable to any individual defendant not fit-
ting the appropriate psychological profile. 
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the conflict between imminence and 
retreat sits on the face of the rules. For years, Ohio's lower courts 
struggled with the question whether, in cases arising in the home, co-
habitants should have to retreat. Eventually, the state supreme court 
decided, following the trend in other jurisdictions, to adopt a rule that 
seemed "friendly" to the battered woman.224 It said that battered 
women do not have to retreat in their homes. But in that very case, the 
court approvingly quoted jury instructions requiring a finding that the 
defendant had no "other alternatives"225 -albeit through the definition 
of an "imminent" threat. What may seem, then, on the surface to be a 
gain for battered women in retreat rules may not be the gain it prom-
ised to be, if a court may take back with imminence what it has given 
on retreat."• 
The conflation of retreat and imminence is particularly problem-
atic in battered woman cases because of the role that "leaving" plays 
in common intuitions about these cases. As courts themselves have 
made clear, the practice, if not the law,"' of battered woman cases re-
volves around the question whether "she should have left." As the 
court put it in State v Kelly,»-" "the crucial issue ... is why, given such 
allegedly severe and constant beatings, combined with threats to kill, 
defendant had not long ago left decedent."229 In this atmosphere, 
where experts and lawyers and judges are all thinking, if not talking, 
about the question of leaving, retreat becomes the kind of "uncon-
scious" of the battered woman's case, driving the lawyers' arguments 
224 Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343. See also text accompanying notes 220 and 222. 
225 Id at 1344 (recounting jury instruction stating that, to find for the defendant on the ques-
tion of self-defense, the jury on the "imminence requirement" must find that "Teresa Thomas 
[the defendant] had an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm and that her only means of escape from that danger was in the use of such force") (empha-
sis added). 
226 This problem should not be seen as limited to those jurisdictions with an overt inconsis-
tency, such as Ohio. Even if there is no explicit doctrinal inconsistency, there is no guarantee, 
given courts' ability to tolerate this at an explicit level, that it might not be tolerated in any indi-
vidual case at the application stage. More importantly, this is not the only kind of inconsistency 
possible; it is only the most dramatic, the one that has the starkest implications given the continu-
ing debate about the wisdom of a retreat rule. 
227 See text accompanying note 223. 
228 97NJ178,478A2d364(1984). 
229 Id at 377 ("Whether raised by the prosecutor as a factual issue or not, our own common 
knowledge tells us that most of us, including the ordinary juror, would ask himself or herself just 
such a question."). 
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and the jury's deliberations.230 Overwhelmingly, courts have attempted 
to thwart such assumptions by embracing battered woman syndrome 
testimony- testimony intended, in large part, to explain that such as-
sumptions fail to describe the situation of the battered defendant.23' 
The problem extends further, however, than the potential ques-
tion of "leaving" -it extends as well to the ways in which imminence 
may absorb other norms disfavoring battered women. Courts have re-
fused to accept, as law or fact, the proposition that battered women 
naturally invite this violence or provoke the attack or that the bat-
tered woman's situation reduces fear. 232 And, yet, if imminence is ca-
pable of absorbing meanings of motive and provocation, meanings.as-
sociated with responsibility for the violence, it should not be surpris-
ing to find that these norms may be recapitulated in battered woman 
cases-despite testimony or instructions to the contrary.233 Put another 
way, the jury instructed that it cannot assume women provoke vio-
lence may find that there was no imminent threat, not because the gun 
was not pointed at the defendant, but because they believe the defen-
dant was in some sense responsible for "dating other men."234 And, if 
that is right, shouldn't these same courts worry that they are creating 
230 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of 
Self-Defense, 15 Harv CR-CL L Rev 623, 624-27 (1980); Mahoney, 90 MichL Rev at 7 (cited in 
note 220). 
231 See text accompanying notes 212 and 223. 
232 Battered woman syndrome testimony is seen not only as relevant to the question of why 
the defendant did not leave, but also to the question of provocation and fear. See, for example, 
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1, 8-10 (1996) (indicating battered woman syn-
drome testimony relevant to rebut the prosecutor's argument that the threat on the day of the 
killing was no more serious than it previously had been and therefore should not have inspired 
fear of imminent danger); Brooks v State, 630 S2d 160,161-62 (Ala Crim App 1993) (recounting 
the testimony of an expert on battered woman syndrome that "[f]or a long time women who 
stayed in battering relationships were felt to be either masochistic or to be emotionally disturbed 
or else why would they stay. And the literature has not supported either of those theories. It ba-
sically says they stay because they are afraid."). For a general discussion, see Parrish, 11 Wise 
Women's L J at 75 (cited in note 212) (providing trend analysis on expert testimony concerning 
battered woman syndrome). 
233 See, for example, Bonner v State, 740 S2d 439,441-44 (Ala Crim App 1998) (recounting 
that "the State countered the appellant's claim of self-defense by arguing that she continued in 
the allegedly abusive relationship with the victim, thereby creating an inference that she was not 
afraid of the victim," and rejecting the state's argument); Humphrey, 921 P2d at 11 (noting that 
the state argued that the victim's threat on the day of the killing "was like so many threats be-
fore," with the implication that she had no reasonable ground for fearing imminent deadly vio-
lence; ordering the lower court to allow battered woman syndrome evidence in opposition to this 
argument); Ibn-Tamas v United States, 407 A2d 626, 633-34, 640 (DC App 1979) (stating that 
"the government implied to the jury that the logical reaction of a woman who was truly fright-
ened by her husband (let alone regularly brutalized by him) would have been to call the police 
from time to time or to leave him"; remanding for a redetermination of the admissibility of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence to rebut this proposition). 
234 See Stonehouse, 555 A2d at 781 & n 5 (noting and rejecting the prosecutor's argument 
that the defendant provoked violence by dating other men). 
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the same rule, via imminence, that they have disavowed under other 
guises? 
This is not a claim of disparate treatment or impact in the con-
ventional sense. That the law may impose on the battered woman a re-
treat rule in non-retreat jurisdictions, or embrace a variety of other 
potentially contradictory meanings, is not unique to battered woman 
cases-as we have seen, it may happen in barroom brawl cases as well. 
Moreover, I can make no claim that there is a statistically disparate 
impact of such a rule-neither I nor anyone is likely to know how of-
ten this kind of inconsistency happens in real life, as opposed to what 
happens in reported cases. Instead, this is a claim of constitutive femi-
nism-a claim that an objective inconsistency in the rules depends 
upon and thus constitutes relational inequality for women. As I show 
below, the problem for the battered woman is not simply that immi-
nence bears undeclared meaning but that its meaning may be created 
in the image of her relation to men, a relation that may become more 
powerful than the rules. 
1. A pre-retreat rule for battered women? 
It is one thing for jurors or judges to confuse imminence with 
"leaving the confrontation"; it is another to confuse it with "leaving 
the relationship." A retreat rule may require the defendant to with-
draw once the confrontation has begun,235 but a rule that demands the 
defendant "avoid the confrontation" is an entirely different require-
ment; such a "pre-retreat" rule is far more severe and, indeed, has 
never been part of standard self-defense law. There is no general duty 
to avoid violence before the confrontation.236 The man who goes for 
the fiftieth time to the violent gang-bar is not deprived of his self-
defense claim because he "should have left" before the violence 
erupted. Indeed, as one of the critics of such a rule acknowledges, the 
common law of self-defense protects the freedom to move.237 To be 
235 See LaFave, Criminal Law§ 5.7(f) at 497-99 (cited in note 6). 
236 As Richard Rosen has colorfully summarized the law: 
No matter how clear it was to Gary Cooper that somebody would end up dead if he did not 
leave before the train carrying his enemy arrived at "High Noon," our culture allows him to 
stay in town and affords him the right to kill in self-defense when the bad guys come after 
him. 
Rosen, 71 NC L Rev at 396 (cited in note 181). See, for example, State v Bristol, 53 Wyo 304,84 
P2d 757,766 (1938) (holding that the defendant had no duty to avoid entering a bar where he 
knew his adversary, who had threatened to attack him, to be drinking); Ball v State, 29 Tex App 
107, 14 SW 1012, 1013 (1890) ("Defendant's presence at the place where the killing occurred 
could not, under the circumstances, constitute provocation to the deceased."). 
237 As Andrew Ashworth has put it, American law respects the defendant's autonomy even 
to a greater degree than does British law, which excepts from a duty to avoid violence claims in 
"those cases where [the defendant] is acting lawfully in remaining at, or going to, a place." An-
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sure, the law of self-defense does reject the self-defense claims of 
those who "provoke" the violence or "create the conditions" of their 
own defense.238 The only problem is that, when applied to the relation-
ship (and not the violence), these principles create a rule that the law 
has never announced- that a defendant can be said to have "pro-
voked" a confrontation simply by "staying" -in this case, in a relation-
ship. That is a norm that courts have openly and consistently denied.239 
To say that the application of a common sense "pre-retreat" rule 
is contrary to the law of most jurisdictions is, of course, not to say that 
one might not urge one, as scholars have. Stephen Schulhofer has ar-
gued, for example, that we should ask of women why they did not 
leave.240 More generally, Andrew Ashworth has argued that avoidance 
of violence should be the proper norm for all cases, although he ac-
knowledges that this is not the rule in America where the law of self-
defense has always jealously protected. the defendant's autonomy.241 
One need not resolve that question (a deep one about the theory of 
necessity) to argue that there may be a problem with applying an im-
plied "pre-retreat" rule in battered woman cases if American law does 
not apply that rule to the man in the dangerous bar or neighborhood. 
To ask of battered women that they leave-in whatever doctrinal 
guise (imminence, retreat, threat, etc.)-raises serious questions about 
whether the law of self-defense treats battered women less favorably 
than others. 
2. Seeing confrontational cases as confrontational. 
The argument is really deeper, however, than whether the rules 
are consistent, or whether objectivity predicts differential treatment. It 
is a question in the end of practice-of what happens before the rules, 
what happens in our images of life that makes us apply one rule rather 
drew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 119 (Clarendon 1991 ). 
238 Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses§ 131(b) at 74 (cited in note 38). 
239 See, for example, Commonwealth v Watson, 494 Pa 467, 431 A2d 949, 951-52 (1981) 
(stating that "[a] woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, 
by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their children, consent to 
or assume the risk of further abuse"). See text accompanying note 223 (discussing battered 
woman syndrome's rebuttal of the stereotype that women are masochistic or must leave to be 
believed). 
240 Schulhofer, 7 Soc Phil & Pol at 128-29 (cited in note 180) ("[W]e cannot forgo all pun-
ishment if the circumstances afforded the [abused] woman some alternative .... Conviction and 
some punishment remain appropriate so long as the social and economic circumstances ... did 
afford some reasonable alternative to the use of deadly force."). Schulhofer does go on to note 
that "tangible barriers to flight" should be relevant to the question of a "reasonable available 
remedy" short of violence. Id at 129. 
241 See, for example, Ashworth, 34 Camb L J at 296 (cited in note 187) (urging that the de-
fendant in such situations should be made to inform the police even if that is not the prevailing 
English rule). 
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than another and recreate that life in those rules. Battered woman 
cases are in general not seen as "real fights" -it is assumed, at the 
start, that one is referring to the killing of a sleeping man."' The impor-
tant point my survey suggests is that even when the cases are confron-
tational-when the gun is pointed at her-they still are not seen as 
confrontational. Imminence is one of the ways in which the threat is 
not seen: in Watson,"' the trial court literally cannot "see" the hands 
around her neck, not because the judge has not heard the testimony, 
but because the judge implicitly places responsibility on her for those 
hands-she should have left before the hands got there.'.,.. 
Put another way, courts and commentators have trouble seeing 
confrontational cases as confrontational because of their normative 
assumptions about what the parties' relationship entails; the structure 
of the parties' relation determines the post hoc view, the "objective" 
view of not only the temporal transaction but also its confrontational 
character. When the gun is pointed at the male defendant in the bar, 
there is an imminent confrontation; when it is pointed at Barbara 
Stonehouse, who was stalked by an ex-boyfriend, there is a question 
about whether the threat was imminent and serious."' Similarly, when 
the beer bottle is about to be thrown after a barroom brawl, few doubt 
that a self-defense instruction is appropriate. But when it is about to 
be thrown at Betty Hundley by the husband from whom she fled, the 
court talks of imminence and the dissenting judge insists she could 
have had a five-minute "head start.""" 
The point is that the norms of the relation are more powerful 
than the law in shaping our intuitions about self-defense cases.'"' Im-
minence and confrontation are concepts formed in the image of social, 
pre-legal, norms about the relative responsibility of the parties. Di-
vorced from their relational context, the battered woman cases look 
242 See notes S, 30. See also text accompanying note 30 (discussing the assumptions of 
scholars that most battered woman cases do not fall into the standard self-defense paradigm). 
243 494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949 (1981). 
244 To say that the victim needed to leave before the hands were around her neck opens the 
time frame to the past-away from the confrontation. The judge in Watson cannot "see" that 
there is a confrontation because he has judged fault from a perspective that has projected the 
self-defense claim back into the history of the relationship. She was at fault for hours, days, and 
weeks before the hands were around her neck. Here, time-framing is a function of social 
norms-we look back because we believe that she is somehow responsible for the relationship. 
245 Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 521 Pa 41, 555 A2d 772,780,783 (1989). See note 147. 
246 State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461,693 P2d 475,478-80 (1985). Id at 481 (McFarland dissent-
ing). 
247 Here is the intellectual progression: The judge says that the defendant has no claim of 
self-defense because of the "objective'' requirement of "imminence." But it turns out that by 
"imminence" he cannot mean time, because the hands are around her neck. It turns out that im-
minence means for him that she "had alternatives." Her response was not "necessary," where ne-
cessity and imminence, and its objectivity, are all constructed, and completed, by an unacknow-
ledged claim that women need to leave-a pre-retreat rule. 
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very much like the male cases- they are cases· of weak threats in a 
violent context. The defendant says that there was a "glint" of a gun, 
or it looked like the victim was reaching for a gun, or the victim's 
hands were raised as if to attack.248 Surely, the man who claims that he 
heard a rustle in the bushes outside his cabin has a weak self -defense 
claim.249 But few say, automatically, that he could have had a five-
minute head start, or that he should never have bought the house in 
such an isolated spot. Even fewer say that to grant a self-defense 
instruction in his case is to risk the downfall of the criminal law. In the 
end, the battered woman cases tell us that it is her relationship to the 
victim that may be the most powerful influence, affecting whether we 
see the threat as imminent, the case as confrontational, or her re-
sponse as necessary. Put another way, it is her relation that silently 
completes the law's claimed objectivity. 
C. Battered Woman Syndrome 
If I am right, then the arguments for battered women cannot sim-
ply be dismissed as claims for "subjectivity" or "special treatment." 
Critics will respond that objectivity cannot account for battered 
woman syndrome evidence-evidence that is synonymous, for many, 
with increased "subjectivity" in the law. I believe there is good reason 
to reach just the opposite conclusion, that syndrome evidence is not 
the enemy, but the essential ally, of an "objective" law of self-defense. 
If that is true, then traditionalists may need to reexamine whether 
their fears of the syndrome may well be exaggerated, and subjectivists 
need to examine whether the argument of subjectivity is really too 
weak a defense of the normative propositions contained in the syn-
drome. 
Scholars, writing for both academic and popular audiences, have 
reviled the syndrome, urging that it lacks scientific validity and wreaks 
havoc with the law of self-defense.250 And yet battered woman syn-
248 See, for example, State v Fuller, 297 SC 440,377 SE2d 328,331 (1989) (reversing for fail-
ure to instruct that the defendant could have acted in self-defense based on the fact that he saw 
the victims "open the trunk of their car and also thought he saw a shiny object in Dixon's hand"). 
See also People v Spencer, 51 Cal App 4th 1208, 1216 (1996) (describing the claim that the defen-
dant shot when the victim "reach[ ed] down to the floorboard of the car"; defendant convicted of 
voluntary manslaughter). 
249 State v Negrin, 37 Wash App 516,681 P2d 1287, 1290 (1984) (describing claim in which 
defendant shoots into woods because he hears noise). 
250 See, for example, Wilson, Moral Judgment at 48-58 (cited in note 3) (arguing that expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome is replacing individual accountability). See also 
Faigman, Note, 72 VaL Rev 619,631-40 (cited in note 30) (stating that battered woman defen-
dants "seek to stretch self-defense doctrine's imminence requirement almost to infinity" and 
criticizing the scientific methodology of Lenore Walker's research on battered woman syn-
drome). 
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drome testimony is widely accepted across the nation."' Indeed, courts 
in many jurisdictions have applied syndrome evidence to a wide array 
of claims-claims of siblings and children, and the odd battered 
male.252 Whether those rulings are correct, they exist and are not par-
ticularly controversial for courts, raising the question why courts (not 
typically dominated by radical feminists or subjectivists) have been so 
welcoming to the syndrome, while the critics remain so insistent that 
the syndrome is not only bad science but also bad law.253 
I think some explanation can be found for this by recognizing, at 
the start, how conventional the syndrome is (something its critics rec-
ognize, I believe). But, to do that, one must first put claims of psychol-
ogy and cycles aside. As its earliest advocates have told us, efforts to 
inject battered woman syndrome into criminal trials sought to tell a 
different normative tale than the one society had long used to under-
stand this kind of violence. In the form of a description about battered 
women, the syndrome really offers reasons why the law should not 
blame women for the battering. It tells us that women who suffer prior 
threats are likely to suffer future violence, implying that we should be-
lieve her when she claims the threat was serious. It tells us that women 
are not masochistic, implying that women should not be assumed to 
have provoked the violence. It tells us that women are attuned to 
threats, implying that the threats are real and well understood. It tells 
us that women are afraid, implying that they did not act out of re-
venge. It tells us that it is very difficult to leave, implying that women 
should not be blamed for failing to leave.254 
251 See note 212. 
252 See, for example, People v Colberg, 182 Mise 2d 798,701 NYS2d 608,608-10 (County Ct 
1999) (holding battered person syndrome evidence admissible in case of father accused of mur· 
dering adult son); State v Nemeth, 82 Ohio St 3d 202,694 NE2d 1332, 1334 (1998) (finding bat-
tered child syndrome evidence admissible in case of child accused of murdering parent); State v 
Janes, 121 Wash 2d 220,850 P2d 495, 501--{)3 (1993) (same); Commonwealth v Kacsmar, 421 Pa 
Super 64,617 A2d 725,730-33 (1992) (holding battered person syndrome evidence admissible in 
case of fratricide), disapproved in part on other grounds, Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Super 
297,634 A2d 614 (1993). 
253 See Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 75 (cited in note 4) (claiming that the syn-
drome is bad science);Wilson, Moral Judgment at 58 (cited in note 3) (stating that the syndrome 
is unnecessary); Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 571 (cited in note 2) (stating that the syndrome is 
inconsistent with the question of justification). Of course, as a legal matter, there is no separate 
"battered woman" defense. Or, at least, courts continually so state. See, for example, State v Koss, 
49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,974 (1990) ("Thus, admission of expert testimony regarding the 
battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or justification. Rather. it is to assist 
the trier of fact [in determining] whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm."). 
254 Even those who reject the syndrome acknowledge that the cycle theory addresses "es-
sential aspects of the law of self-defense," including "the defendant's knowledge of the aggres-
sor's history of violence," the "reasonableness of the amount of force used," her "perception of 
harm," and "why battered women fail to leave violent relationships." Faigman and Wright, 39 
Ariz L Rev at 73,75 (cited in note 4). 
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If we reduce the syndrome testimony to the normative proposi-
tions associated with these descriptions-if for example, we imagine 
them to be jury instructions rather than expert testimony25'-then the 
syndrome is consistent with some very standard propositions in the 
law of self-defense, so standard, they could all be supported by nine-
teenth-century law citations. Take, for example, the proposition that 
prior threats and violence increase the credibility of a claim of future 
violence. Since the nineteenth century, past threats and violence, in-
cluding the victim's character for violence, have been considered 
highly relevant to a claim of self-defense, on questions of imminence 
and aggression, and the nature of the threat.256 Or consider the propo-
sition that a woman's claims should be judged from her position, ac-
cording to her situation. In 1888, courts would charge juries that the 
reasonable person is not to be judged by some "ideal" standard but 
that the members of the jury were to put themselves "in the position 
of the assailed person, with his physical and mental equipment, sur-
rounded with the circumstances and exposed to the influences with 
which he was surrounded, and to which he was exposed at the time."257 
255 I make absolutely no claim about the psychological validity of the syndrome; my claim is 
purely based on its normative propositions. 
256 See, for example, Allison v United States, 160 US 203,215 (1895): 
Here the threats were recent and were communicated, and were admissible in evidence as 
relevant to the question whether defendant had reasonable cause to apprehend an attack, 
fatal to life or fraught with great bodily injury, and hence was justified in acting on a hostile 
demonstration and one of much less pronounced character than if such threats had not pre-
ceded it. They were relevant because indicating cause for apprehension of danger and rea-
son for promptness to repel attack. 
See also People v Thomson, 92 Cal506, 28 P 589,590 (1891): 
Under these circumstances, all the acts and conduct of the deceased, either in the nature of 
overt acts of hostility, or threats communicated or uncommunicated, were proper evidence 
to be considered by the jury as shedding light-to some extent at least-upon the issue as 
to whether the deceased or the defendant was the aggressor in this fatal affray. These prin-
ciples are elementary in criminal law, and a citation of authorities not demanded. 
See also Marts v State, 26 Ohio St 162, 168 (1875) ("[T]he court erred in ruling out the evidence 
of the violent, vicious, and dangerous character of the deceased.") (emphasis added). 
257 The court charged the jury that in determining whether the defendant's apprehension of 
imminent death or grievous bodily harm was reasonable, the "jury are not to conceive of some 
ideally reasonable person." United States v King, 34 F 302,309 (ED NY 1888) (emphasis added). 
See also United States v Lewis, 111 F 630, 636 (W D Tex 1901) (employing very similar language); 
Carleton v State, 43 Neb 373, 61 NW 699, 710 (1895) (instructing the jury to ask, "What would a 
reasonable person, a person of ordinary caution, judgment, and observation, in the position of 
defendant, seeing what he saw and knowing what he knew, suppose from this situation and these 
surroundings?"); People v Bruggy, 93 Cal 476, 29 P 26, 27 (1892) ("The rule in such a case is this: 
What would a reasonable person,-a person with ordinary caution, judgment, and observation-
in the position of the defendant, seeing what he saw, and knowing what he knew, suppose from his 
situation and his surroundings?") (emphasis added); People v lams, 57 Call15, 119 (1880) ("The 
rule in such cases is this, What would a reasonable person-a person of ordinary caution, judg-
ment, and observation- in the position of the defendant, seeing what he saw, and knowing what 
he knew, supposed from this situation and these surroundings?") (emphasis added). 
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Consider the claim that it is the defendant's perception or perspective 
that counts rather than the actual threat. It was well-established in the 
nineteenth century that the defendant's perception of the victim's 
threat (what is today called the "subjective" perception), rather than 
an actual threat, was sufficient to establish self-defense if the percep-
tion was reasonable (indeed, this was and still is known as the "ap-
pearances" rule).258 Finally, it was assumed that one does not automati-
cally provoke an incident or become an aggressor by walking into a 
dangerous situation or staying in a dangerous place-whether that 
dangerous situation is a barroom brawl or a shootout."• 
I am not arguing that battered woman syndrome is unnecessary 
because it fits so clearly with existing self-defense law. I am question-
ing why battered woman syndrome has gotten so many scholars so 
very aggravated at absurd "subjectivism," despite the fact that, from a 
doctrinal perspective, its legal tenets are so conventional. Oddly, the 
critics know of the conventionality of the legal norms of the syn-
drome; they cite this, however, as a reason to increase suspicion of the 
syndrome as trumped-up psychology. 260 The answer to that, of course, is 
simply to take off the veneer and get to the substance of the norms. 
And, if one gets there, I think it possible to make an argument-from 
traditional self-defense law itself-that something like the norms in 
battered woman syndrome testimony may be necessary to reconcile 
the law to its own aspirations. Under this reconception, the syndrome 
becomes a kind of normative equalizer, a reminder that there is no 
such thing as a "pre-retreat" rule or an "assumed-provocation" rule or 
a rule that says the victim must have left the relationship to defend 
against a knife hovering over her head. Put another way, the syndrome 
rebuts the prosecutor's arguments that she provoked the violence be-
258 King, 34 F at 309 ("If, with these tests applied ... the jury are satisfied that there was 
then an apparently imminent danger of death or grievous bodily harm to the person assailed, he 
is entitled to act upon the appearances.") (emphasis added); People v Fitchpatrick, 106 Cal286, 
39 P 605, 606 (1895) ("It was not a matter of fact, but a matter of appearance, which measured 
defendant's right of self-defense."); Bruggy, 29 Pat 29 ("the right of the defendant to act upon 
appearances was fully and clearly stated to the jury by the court. The doctrine of apparent dan-
ger was repeatedly explained to the jury."); Maher v People, 24 Ill241, 243 (1860) ("This court ... 
[has previously) held that a person when threatened with danger, must determine from the ap-
pearances and the surrounding circumstances as to the necessity of resorting to self-defense.") 
(citation omitted). 
259 See, for example, Ball v State, 29 Tex App 107, 14 SW 1012, 1013 (1890) ("Defendant's 
presence at the place where the killing occurred could not, under the circumstances, constitute 
provocation to the deceased."). See also State v Bristol, 53 Wyo 304,84 P2d 757,766 (1938) (hold-
ing that the defendant had no duty to avoid entering a bar where he knew his adversary, who had 
threatened to attack him, to be drinking). 
260 See, for example, Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 88-89 (cited in note 4) ("[T)he 
syndrome so closely parallels the law of self-defense that its basic parameters appear to be con-
trolled more by legal convenience than by psychological observation or theory."). 
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cause she dated someone else,261 or that she could not have feared se-
rious violence because she weathered it before,262 or that she faced no 
imminent threat because of the "parties' relationship."263 Even if a syn-
drome may not be the preferred method of addressing these problems, 
it is at least some protection against applying rules to battered women 
that do not apply outside intimate relationships. 
Rethinking the syndrome as a set of relatively innocuous and per-
haps necessary normative propositions may explain the odd status of 
the syndrome-controversial among academics because of its "bad" 
science, but readily embraced by politicians and judges. At the same 
time, however, it also raises serious questions about the intemperate 
claims made by some scholars. It is no exaggeration to say that some 
have suggested that battered woman syndrome will bring down the 
criminal law in its entirety.264 But if one can find reasons to support the 
syndrome's norms within traditional self-defense law, then opposition 
toward it takes on a different, and more suspiciously anti-feminist, 
character. Indeed, feminists must wonder whether all the controversy 
is about making women's claims of subjectivity strange and political so 
that men's claims of subjectivity may appear normal and uncontest-
able. 
D. Subjectivity and the State 
One of the deepest oddities in all the apparent concern about 
subjective defenses is that the objection is something of a phantom 
when it comes to self-defense law. There is no jurisdiction in the 
United States that adopts a purely subjective self-defense standard 
(for women or anyone else).265 Indeed, there are other defenses with 
261 Stonehouse, 555 A2d at 781 n 5. 
262 Humphrey, 921 P2d at 11. 
263 Watson,431 A2d at 951. 
264 See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 45-47 (cited in note 3) (charging that battered woman 
syndrome "began" the abuse excuse and that the "abuse excuse poses real dangers to our safety 
and to the integrity of our legal system"). See also id at 5 (suggesting that battered woman non-
confrontational claims are vigilantism that "sow[] the seeds of anarchy and wrongdoing"). 
265 Even in State v Wanrow, the case frequently cited as involving a "subjective" standard, 
the court adopted, by quoting, a rule from a 1926 case that required the honest beliefs of "rea-
sonably and ordinarily cautious and prudent men." 88 Wise 2d 221,559 P2d 548,558 (1977), quot-
ing State v Miller, 141 Wise 104,250 P 645,645 (1926). A purely subjective standard would, pre-
sumably, excuse a defendant based on her own fears (whether or not the fear was reasonable), 
and without respect to the crime charged. Although treatises, see LaFave and Scott, Criminal 
Law§ 5.7(c) at 494 (cited in note 6) sometimes suggest that there are a few "subjective" jurisdic-
tions, the typical citation is to the Model Penal Code formulation which, in fact, includes a rea-
sonableness qualifier. MPC § 3.04 provides a defense that is based on the subjective belief of the 
defendant, but takes back that subjectivity with a qualifier that eliminates a complete defense if 
the defendant's subjective belief was unreasonable. See MPC § 3.09. Even if the defendant be-
lieves that self-defense was necessary, under MPC § 3.04, he is not entitled to a complete defense 
if his belief in the necessity of self-defense was reckless or negligent under MPC § 3.09; instead, 
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far greater claims to nearly complete subjectification -defenses about 
which few have complained."'" It is widely accepted, for example, that a 
man who kills his wife in a "heat of passion" deserves to have his sub-
jectivity considered favorably. As I have written elsewhere, if one is 
concerned with subjectivity, then one's first target as an "abuse ex-
cuse" should be the provocation defense.267 The only problem is that 
standard criminal law scholarship has defended, or at least assumed as 
natural, the emotional subjectivity of men who kill because their wives 
cheat or leave them.'68 
The claim against subjectivity typically made by the objectivist-
that it contradicts established law-simply dissolves once we consider 
provocation. Writing (quite sympathetically) of the disturbing events 
that led Judy Norman to kill her husband, George Fletcher complains 
that Norman "put herself in the position of judge and executioner," 
imposing a "death penalty" that no authority would have imposed. He 
concludes: "there may be justice in his dying, but it is not a form of jus-
tice that the legal system can readily accommodate."'69 The very same 
arguments, however, might be said of Kenneth Peacock.270 When Ken-
neth Peacock found his wife in bed with another man, he got his shot-
gun and scared his rival off; several hours and a gallon of wine later, 
Peacock shot and killed his wife. Certainly, Peacock acted as "judge 
and executioner." We could insist, with even more fervor than 
Fletcher, that one does not deserve the death penalty for having sex 
with another. The only thing that we could not conclude is that the le-
gal system cannot readily accommodate this kind of justice: provoca-
tion claims of Peacock's variety are an everyday affair, sanctioned in 
many states and by the criminal law academy."' Subjectivity is neither 
new nor foreign to what most consider well-established and, for that 
reason, "objective" criminal law. 
he may be convicted of a lesser crime, equivalent to his level of mistake. 
266 I refer, in particular, here to the Model Penal Code's version of the provocation defense. 
See MPC § 210.3 cmt 3. See also Nourse, 106 Yale L J at 1339-40 (cited in note 85) (explaining 
that the Code drafters "created a defense remarkably sensitive to context and the defendant's 
peculiar perspective"). 
267 V.F. Nourse, The New Normativity, 50 Stan L Rev 1435, 1453 (1998) (noting that provo-
cation cases cast doubt on the argument that women's claims promote abuse excuses). 
268 Nourse, 106 Yale L J at 1364-65 (cited in note 86). 
269 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2). 
270 See Karl Vick, Md. Judge Taking Heat in Cuckolded Killer Case, Wash Post A1 (Oct 30, 
1994). To the judge assigned to this case, there was no question that Peacock suffered an ade-
quate provocation resulting in "uncontrollable" rage: he sentenced Peacock to eighteen months 
to be served on work release, based on a plea of voluntary manslaughter. See Ann G. Sjoerdsma, 
Justice: 18 Months for a Wifes Life, Chi Trib 21 (Nov 14, 1994) ("Within two weeks of sentencing, 
the man is back on the road, driving his rig."). See also Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Ac-
counting for Judges, 58 Alb L Rev 1063, 1063-M (1995) (discussing Judge Cahill's sentence in the 
Peacock case). 
271 Here, I refer to claims of provocation based on infidelity. 
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My argument is not tit-for-tat. Indeed, I have some sympathy with 
the notion that, in a confessional age, subjectivity quickly occludes 
grave wrongs. What I am insisting upon is a completion of what per-
sons mean by "objectivity." In the Watson and Peacock cases, it is 
rather easy to see that "time" is more than an objective reference to 
the clock, that, instead, it absorbs beliefs about the normal obligations 
of intimate partners. The Watson trial judge applied an objective 
rule-imminence-but meant that a woman should leave. The Pea-
cock trial judge applied an objective rule- a continuous passion- but 
meant that it was not "right" to let women go unpunished for affairs. 
Curiously, these meanings are openly disavowed by the law-the law 
does not punish women for having affairs and loudly announces that 
we should not ask why she did not leave. 
Unfortunately, there is a good deal at stake in this kind of 
claimed objectivity. This is not about two cases with bad judges but 
something a bit larger; it is about how the criminal law constitutes us 
and our relationship to the political order. Deeply held views about 
women and their relationships to men as well as their position as citi-
zens reside in the criminal law. As I have argued above, every claim of 
defense is a claim not only between victim and defendant but also be-
tween the defendant and the state (was she a vigilante, a traitor to the 
law, an aristocrat reenacting her superiority?). When, in Watson, the 
trial court bars the woman's defense because she had the time to 
leave, this is not only a claim that she should have left her husband, 
but also that she failed to defer properly to the state (by choosing law-
ful alternatives).212 Similarly, the judgment of the court in Peacock is 
not only that he was "right" to punish his wife but that he was right-
did not offend the state-by "taking the law into his own hands."273 
Watson is a traitor and Peacock is a loyalist because the state meas-
ures allegiance by reference to relational norms. The common law's 
overt judgment that a woman who kills her husband is fully traitor-
ous,274 and a man who kills to defend his marriage is partly patriot, re-
272 One might complain that the Watson and Peacock cases are not comparable because 
Watson involved self-defense (a full defense) and Peacock involved provocation (a partial de-
fense). This difference does not change the claims made in this paragraph. My argument still 
holds if we imagine that both claims were partial defenses. 
273 According to an article quoting the transcript of proceedings, the trial judge, in sentenc-
ing Peacock, stated that "the most difficult thing that a judge is called upon to do ... is sentenc-
ing noncriminals as criminals ... I seriously wonder how many married men, married five years 
or four years would have the strength to walk away, but without inflicting some corporal pun-
ishment." Schafran,58 Alb L Rev at 1063-64 (cited in note 270). 
274 According to Blackstone, a wife who killed her husband was guilty of petit treason and 
subject to be drawn and burned (rather than hanged as might a man who killed a stranger). See 
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *203-04 (cited in note 49). If a husband killed because provoked 
by infidelity, and thus to defend or avenge his marriage, the crime was not murder, but 
manslaughter. Id at *191-92: 
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mains two hundred years later. Time transforms self-defense into a 
woman's treason; man remains aligned with the state.275 Blackstone: 
meet Catharine MacKinnon. 
If what is wrong with the law, for women, is the law's lack of sen-
sitivity, its failure to sympathize, women's claims may be true but they 
will fail to persuade. If subjectivity simply means that "my view counts, 
yours doesn't," it is as intolerant as an empty objectivity; it can never 
go beyond an "apprehension of the world as self-evident"276 and risks 
becoming the privileged knowledge of a special body of the clairvoy-
ant. It is not sympathy that is required but humility (from both men 
and women), a recognition of the ways in which the law absorbs and 
constitutes popular norms that it does not disclose and may even dis-
avow. 
V. WHYDOWETALKTHISWAY? 
If there is a grammar of argumentation in criminal law, it is a 
grammar dominated by the "objective" and "subjective." It is not only 
that the current debate about self-defense is created in its mirror; it is 
negligence and provocation, necessity and duress, that are shaped by 
the demands of this opposition. The ideas of objectivity and subjectiv-
ity are pervasive and yet inarticulate. Most people assume vaguely 
that a subjective standard is the more progressive and an objective 
one the more conservative. But this overtly political consensus is a 
fragile one and has increasingly led to heated debates in which other-
wise polite scholars have been left trading insults. In the end, I suggest 
in this Part that we might be better off jettisoning this discourse. Put 
another way, it is time to stop blaming the downfall of the criminal law 
on subjectivity and the battered woman; she has not created new 
So if a man takes another in the act of adultery with his wife, and kills him directly upon the 
spot ... it is manslaughter. It is however the lowest degree of it; and therefore in such a case 
the court directed the burning in the hand to be gently inflicted because there could not be 
a greater provocation. 
As one of Blackstone's nineteenth-century editors put it, with regard to these rules, "it is difficult 
to find any substantial grounds upon which to support Blackstone's conclusion that the female 
sex is a favorite of our laws." J.F. Hargrave, ed, William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws 
of England *445 n 27 (Harper & Bros 1859). 
275 If Peacock committed premeditated homicide, the verdict was too compassionate; he 
was guilty of murder, not manslaughter. If Watson acted in self-defense, her trial court sentence 
of manslaughter was too harsh; she deserved acquittal. Moreover, the separate sets of rules that 
make this possible suspiciously parallel the situations in which men and women are, in fact, likely 
to kill: men tend to kill their spouses in situations where the spouse leaves or is unfaithful; 
women tend to kill their spouses in cases of physical violence. See Nourse, 106 Yale L J at 1342-
52 (cited in note 86) (explaining various statistical claims concerning this basic difference). 
276 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice at 25 (cited in note 1). 
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problems, but simply reminded us of the importance of resolving old 
controversies. 
A. Confounding the Standard Distinctions 
Let us start by asking whether we really have a good idea of what 
the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity means. If these are 
taken as evaluative positions (subjective is bad, objective is good), 
then the distinction raises some obvious problems. One set of critics, 
the conservative ones, seems to believe that subjectivity is bad because 
it departs from good old-fashioned standards. The only problem is that 
good old-fashioned criminal law includes subjectivity; indeed, it has 
revered the subjectivity of defenses like provocation.277 Another set of 
critics, generally the liberal ones, complains that feminists have un-
dermined liberalism's aim to protect defendants by taking the law too 
far, pushing the law to embrace absurd and abusive defenses.278 The 
only problem is that the syndrome gains legitimacy because it relies 
upon the traditional liberal emphasis on defendant-friendly individua-
tion. 
The distinction between objectivity and subjectivity fares little 
better at an analytic levee7• My survey was intended to be something 
of a test of the distinction. And, indeed, my hypothesis was borne out. 
What seems uncontestable and empirical, the clock, becomes ques-
tionable and normative (should Mrs. Watson have left?). What seems 
nondiscretionary and relatively determined becomes discretionary: we 
find that imminence chooses among possible meanings. What seems 
contextless turns out to depend upon context: imminence is structured 
by our assumptions about social relationships. What should be exter-
nal may refer to the classically internal, the defendant's mental state 
(fear), and what seems so internal, a subjective standard, might actu-
ally be judged by the external rule-like criteria embedded in social 
norms. 
Nor, in the end-and this may be the most important point-does 
the objectivity/subjectivity distinction work at a doctrinal level. It is an 
open secret that courts adopt a self-defense standard that is both ob-
jective and subjective; as a doctrinal matter, then, there simply is no 
debate, except at the margins. Humor me: perform a simple test. Open 
up a self-defense case using objectivity and subjectivity to describe 
277 See Nourse, 50 Stan L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 267). 
278 See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 45 (cited in note 3) (asserting that the abuse excuse 
"all began" with battered woman syndrome). 
279 The standard for the analytic difference I use is taken from Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 
164 (Princeton 1987) (positing three senses of objective as "(1) external as opposed to phenome-
nological or internal; (2) empirical as opposed to normative; or (3) standardized as opposed to 
individualized"). 
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self-defense law. Now black out those adjectives.""" You will probably 
be left with a better text and nothing will have been lost. The law can 
still speak of state of mind and conduct, it can even speak of the rea-
sonable person and her perceptions, it can apply the age-old "appear-
ances" test in self-ddense, and announce the proper rules of aggres-
sion and proportionality.28' History makes it quite clear that the law of 
self-defense does not need the discourse of subjectivity for any of that. 
B. History: Of Norms and Mind 
We can and have lived with reasonable persons and their percep-
tions in the law of self-defense and elsewhere for a good long time, 
centuries indeed. But there has been a change in how we talk about 
them. Open a casebook or a treatise before 1960 and there will be no 
emphasis on objectivity and subjectivity. Yes, the reasonable man will 
appear and we will call him reasonable because of both his conduct 
and his state of mind, but there will be none of the discussion, in older 
materials, about how to frame discussions about everything from neg-
ligence to self-defense in terms of objectivity and subjectivity. Indeed, 
it almost appears, today, as if objectivity and subjectivity have come to 
substitute for the content of the criminal law. But they are a very poor 
substitute. 
History, more than anything else, helps to explain the discourse of 
subjectivity and objectivity. The debate hails from a particular time 
280 I began this Article, in its doctrinal section, with State v Bellino, 31 Conn App 385,625 
A2d 1381 (1993), a typical appellate decision whose discussion of objectivity and subjectivity 
bears up quite well despite these excisions. Here is an excerpt from the decision: 
The trial court began its self-defense charge by providing the jury with an almost verbatim 
recitation of General Statutes§ 53a-19(a). This language, like that of the statute, sets forth 
the appropriate subjective-objective test for evaluating the defendant's belief concerning 
the danger he was facing. Immediately thereafter, the court provided the jury with addi-
tional guidance on the objective part of its inquiry by explaining how the jury would have 
to determine whether the defendant's belief was a reasonable one. The court necessarily 
referenced the objective, reasonable person at this stage of the instructions. 
Id at 1385-86 (citation omitted). If we eliminate the references to "subjective" and "objective," 
we have the following: 
The trial court began its self-defense charge by providing the jury with an almost verbatim 
recitation of General Statutes§ 53a-19(a). This language, like that of the statute, sets forth 
the appropriate [ J test for evaluating the defendant's belief concerning the danger he was 
facing. Immediately thereafter, the court provided the jury with additional guidance on [an-
other] part of its inquiry by explaining how the jury would have to determine whether the 
defendant's belief was a reasonable one. The court necessarily referenced the [ J reasonable 
person at this stage of the instructions. 
281 The opposition of objectivity and subjectivity, to the extent that it focuses on the reason-
able man, mistakes an evaluative claim for an epistemological procedure. The reasonable man is 
a way of reasoning that unifies conduct standards with particular situations. It is an intellectual 
procedure (much like the Rawlsian original position) in which we imagine ourselves reflectively 
alternating between the defendant's position and that of his fellow citizen. 
2001) Self-Defense and Subjectivity 1297 
and place and has a particular problem of law in mind. Once upon a 
time (in the late nineteenth century), the deep normative question of 
self-defense-whether and how much pacifism the law must require-
was explicitly before the Supreme Court of the United States.282 Justice 
Holmes, ever the advocate of the objective criminal law, easily side-
stepped the question.283 Refusing to decide whether retreat was re-
quired,284 Holmes, in one of his more famous passages, concluded that 
"[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an up-
lifted knife."285 With this move, Justice Holmes transformed the social 
and political question of necessity into a question of imminence and 
voluntariness, leaving retreat rules dangling and the basic question of 
necessity unanswered.286 
Holmes's intellectual move-transforming a question of norm 
into one of mind-is not unique to self-defense. It is a strategy 
adopted by Herbert Wechsler and embodied over and over in the 
Model Penal Code. Consider the Model Penal Code's approach to-
ward self-defense and imminence. Rather than eliminating the refer-
282 The parties' arguments in Brown v United States, 256 US 335 (1921), put the retreat 
question quite clearly to the Supreme Court. See id at 336-37 (arguing on behalf of petitioner 
that there was no duty of retreat at common law for a justifiable homicide-where one was felo-
niously attacked). See also id at 337-38 (arguing on behalf of the government that "[t)he com-
mon law never recognized two species of homicide in self-defense, one justifiable and the other 
excusable; one dispensing with avoidance of, or retreat from, an assault with a deadly weapon, 
the other requiring it"). 
283 ld at 343. Holmes was not alone in this of course. During the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the term "imminence" takes on importance in courts' attempts to avoid there-
treat issue. At common law, the defense of "prevention of a felony" did not require retreat; se de-
fendendo did. Faced with two apparently conflicting common law rules-retreat or no retreat-
at least some courts found in imminence the way to "resolve" the contradiction. (Note that the 
contradiction really arises from a different source-doubts about allowing individuals to "pre-
vent" a felony when there are public police forces.) If the threat was imminent, the courts rea-
soned, the retreat controversy really did not matter since the "suddenness of the attack puts him 
to the wall." People v Hecker, 109 Cal 451, 42 P 307, 313 (1895), superseded in part on other 
grounds by statute, as stated in People v Hardin, 85 Cal App 4th 625, 102 Cal Rptr 2d 262,268 
(2000). 
284 See Brown, 256 US at 343 ("It is useless to go into the developments of the law from the 
time when a man who had killed another no matter how innocently had to get his pardon, 
whether of grace or of course"-this referring, of course, to the fact that se defendendo required 
a kingly pardon not required by prevention of a felony). 
285 Id. 
286 After refusing to resolve the historical dilemma on the theory that times had changed, 
Holmes stated as follows: "Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes that 
he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his 
ground and that if he kills him he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense." ld 
(emphasis added). From there, he concluded that one presented with "an uplifted knife" should 
not be deprived of a self-defense instruction because he had failed to retreat. ld. On retreat and 
the Holmesian position, see Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev at 430 (cited in note 10) (stating that 
Holmes believed "it would [have been) a waste to punish a man for not taking flight in the face 
of deadly aggression"). 
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ence to time altogether (as the drafters had done in other places),287 
the draft code places the old imminence rule firmly within the mind of 
the defendant. Section 3.04 specifically provides a defense for those 
who honestly believe the need to use force is "immediately neces-
sary."288 Time thus depends upon a reasonable "belief in time," and 
controversies about time become controversies about the reasonable 
man and his view of time, objective or subjective. This satisfies the lib-
eral ideal of individuation by transforming all normative questions 
into questions of individual minds, but it does little to resolve the 
meaning of necessity.289 
This is but a single example of a more general trend in which the 
criminal law has sought to attain neutrality by avoiding difficult nor-
mative questions. This was also the preferred "neutral" solution pro-
vided by Wechsler's model code: the theory was that, if one drafts neu-
trallaws in abstract terms and makes them clear, then we will be pro-
tected from injustice. To talk of norms in this atmosphere was thought 
to risk imposing the unwise and unjust judgments of the community 
upon a lonely and weak individual. As George Fletcher has written, 
the Model Penal Code was an experiment in a criminal law that pur-
ports to be precise and neutral but is without content,290 a contentless-
ness driven by a naive desire to prevent injustice by positive prescrip-
tion. 
The problem is that, as feminists have exposed, the criminal law 
not only oppresses openly and in positive law, but quietly and consti-
tutively. Injustice may originate from the bottom up in the way that 
members of society treat each other and the ways in which this behav-
287 Indeed, the Model Penal Code is notable for its rather casual jettisoning of almost all of 
the common law's timing rules-in duress, necessity, and provocation. MPC § 3.02(1) (defining 
justifiable conduct as "[c]onduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil 
to himself or to another," without requiring that the harm or evil be "imminent"); MPC § 2.09 
(defining duress as an offense committed because the defendant was "coerced to do so by the 
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a per-
son of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist," without requiring 
an imminent threat); MPC § 210.3 (defining provocation without regard to "cooling time" as "ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse"). 
288 MPC § 3.04(1) ("Subject to ... Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward another 
person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the pur-
pose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present 
occasion.") (emphasis added). This self-consciously styled "subjective" provision is then modi-
fied, in later sections, by testing whether the defendant's perceptions were mistaken and, if so, 
imposing liability for the negligence or recklessness of the mistake. MPC § 3.09(2) (providing 
that if "the actor is reckless or negligent in having" the "belief' in the necessity of force de-
scribed in § 3.04, he may be prosecuted for a crime "for which recklessness or negligence ... suf-
fices to establish culpability"). 
289 This is not my characterization alone- George Fletcher would, I think, agree with me on 
this point about the strategy involved. See George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of rhe Model Penal Code, 
2 Buff Crim L R 3,14 (1998). 
290 Id at 7-10. 
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ior constructs human relationships. The criminal law theory of the past 
was obsessed with the problem of imposing state morality. What theo-
rists failed to notice was the possibility of oppression achieved by pri-
vate means sanctioned by public law. They failed to consider the pos-
sibility that, for all the worry about a misdemeanor penalty for sod-
omy, the law then and now may allow private persons to kill others for 
their homosexuality and claim, with the law's sanction, that this was 
"partially" justified. What is worse, a state that criminalizes sodomy or 
a state that allows its citizens to kill each other because they are gay? 
What is worse, a state assault law that omits explicit reference to bat-
tering, or a state that assumes that there are no hands around her 
neck? Injustice, as Judith Shklar made so clear, is as much about indif-
ference as evil. 291 
C. Protecting the Status Quo? 
If history may foretell our current obsession with subjectivity and 
objectivity, the present should tell us of the risks of this way of argu-
ing. It is not only that our arguments are incomplete-that we are ar-
guing about things we are defining quite differently, leading to inevi-
table misunderstanding. It is that, unless the argument is completed, it 
reduces to a question of power and a claim for recognition. The dis-
course of subjectivity and objectivity says most not about the law of 
self-defense or any other rule of criminal law, but about the politics of 
criminal law scholarship. It has become a fight between some scholars 
and their critics, in which each side claims that the other is guilty of 
exaggeration and partiality: a claim of power in which some voices say 
about subjectivity, "You are too soft and weak-minded to argue about 
the law," and the others say about objectivity, "You are too rigid and 
dense to see law's injustice."292 
The risk is not only that we will insult each other, but that we will 
ignore the ways in which law embraces contradiction and injustice. 
The kind of objectivity demanded by contemporary theory is doctrine-
preserving. Objectivity narrows the possibilities of argument in ways 
that make all other normative claimants appear illegitimate, as if they 
were political arguments asking for special favors (because it implic-
itly defines objectivity as existing rules).293 This not only perpetuates 
291 Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 55 (Yale 1990) ("We all tend to be passively un-
just."). 
292 Objectivity is one kind of power, subjectivity another. Objectivity is a claim of authority, 
indeed a demand of recognition that relies on its author's claimed impartiality. When one says 
that something is "subjective," one is claiming a different kind of power. One is "right" not by 
distance (as the objectivist claims) but by experience. 
293 This is the story of battered woman syndrome. The syndrome fit quite nicely with the 
ways in which liberal theory would allow normative change. And yet once this shift grew popular, 
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the kind of debates we see between feminists and their critics (people 
say the same things over and over again) but it perpetuates the con-
tentless nature of the criminal law. Everyone is all wrapped up in sec-
ond-order arguments that look "smart" because they are abstract and 
no one reads the cases any more. As a result, we know less, rather than 
more, about the meanings, social and legal, of the substantive criminal 
law. 
One might argue that the discourse of subjectivity and objectivity, 
however obfuscatory, helps to civilize our debates about self-defense 
law.294 If this is true of political argument, I am not sure it is true of le-
gal argument, which in my opinion must be open about its ontological 
normativity. The experience of the academic debate about self-defense 
has not been, in my view, civilized by the discourse of objectivity and 
subjectivity. This way of talking has not kept scholars and courts from 
arguing about protecting "executioners"; indeed, it may well have en-
couraged such claims. There is a difference between emptiness and 
tolerance. If the discourse of subjectivity and objectivity represents 
empty claims of power, then it means that we will argue at a higher, 
more politicized pitch. If, however, it aims at tolerance then we must 
give it some content. If "objectivity" and "subjectivity" are to be more 
than adjectives "without portfolio," we need to talk more, rather than 
less, about the meanings of the criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal law is not some technical arena, separated from the 
public institutions of our time; it is quintessentially public law, describ-
ing not only the relationship of citizens to each other but also their re-
lation to the state. We know this, but we simply do not think of it this 
way. We know that no government, no constitution, no separation of 
powers, can protect a state from the roving band bent on private 
vengeance. At the same time, a state that denies the opportunity for 
it took on the character of the "political." As soon as it lost its appearance as a fine respect for 
individuality and became a syndrome, the cries of special privilege came stronger and stronger. 
Put another way, the objectivity/subjectivity debate has not been kind to feminism, even though 
it has been perpetuated in part by feminists. 
294 Dan Kahan has argued, for example, that we should not be so quick to claim that all 
"norms" are worth revealing or acting upon, and that the open clash of norms may undermine 
claims to public reason. See Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev at 487--88 (cited in note 10) (discussing the 
manipulation of norms). My answer here is that this has not been the case in debates about the 
objective and subjective-these debates have increased rather than decreased battle. My more 
abstract, and more complicated answer (briefly put) is that the transparency of normativity in 
law is a different claim than the transparency of normative content; wise restraint may prevent us 
from calling each other names but, in the end, claims denying that the character of an argument 
is normative (rather than factual) a claim of power with false intellectual pretenses. It is one 
thing to talk "deterrence," to keep us all in the same room. It is another to claim, and insist, that 
deterrence is a question of verifiable fact. 
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self-defense, that asks its citizens to die rather than protect themselves, 
recreates the very same fears that citizens will become the slavish vic-
tims of the strong. When critics call Mrs. Norman an executioner, they 
are calling her a traitor, telling us that she has acted above the law; 
they are making, in other words, a classic political argument about the 
failings of citizens and their relation to the state. If one were arguing 
politics, the proper response would be to point to Mrs. Watson and ask 
whether she was a patriot to stand before an uplifted knife and risk 
death or imprisonment for a country that has historically failed to pro-
tect her. As lawyers and legal scholars, however, these arguments are 
unlikely to get us much of anywhere. Ours is the responsibility to ex-
plain, in tempered terms, what we mean about how the law of self-
defense constructs our relations to each other and the state, to civilize 
this discourse of necessity by something better, and more articulate, 
than irritated claims of "subjectivity." In a world in which more and 
more are investing in the power of the criminal law to determine pub-
lic morality, we should take care that people may be listening. 
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APPENDIX:.METHODOLOGY 
The survey was conducted in two phases after an initial pilot 
search.""' The first phase focused on decisions in which the term "im-
minen!" appeared at least five times (the "multi-hit" phase).296 The 
second phase focused on "single-hit" cases, in which the term "immi-
nen!" might appear only once (the "single-hit" phase). The numbers 
that appear in the text combined phases one and two, which should 
represent, as nearly as possible, a universe of trial and appellate opin-
ions on homicide and self-defense in which imminence appears as a 
legal issue covering the years from 1979 to 1999. The same search was 
conducted for both phases; the multi-hit phase was conducted in the 
stand-alone LEXIS database; the single-hit phase was conducted using 
Lexis.com. 297 
A. General Terms of the Survey 
1. Cases outside the scope of the search. 
Because LEXIS searches for words, it often brings up cases that 
are irrelevant to the inquiry but, for fortuitous reasons, involve the 
search terms. This requires an initial inquiry as to whether the case is 
within the scope of the study. For example, this search brought up civil 
cases as well as criminal cases that ranged from "fighting words" to la-
bor strikes to abortion clinic boycotts. 
295 The pilot search experimented with various combinations of words to avoid the "over 
1000 case" message on LEXIS in the state courts database. The pilot phase began with a search 
from 1988 onward ("at15(imminen!) and date( aft 1988) and "self-defense") that was found to in-
clude many irrelevant cases because it included assaults, etc. The search was refined to eliminate 
anything except homicide cases by adding the words ("and (homicide or murder or manslaugh-
ter)"). The search for this multi-hit phase was "at15(imminen!) and "self-defense" and (homicide 
or murder or manslaughter) and date (aft 1988)" and was conducted in the "states"/"courts" da-
tabase of the LEXIS-NEXIS stand-alone software. 
296 The initial multi-hit phase was conducted in three different date sequences. The 
"vanessa" search yielded a total of 171 cases from the years 1989 to 1999. To complete a twenty-
year period, additional searches were done to cover the years 1982 to 1988 (the "adam" 
searches) as well as to complete the years 1979 to 1982 and 1999, as the first search was done 
during that year (the completion searches). 
297 Because of changes in the Lexis.com format and the vast number of cases, the search in 
the second phase was conducted by jurisdiction in the most relevant database available. The 
search was the same ("date(aft 1978) and imminen! and "self-defense" and (homicide or murder 
or manslaughter)). I say "most relevant" database because the Lexis.com platform organizes 
state databases differently than did the LEXIS-NEXIS stand-alone software. For example, a 
search in Connecticut would be done in "CT Cases, All Courts." Other states have other varia-
tions. To the extent these databases brought up cases in "irrelevant" categories, they were simply 
eliminated in the first cut of the coding as not relevant to self-defense or homicide. 
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2. Cases unrelated to self-defense. 
Cases involving claims unrelated to self-defense were excluded as 
outside the scope of the inquiry. For example, if a case raised only is-
sues of other defenses, such as provocation or duress, it was elimi-
nated. Only if a case involved a claim of self-defense was it included 
within the scope of the search (other defenses could be raised, of 
course). It was not enough, for example, if a case involved the term 
"self-defense" but the defendant was not making a self-defense argu-
ment. "Self-defense" was defined to exclude claims based on defense 
of others, but not imperfect self-defense. 
3. Cases not involving homicide. 
To limit the search to similar doctrinal circumstances, the search 
base was further limited to cases involving homicide. That was defined 
to include any form of murder or manslaughter, including negligent 
homicide. Cases were eliminated if they involved lesser crimes, such as 
assault or mayhem. Attempted homicides, conspiracy to commit homi-
cide, and cases involving accomplice liability were also eliminated.298 
4. Cases deemed "relevant" on the question of imminence. 
Again, because LEXIS searches for word usage, a case in which 
the term "imminence" appeared would not necessarily raise an issue 
of imminence, even if the case was about self -defense in the homicide 
context. For example, it was possible that "imminence" might arise be-
cause the court was discussing the nature of self-defense in another 
context, such as evidentiary challenges that mention self-defense.29• 
Similarly, "imminence" might appear in a case because the appellate 
court cited the jury instructions and imminence was never raised again 
298 One might argue that this would eliminate nonconfrontational cases arising from 
"hired" killings and skew the nonconfrontational sample by eliminating <;ases involving battered 
women who hire others to kill. That may or may not be true depending upon the law of the juris-
diction and the way in which charges are drafted (that is, whether the defendant is charged as a 
principal or an accomplice). Moreover, it would also eliminate any case involving a man who 
hired another to kill, claimed self-defense, and was charged as an accomplice. In fact, my survey 
did include cases involving battered women who hired others to kill. See, for example, People v 
Yaklich, 833 P2d 758,760 (Colo App 1991) (holding that a self-defense instruction was not avail-
able in a contract-for-hire situation). I know of only one case involving a battered woman that 
was eliminated on this basis-it was a case, involving the killing of a sleeping man, in which it 
was unclear whether the defendant acted as principal or accomplice. The issue on appeal con-
cerning imminence arose solely in the context of whether she was entitled to an instruction on 
self-defense in the context of the accomplice charge. See Springer v Commonwealth, 998 SW2d 
439, 453-54 (Ky 1999) (holding that the battered woman defendant was "entitled to instructions 
on self-protection as a defense to both the principal and accomplice theories of liability"). 
299 See, for example, People v Coad, 181 Cal App 3d 1094, 226 Cal Rptr 386, 392-93 (1986) 
(discussing imperfect self-defense in the context of a decision about the impeachment of a wit-
ness by his conviction for manslaughter) {coded as irrelevant). 
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in connection with the case. Such a case was not considered "immi-
nence-relevant." Relevance here was defined broadly, however. It was 
not necessary that the court discussed imminence at any length or 
separated imminence from other issues. 
A clearly relevant case would be one in which the court discussed 
imminence and its meaning at length or even briefly. It was also con-
sidered relevant, however, if the court discussed imminence in terms 
of other issues. For example, if a defendant argued that the jury in-
structions were too "objective" on appeal and the "objectivity" related 
to imminence, this was considered an "imminence-relevant" case. 
Similarly, if a defendant argued that he or she was entitled to expert 
testimony and the trial or appellate court found the expert testimony 
relevant-in part because of imminence-then the case was immi-
nence-relevant. Finally, a case was considered imminence-relevant re-
gardless of whether the imminence issue was resolved or simply re-
turned to the lower court. 
It is important to remember that a case did not need to address 
imminence directly in any lengthy manner to be imminence-relevant. 
Imminence might arise in the context of a discussion of the propriety 
of a question by the prosecutor, in the context of the admission of 
prior threats, or in the context of an argument about inconsistent de-
fenses. These cases, as a general rule, do not discuss imminence at any 
length. Imminence-relevant cases are clearly not limited to cases in 
which imminence is considered the central or even an important issue. 
The case might be presented in any procedural posture, including 
challenges to jury instructions, appeals of sentencing, or even an appli-
cation for witness fees. 
Finally, it should be noted that the search was focused on the 
term "imminen!" rather than "immediate." "Imminence" and "immi-
nent" are the terms typically used in the debate about self-defense and 
subjectivity. Searches for the term "immediate" proved difficult be-
cause the term bears both technical and nontechnical meanings. Inter-
estingly enough, however, some jurisdictions tend to use the terms in-
terchangeably, although this was not the intent of the Model Penal 
Code formulation from which the "immediately necessary" terms 
originate.300 Some cases from "immediately necessary" jurisdictions 
300 See, for example, State v Clifton, 880 SW2d 737,743 {Tenn Crim App 1994) (stating that 
Tennessee law provides that a person is justified in using force "when and to the degree the per-
son reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other's use or 
attempted use of unlawful force. The person must have a reasonable belief that there is an immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury."), quoting Tenn Code Ann§ 39-11-611 (1994); 
McKee v State, 785 SW2d 921, 928 (Tex App 1990) (stating the relevant self-defense question as 
whether deadly force was "immediately necessary to protect himself against the imminent com-
mission by the deceased of sexual assault"). But see MPC § 3.04 {defining permissible use of 
force in self-protection as justifiable when ''immediately necessary," as opposed to imminent). 
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appear in the dataset, although there was not complete coverage of 
states using the "immediately necessary" formulation. 
5. Confrontational coding. 
A case was coded as confrontational based on clock time and 
given the defendant's allegations or facts as presented in the opinion. 
If there were insufficient facts reported in the opinion to make an as-
sessment, the case was excluded from the survey. Cases were coded as 
confrontational based on clock time, not the nature of the threat the 
victim posed or any other circumstance. Thus, in some cases, the state's 
allegation was that the victim's actions at the time of the killing posed 
no threat. That case might still be classified as a "confrontational" case 
because the issue was not time, but quality of the threat. 
Most cases represented fairly straightforward questions on this is-
sue, although in a few cases there were doubts about the factual cir-
cumstances. These doubtful cases were coded as nonconfrontational. 
For example, in one case the defendant testified that she "could not 
remember" anything between the time of the last assault and finding 
her husband dead.301 Given the doubts about whether, taking as true 
the defendant's own allegations, there was a long or a short period of 
time, the case was classified as "nonconfrontational." Doubts were 
thus resolved against my hypothesis. 
6. Counting opinions. 
Opinions were "counted" by opinion, rather than by case, because 
the meaning of imminence might differ from opinion to opinion in a 
single case. For example, if there were two opinions in a single case, 
one by an intermediate appellate court and another by the state su-
preme court, both would be counted and coded.302 Furthermore, mean-
ings were coded wherever they appeared in the opinion, whether in 
the majority, a concurring opinion, or even a dissent. Sometimes, for 
example, imminence is not perceived as an issue by the majority; how-
ever, the dissent, which has a different view of the case, depends upon 
301 See State v Koss, 49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,971 (1990) (noting that the defendant 
could not remember anything from the time her husband hit her to hearing a noise of gurgling 
blood). 
302 In one instance, several appellate opinions in one jurisdiction were consolidated on ap-
peal in the state supreme court. The court's decision was counted as one "opinion" rather than as 
an opinion in each of the several cases it reviewed, on the theory that we were counting legal 
meanings (in this case, one opinion), rather than cases. See State v Studd, 137 Wash 2d 533, 973 
P2d 1049, 1051-54 (1999), consolidating appeals of State v Studd, 87 Wash App 385,942 P2d 985 
(1997); State v Cook, 1997 Wash App LEXIS 1145; State v Bennett, 87 Wash App 73,940 P2d 299 
(1997); State v McLoyd, 87 Wash App 66, 939 P2d 1255 (1997); State v Ameline, 1997 Wash App 
LEXIS 1187; State v Fields, 87 Wash App 57, 940 P2d 665 (1997). 
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imminence in reaching its conclusions. It would have seemed to be an 
inaccurate measure of the relevant "legal" meanings to discount the 
dissent's usage. In the interest of comprehensiveness, all opinions were 
counted. Opinions were not rejected from the sample because they 
were officially unpublished or reversed by a higher court. The point of 
this exercise was not to obtain controlling authority, but to measure 
legal meaning. Opinions at all trial and appellate levels were included 
in the survey. Finally, cases were coded without regard to the source of 
the meaning; even if a case was quoting another case, that was in-
cluded as a "meaning" of the case reviewed. 
B. Case Coding Distinctions 
What follows explains how decisions were made to determine the 
meaning of imminence. Coding in both phases was done initially by 
legal research assistants, subject to my review.""' Coding for both itera-
tions was completed in March 2000 and was reviewed again in Janu-
ary-February 2001. 
1. Threat. 
Cases classified as ones of threat were ones in which the court 
equated imminence with the severity or probability, rather than the 
timing, of the threat. A key indication here would be, for example, a 
statement that there was no imminent threat followed by a sentence in 
which the court recounts that the victim was not carrying a weapon. 
Also included in this category were claims that the use of violence by 
the defendant was disproportionate. 
2. Emotion/motive. 
Cases classified as ones of emotion or motive were typically those 
in which the claim was made that there was no imminent threat be-
cause the defendant acted not from fear, but revenge or deliberation. 
Not all references to fear or deliberation were included, but only 
those that could be directly tied to the question of imminence. In-
303 I made no attempt to assess coding error rates, nor to exclude my role in case review, for 
several reasons. First, this was a qualitative study of legal meaning, not an attempt to predict a 
particular quantitative usage of imminence in self-defense cases. Second, there were significant 
checks built into the survey in terms of the overall hypothesis (that imminence has legal meaning 
other than the clock). If the case was in fact confrontational, imminence was likely to bear some 
meaning other than the clock. Third, I sought to triangulate my research on this general hy-
pothesis, finding work in other disciplines and within the history of the criminal law to support 
my general claim that time had meaning. Finally, to assure consistency of particular meanings, I 
required coders to support their decisions by pointing to specific text in the opinion (e.g. the 
term "imminence" followed by text about a lack of a weapon). I then reviewed coding decisions 
for consistency. 
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eluded within this set of cases were claims that the defendant intended 
to kill if this was meant as a reference to deliberation.304 The term "in-
tent" itself was specifically avoided for this category because of its 
ambiguities. 
3. Perception/appearances. 
One might argue that perception, unlike emotion or threat, does 
not constitute a meaning of imminence but rather an approach or an-
gle on imminence that itself must mean time or threat. The purpose of 
this inquiry, however, was to try to see how courts treat the question of 
imminence and whether the treatment focused on time. A focus on 
perception is obviously not a focus on the clock but, instead, one that 
focuses on the defendant's mind. Perception, however, proved to be 
one of the trickiest of categories. It was not enough, for example, that 
the case simply talked about the defendant's subjectivity in connec-
tion with imminence (that might cover a healthy majority of these 
cases). Instead, cases in which imminence was categorized as a ques-
tion of perception were cases where the meaning of imminence was 
not time (the case is confrontational) but really mistake-even if the 
victim did not have a gun, the question was whether the defendant 
acted on reasonable appearances. In some of these cases, the emphasis 
on perception seemed to be closely allied to threat. For example, the 
defendant and the court appeared to be assuming that the term immi-
nence might convey the meaning of actual threat when the law only 
requires an apparent threat. Such cases differed, however, from those 
that focused on the severity of the threat, which is the standard mean-
ing of imminence (there was no gun, therefore there was no imminent 
threat). In the case of situations involving perception, the question in-
volved real versus apparent, or mistaken, threats. 
4. Alternatives. 
Cases in which imminence appeared as an alternative were cases 
in which the court found the threat not imminent because the defen-
dant had other choices-running through the bathroom door, taking 
advantage of other opportunities for escape, etc. 
5. Aggressor/provocation. 
Cases classified under the heading of aggressor or provocation 
treated imminence as encompassing the principle that one who ere-
304 See Lancaster v State, 472 S2d 363,365 (Miss 1985) ("He freely admits at this time he in-
tended to kill Deputy Kirby. Under these facts ... Lancaster had no reason to believe himself to 
be in any imminent danger."). 
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ates the conditions of the defense (provocation) or is at fault for the 
altercation (aggressor) should be denied the right of self-defense. On 
more than one occasion courts treated questions of provocation or 
aggression, instead, as questions of imminence. Imminence does not 
carry the notion of "time" in these cases but instead questions about 
the relative fault of the parties for the lethal altercation.305 
305 See Lancaster, 472 S2d at 365 ("The appellant returned now as the aggressor and, using 
the comer of his house and a refrigerator as obstructions between him and the deputy, fired 
three additional shots. ... Under these facts, a reasonable jury would not disagree that Lancaster 
had no reason to believe himself to be in any imminent danger of bodily harm or death."). 
